

POL 27

BIAFRA-NIGERIA

8/1/69

Systematic declassification review of material in this folder  
was completed by the Department of State on:

3-19-76 XTH

(Date and Reviewer's Initials)

The remaining material was declassified as of that date.

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DECLASSIFIED  
Authority VND 959503  
By MN NARA Date 10/1/03

59

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA  
147524

## OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

SECRET/EXDIS

Classification

Origin

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy LAGOS

IMMEDIATE

31 AUG 69 13 28 z

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STATE

EXDIS

(OC/T: Please repeat GENEVA 3123 Exdis to the above  
addressee.)

31 Aug 69 Biafra-Nigeria

END

ROGERS!

Drafted by: *L. Kilday* S/S-O: L. Kilday/mmt  
 Tel. Ext. 21530 Telegraphic transmission and  
 classification approved by: S/S-O: L. Kilday

FORM 8-65 DS-322  
8-65

Row

SECRET/EXDIS

Classification

0177

DECLASSIFIED  
 Authority *VND 959503*  
 By *MNARA* Date *10/5/05*

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(b)

POD 27 Biafra-Nigeria

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 781

PAGE 01 GENEVA 03123 311142

16  
ACTION SS130

INFO OCT 01 ACCO 00, SSO 00, NSCE 00, 031 W 059673

01311055Z AUG 69 ZFF4  
FM USMISSION GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000

SPECIALLY FOR GENEVA 3123

EXDIS

DEPT PASS LAGOS DELIVER 900 AM

SUBJECT NIGERIAN RELIEF CROSS RIVER TALKS

REFERENCE A) LAGOS 7872  
B) STATE 147032


1. FERGUSON CONCURS VIEWS REF (A). WILL ATTEMPT HOLD TALKS  
TOGETHER UNTIL WEDNESDAY.  
TUBBY

NOTE NOT PASSED LAGOS BY OCT

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SECRET

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
337

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S/S 8-9	Classification SECRET	
S/S-Screener 28-29-30	Post GENEVA	Dpty
S/S-S-CMS 31	Serial No. 3123	
S/S-0 11	Date 8/31/69	Dpty

PRINCIPALS	GEOGRAPHIC BUREAUS
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J/PM	OTHER AGENCIES
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S/CPR	Vice President
U/CF ✓ 14 ✓	Defense ✓ 18 ✓
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Department of State **TELEGRAM**  
XR POL 279 Biafra-Nigeria  
XR POL 27 Biafra Nigeria

SECRET 600

PAGE 01 GENEVA 03119 301910Z

53  
ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01,CCO 00,SSO 00,NSCE 00,031 W

057797

O 301845Z AUG 69 ZFF4

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2774

S E C R E T GENEVA 3119

EXDIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR FLANIGAN.

DEPT PASS ADDIS, LAGOS, LONDON, PARIS, ROME, USUN.

SUBJECT: POPE-FERGUSON AUDIENCE-SECTION 2 REFTEL

REF: ROME 5499, - 04

**ACTION COPY**

10/16/69  
b6 b7c

1. POPE NEXT TURNED SIGNIFICANCE AZIKIWE. ASKED FERGUSON IF HE HAD INFO RE MONROVIA MEETING. POPE INDICATED HE HAD NO INFO. FERGUSON REPLIED UNDERSTOOD MANY HAVE BEEN AT LEAST THREE MATTERS UNDER DISCUSSION: (A) ZIK STATEMENT ON WAR; (B) ZIK PLAN FOR SOV STYLE INTERNATIONAL REPRESENTATION, E.G., LIKE UKRAINE IN UN, AND (C) PROMISE ZIK TO RETURN LAGOS TO LIVE. FERGUSON INDICATED HIS INFO UNOFFICIAL BUT UNDERSTOOD GOWON VERY COOL TO POINT (B). POPE ASKED FERGUSON WHAT USG VIEW WAS AS TO EFFECTIVENESS AND CREDIBILITY OF ZIK. REPLIED: DID NOT THINK USG HAD VIEW BUT STRICTLY PERSONAL VIEW ZIK NO INFLUENCE WITH BIAFRAN ESTABLISHMENT BUT ZIK LIKELY HAVE INFLUENCE ON MAN IN BUSH BUT MAN IN BUSH DOES NOT MAKE BIAFRAN POLICY. POPE ASKED IF GOOD IDEA TO PROMOTE ZIK-MOJOKRU MEETING. POPE SAID HE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH FONMIN IVORY COAST ON MATTER. FERGUSON REPLIED NO INSTRUCTIONS ON MATTER. POPE PRESSED FOR OPINION. FERGUSON, STATING VIEW STRICTLY PERSONAL, THOUGHT SUCH MEETING EXCELLENT IDEA. FERGUSON THEN STATED: REASONS FOR PERSONAL VIEW.

2. POPE ASKED FOR USG VIEW RE ROLE FOR POPE IN UPCOMING OAU. FERGUSON ATTEMPTED EVADE QUESTION BY STATING WOULD BE PRESUMPTIOUS

44  
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0180

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By MN NARA Date 01/10/05



Ref 27 Biafra - Nigeria  
XP Ref 27-9 Biafra - Nigeria  
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 306

PAGE 01 LIBREV 00892 301209Z

51  
ACTION: SS: 70

INFO: OCT 01 CIAE: 000/071 W

056402

RI 301030Z AUG 69  
FM: AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE  
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC 2785

S: EI CIR ETT LIBREVILLE 892

LIMDIS

DEPT: RPT AS DESIRED

SUBJECT: FRENCH MILITARY ATTACHE'S ASSESSMENT OF BIAFRAN SITUATION

REFB: LIBREVILLE 875

1. AS PROMISED ME BY FRENCH AMB DELAUNAY, THIS MILITARY ATTACHE: LTC: JEAN MERLE (WHO DOUBLES AS DIRECTOR FRENCH RED CROSS RELIEF OPERATION HERE) BRIEFED ME YESTERDAY ON CURRENT STATE IN BIAFRA. SOME KEY POINTS FOLLOW. FURTHER DETAILS IN MEMCON POUCHED TO DEPT.

2. AS HAD PRES: BONGO BEFORE HIM (REFTEL), MERLE RETURNED REPEATEDLY TO THEME THAT WORKABLE SOLUTIONS TO BOTH RELIEF AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS WOULD ULTIMATELY REQUIRE AGREEMENT AND INTERVENTION AT GREAT POWER LEVEL, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO FULL RESUMPTION OF RELIEF EFFORT. MERLE MADE CLEAR HE PERSONALLY HOPED FOR DIRECT US INVOLVEMENT. ONLY WAY DEEP SUSPICIONS ON BOTH SIDES COULD BE OVERCOME AND SUPPLIES GOT MOVING AGAIN. HE SAID WOULD BE FOR US INSTRUMENTALITIES AND PERSONNEL TO ASSUME DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY, SINCE ONLY UNITED STATE WAS CONSIDERED NEUTRAL.

3. MERLE ALSO ARGUED FORCEFULLY THAT OAU AND OTHER AFRICAN FORUMS HELD SCANT HOPE FOR POLITICAL SETTLEMENT TO WAR. FUNDAMENTAL HITCHES WERE (A) AFRICANS' LIMITED ABILITY BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR TO ENFORCE SOLUTION AND (B) FUNDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENTS AMONG BOTH AFRICANS AND GREAT POWERS PRESENTLY TAKING SIDES IN DISPUTE. MERLE, LIKE

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 LIBREV 00892 301209Z

DELAUNEAU FELT MATTER SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED FROM OAU TO UN. AS IN CHAT WITH AMBASSADOR, I EXPRESSED MY PERSONAL BELIEF TO MERLE THAT UN, WITH ATTENDANT PUBLICITY AND CONCOMITANT HARDENING OF POSITIONS, WOULD PROVIDE SURE ROUTE TO IMPASSE AND THAT NEGOTIATIONS IN CAMERA BY INTERESTED PARTIES SURELY MORE IMPRACTICABLE.

4. ON BIAFRAN RESISTANCE, MERLE POINTED OUT THAT AIR STRIPS AT OJI AND UGA WERE HIGHLY VULNERABLE TO AIR ATTACK BY FMG. AS BIAFRAN LIFELINES, THEIR LOSS WOULD BRING BIAFRA TO ITS KNEES WITHIN MATTER OF WEEKS. ASKED WHY HE THOUGHT GOWON DESISTED, MERLE OPINED (A) HE FEARED OPPROBRIUM OF WORLD OPINION FOR CLOSING ONLY REMAINING RELIEF SUPPLY ROUT AND (B) FMG ADVANCED ITS "ULTIMATE SOLUTION" STRATEGY WITH EACH DAY WAR PROLONGED.

5. IN CONTRAST TO INFO FROM GABONESE SOURCES (REFTEL) MERLE TOOK POSITION THAT BOTH GOWON AND OJUUKWU WERE MORE REUMMALBE THAN THEIR ENTOURAGES.

6. SOME OTHER POINTS:

A. WITH RAINY SEASON NOW ENDING, FIGHTING WOULD CERTAINLY INTENSIFY. FMG FORCES FAR BETTER EQUIPPED (TANKS, ARMS, AIRCRAFT) THAN BIAFRANS, WHO HAVE PRATICALLY NO HEAVY VEHICLES OPERATIONAL.

B. FEDERAL FORCES WERE EXPECTED EXPLOIT ARMS ADVANTAGES TO RECOVER BIAFRAN SALIENT IN OIL FIELDS ON NIGER'S WEST BANK. BIAFRANS HOPED MEANWHILE TO REACH PORT HARCOURT, BUT MERLE DOUBTED THEY HAD NECESSARY STRENGTH, EVEN WITH GUERIGLAS, TO FOISM.

C. RELIEF TRAFFIC OUT OF GIBREVILLE AIRPORT HAS CURRENTLY REACHED "SATURATION POINT" (PRESUME HEREFERRING TO GROUND SUPPORT FACILITIES AND AVAILABLE AIRCRAFT). DURING JULY 23 RELIEF MISSIONS FLOWN CARRYING QTRITONS FOOD AND MEDICINE AND 0 CHILDREN EVACUATED (EMBASSY HAS NOTED

INCREASED OVERALL NIGHT TRAFFIC THIS WEEK - EMBTEL 8781.

7. COMMENT: DELAUNEAU AND MERLE HAVE PROMISED BRIEF ME

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By MNARA Date 10/5/03



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 LIBREV 00892 301209Z

PERIODICALLY ON BIAFRA AND ALERT ME IMMEDIATELY ON IMPORTANT NEW DEVELOPMENTS, WHICH I OF COURSE WILL PASS ON TO DEPT. NATURALLY I DO NOT EXPECT THEM BE COMPLETELY FORTHCOMING REGARDING FRANCE'S OWN ROLE THESE MATTERS, PARTICULARLY ARMS SHIPMENTS, AND ASSUME MOST INFO WILL BE DUPLICATORY OR OF MARGINAL INTEREST. WOULD NEVERTHELESS APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S ASSESSMENT OF UTILITY AND ACCURACY OF INFO PROVIDED. GP-3  
FUNKHouser

NOTE: #AS RECEIVED WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

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23

0183

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Authority NID 959503  
By MNARA Date 10/3/03

L I M D I S

~~TOP SECRET~~

I N C O M I N G

Screener *MM*

POST LIBREVILLE

SERIAL 892

(Time Received)

1969 AUG 30 AM 9 40

DISTRIBUTION

MONTHLY COUNT 811

Secretariat

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S/S-Screener 3  
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Principals and  
"S" Area

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U/UCS

Geographic

AF 5 *X*  
ARA 9  
EA 11  
EUR 10  
NEA 8

Functional

CU  
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INR 6 *✓*  
IO 4 *✓*  
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Other

WH 10 *✓*  
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8/5/69

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Authority VND 959503  
By MN NARA Date 10/5/05

*65*  
**OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State**

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
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*Classification*

*29 Aug 69 17 11z*

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**Action:** Amembassy LAGOS

**Info:** Amembassy LONDON, ADDIS ABABA  
PARIS  
USUN NEW YORK  
US MISSION GENEVA  
Amconsul IBADAN  
KADUNA

**SUBJECT:** Nigeria - NYTimes Editorial August 29

1. NYTimes editorial Aug 29 lauds Azikiwe break as "most hopeful development" in 26 month old Nigerian civil war. Article says Zik's action unable stop war overnight, but historically will probably be considered turning point in "Nigerian struggle for unity and nationhood."

2. Full text follows:

QTE Nnamdi Azikiwe's dramatic decision to break with Biafra and work for peace, reunification and reconciliation in Nigeria is most hopeful development for that ill-starred land since start of civil war 26 months ago. It will not halt the killing overnight nor bring immediate changes in behavior of Biafra's rulers; but it probably will be looked back on one day as a positive turning point in Nigeria's agonizing struggle for unity and nationhood--a struggle that has torn at the heart of world.

The Biafran leaders will be hard put to discredit Dr. Azikiwe even inside secessionist enclave. Many Ibos still regard "Zik" as greatest Ibo of them all--

*(9)*  
Drafted by: AF/P:WCPowell, mb 8/29/69

20322

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:


*(10)*  
AF/SN:WHBrübeck (subs)

Clearances:

FORM DS-322  
8-65

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*Classification*

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Origin: ACTION: Page 2 of tel to Amembassy L AGOS

Info:

not only the first (and only) President of Republic of Nigeria, but father of [redacted] Nigerian nationalism and independence and one of founders of nationalist movement for all of West Africa.

They also remember him as one who--despite his strong opposition to drastic act of secession in 1967--remained loyal to Biafra's cause until he became convinced that peace with justice was possible but that General Ojukwu and his colleagues were unwilling to negotiate realistically. Only a year ago, Dr. Azikiwe sat at General Ojukwu's side in Biafran delegation to abortive peace talks in Ethiopia.

It will be difficult for Biafran leaders and their foreign supporters to maintain their accusation that Nigeria is bent on exterminating Ibos when most eminent of Ibo elders calls this charge "a cock-and-bull fairy tale," and affirms "the safety and security of Ibo and non-Ibo people" alike in Federal territory, including most of the original Biafra.

In short, Dr. Azikiwe's return to Lagos as "an envoy of peace" will give Federal Government its greatest opportunity since shooting started to mount an offensive for peace and reconciliation. Merely to broadcast Dr. Azikiwe's message and wait for a positive Biafran response will not be enough.

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:


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FORM DS-322  
8-65

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
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Origin

ACTION: Page 3 of tel to Amembassy LAGOS

Info:

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The convening next week in Ethiopia of an OAU summit meeting could provide General Gowon an excellent platform for launching needed peace offensive. If Lagos will now demonstrate magnanimity and compassion it can galvanize strong support, even perhaps from four African governments that have recognized Biafra. Dr. Azikiwe, after all, played key role in obtaining that recognition.

There are interim measures that Lagos could take at once as evidence of good faith, however. One would be to allow immediate full-scale resumption of the food airlift to meet a rapidly deteriorating situation in Biafran enclave.

In any event, Lagos must not muff opportunity provided by Nnamdi Azikiwe's restatement of his faith in "one Nigeria, indivisible, indestructible and perpetual." That would be as unforgivable as a flat rejection by Biafra of a generous offer of peace with security and justice. UNQTE

End

ROGERS

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FORM DS-322  
8-65

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By MMNARA Date 10/5/05



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA  
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED 757

PAGE 01 KADUNA 0829 291610Z

52

ACTION AFT 18

INFO: OCT 01, UCF 05, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,  
NSAE 00, NSCI 10, P 03, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, SR 01, ORM 03,  
AID 28, PC 04, EUR 17, RSR 01, /154 W

050474

R 291000Z AUG 69

FM: AMCONSUL KADUNA

TO: SECSTATE WASHDC 1286

INFO: AMCONSUL IBADAN

AMEMBASSY LAGOS

UNCLAS KADUNA 0829

1. COMMENTING ON AZIKIWE PRESS CONFERENCE IN LONDON, AUGUST 29 NEW NIGERIAN STATES MOST IMPORTANT ASPECT WAS HIS DENIAL OF GENOCIDE CHARGE. BECAUSE OF HIS INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION, AZIKIWE AND EXPLAINING AIMS AND POLICIES TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS AS REPRESENTATIVE OF "IBO LEADERSHIP" AS OPPOSED TO "REBEL LEADERSHIP."

2. EDITORIAL ALSO AVERS AZIKIWE HAS "IMPORTANT" JOB HERE IN NIGERIA IN ASSISTING FMG WITH RECONCILIATION WITH REBELS. ALTHOUGH IT MIGHT BE BELOW DIGNITY OF FORMER PRESIDENT TO SERVE ON FMG EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, AZIKIWE COULD OFFER "HIS COUNSELS" TO GOWON AND COULD ASSIST IN RESUSCITATING UNIVERSITY OF NSUKKA.

STS PHAN


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POL 15 NIGERIA

Department of State

**TELEGRAM**

Re POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA

CONFIDENTIAL 196

PAGE 01 KADUNA 00830 291136Z

12  
ACTION AF 18

INFO OCT 01, CIAE 00, OODE 00, JPM 04, HI 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00, MSC 10,  
P 03, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, EUR 17, IO 19, UPW 01, UCE 05,  
AID 28, RSR 01, /147 W

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Kaduna 830  
8-26-69

R 291000Z AUG 69  
FM AMCONSUL KADUNA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1287  
INFO RUTALS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS 2851  
AMCONSUL IBADAN

CONFIDENTIAL KADUNA 0830

SUBJECT: INCREASING DEMANDS IN NORTH FOR POLITI-  
CIZING NIGERIA.

1. DURING RECENT CONVERSATION WITH CONSULATE  
OFFICERS IN MAIDUGURI, SIR KASHIM IBRAHIMA, FORMER  
NORTHERN GOVERNOR AND ADVISOR TO INTERIM ADMINISTRA-  
TIVE COUNCIL, OPINED THAT CESSION HOSTILITIES  
COULD BEST BE NEGOTIATED BY CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT IN  
LAGOS. FURTHERMORE, HE SAID, WAR WOULD NEVER HAVE  
ERUPTED IF POLITICIANS HAD BEEN IN POWER TO WORK  
OUT COMPROMISE WITH IBOS. SIR KASHIM ADMITTED THAT  
IMMEDIATE RETURN TO CIVIL RULE WOULD BE DIFFICULT  
IN VIEW OF RELUCTANCE OF MILITARY TO RELINQUISH  
POWER AS WELL AS ABSENCE OF LEADER AROUND WHOM  
VIABLE POLITICAL GROUPING COULD POSSIBLY COALESCCE.  
HE DESCRIBED CORRUPTION OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT WHERE  
MILITARY OFFICERS HAVE AMASSED LARGE SUMS OF MONEY  
FOR PERSONAL GAIN AND FOR "FURTHERING THEIR OWN  
DRIVE FOR POWER." SIR KASHIM NOTED THAT IN  
"POLITICAL DAYS", KICKBACKS AND OTHER FORMS FISCAL  
VENALITY PROVIDED FUNDS WHICH WERE PARTIALLY  
FUNNELED BACK TO PARTY ORGANIZATION AS COMPARED  
TO PRESENT SITUATION WHERE LARGESSE NEVER MOVES  
OUT OF MILITARY CIRCLES.

CONFIDENTIAL

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Authority NID 950503  
By MN NARA Date 10/5/05

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NSC 6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# AIRGRAM

POL27 BIAFRA-  
NIGERIA  
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A-403

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TO : Department of State *RECEIVED*  
INFO : ADDIS ABABA, IBADAN, KADUNA, LONDON, PARIS, USMISSION GENEVA

HANDLING INDICATOR

RSK *W*  
*filed 8/28*

FROM : Amembassy LAGOS DATE: AUG 28 1969  
SUBJECT: Biafran Complaints: Straws in the Wind?

REF :

Without overestimating their importance, the Embassy finds the tone of several recent broadcasts on the Biafran radio interesting for their hints of difficulties in the enclave. The broadcasts state publicly that there has been maladministration in the distribution of relief supplies; that Biafran youth have shied away "from their national obligations," and that there is "corruption, profiteering and hoarding" in Biafra.

From scattered reports over the last few months, we have been aware that there is probably continuing small-scale trade between rebel and federally controlled territory. Salt, sugar, batteries and alcohol are probably the major items going into the enclave. We have no way of knowing what the Biafrans can offer in return but suspect that hard currency notes may still be accepted on a devalued basis and that gold and silver jewelry and other small, relatively high-valued items are being disposed of by Biafrans. We assume that the public warnings about profiteering are aimed at persons engaged in this trade, which the FMG is also trying to shut off, especially the Mid-West.

The following quotes should not be overrated, but we think they indicate the kinds of difficulties which the Biafran regime faces after a prolonged blockade and a slow but steady compression of rebels into the Ibo heartland:

(a) "General Ojukwu's declaration...called for, among other things, the eradication of corruption, profiteering, and hoarding. He ordered community action to insure a fairer distribution of goods and services in blockaded Biafra... (AFP despatch from Owerri, August 18, 1969).

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

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In  Out

Drafted by: POL:FPicard:mjr 8/26/69

Contents and Classification Approved by:  
POL:ERamsaurJr *SN*

Clearances:

*26*

0190  
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Authority *VND 959503*  
By *MN* NARA Date *10/5/03*

Lagos A-403

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(b) "Representatives of various relief bodies operating in Biafra have been urged to help minimize the suffering of refugees by insuring that relief materials meant for the people get to them. The appeal was made by the military administrator for Aba province...while addressing representatives of relief bodies in Owa Division. He advised them to be more serious with cases of misappropriation of relief materials by officials and warned that disciplinary action will be taken against culprits (Biafra radio, August 23, 1969).

(c) "An eminent social worker has spoken of the necessity for youths not to shy away from their national obligations....in a lecture to the Ikwano branch of the Biafran Youth Front on the tenets of the Ahiara Declaration. Monsignor Ogbonna reminded the youths that every privilege carries its obligation, and no one has the right to choose the privileges and evade the obligations (Biafra radio, August 23, 1969)."

OLSON

*SW*

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DECLASSIFIED  
Authority VND959503  
By MN NARA Date 10/5/05

0 1 9 1



1 POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA  
X R POL 7 NIGERIA  
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 523

PAGE 01 TUNIS 05024 281501Z

43:  
ACTION: AFI 18

INFO: OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, AID 28, SRI 01, ORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 01, CIAE 00,

DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 03, RSC 01,

PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, UCF 05, UPW 01, RSR 01, /156 W  
041927

R 281205Z AUG 69  
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 61  
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN  
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS  
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY RABAT  
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

C O N F I D E N T I A L TUNIS 5024

2 SUBJ: GOT NIGERIAN POLICY

REF: TUNIS 4027 (NOTAL)

1. FONMIN HABIB BOURGUIBA, JR. SPEAKING AT KASSERINE AUG 27 SAID STUBBORNNESS OF BOTH PARTIES IN NIGERIAN CONFLICT DOES NOT ENCOURAGE HOPE FOR QUICK SOLUTION TO PROBLEM. QUOTE: WE DO NOT INTEND TO BECOME INVOLVED IN THIS AFFAIR, BUT WE WILL SUPPORT ANY SOLUTION ABLE TO BRING PEACE TO NIGERIA. UNQUOTE.

2. FONMIN STATEMENT INTERESTING IN VIEW OF RECENT VISITS ENVOY OF GENERAL GOWAN AND IVORY COAST FONMIN TO TUNISIA. (REFTEL) ACCORDING FONOFF OFFICIAL NEITHER ABLE CONVINCE GOT TAKE STRONGER POSITION IN FAVOR ITS VIEWS OF NIGERIAN CONFLICT. GP-3 CALHOUN

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POL 27 BIAFRA-  
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**TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 NIAMEY 01056 281148Z

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ACTION: AFI 18

INFO: OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 03, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, AID 28, UCF 05,

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R 280856Z AUG 69  
FM: AMEMBASSY NIAMEY  
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC 319  
INFO: AMEMBASSY ACCRA  
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA  
AMZMBASSY LAGOS 778  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE

S E C R E T NIAMEY 1056

SUBJ: OAU MEETING AND NIGERIA WAR

REF: NIAMEY 1029 - POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA

1. IN CONVERSATION TODAY, AS FOLLOW-UP TO HIS SUGGESTION THAT I SEE HIM AFTER ARIKPO'S AUGUST 20 VISIT NIAMEY, PRESIDENT DIORI COMMENTED THAT:

(A) ARIKPO TOLD HIM FMG STILL CONFIDENT THEY CAN ACCOMPLISH MILITARY SUCCESS AGAINST BIAFRANS IF NEED BE, BUT VERY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED WITH AZIKIWE ON POSSIBILITY BIAFRA-FMG ACCOMMODATION.


(B) HE THINKS NIGERIA WAR WOULD NOW SEEM LIKELY TO APPEAR ONLY ON THE QTE MARGINS UNQUOTE OF OAU DISCUSSIONS. INDICATIONS ARE THAT AS FEW AS TEN CHIEFS OF STATE MAY ATTEND ADDIS MEETING.

(C) HE DOUBTS CONCOM MEETING ON NIGERIA CIVIL WAR TALKED ABOUT FOR MONROVIA BEFORE ADDIS CHIEFS OF STATE OAU SESSIONS

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WILL OCCUR.

2. DIORI REPORTED THAT ARIKPO TOLD HIM THAT AZIKIWE STOP LAGOS HAD BEEN QTE PROVIDENTIAL UNQUOTE AND UNEXPECTED. GENERAL POPULARITY AZIKIWE EVOKED IN LAGOS CROWDS WHICH RECOGNIZED HIM WITH CRIES QTE ZIK, ZIK, UNQUOTE MAY, DIORI SAID, OPEN UP POSSIBILITY OF QTE FURTHER GIVE UNQUOTE IN POSITION FMG FEELS IT CAN FIND ACCEPTABLE FOR ENDING WAR. DIORI SAID HE TALKED WITH ARIKPO ABOUT A VARIETY OF FORMS WHICH FUTURE NIGERIA MIGHT TAKE. BIAFRANS MIGHT CONCEIVABLY BE ALLOWED AUTONOMY IN A QTE ONE NIGERIA CONTEXT UNQUOTE IN ALL AREAS EXCEPT EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND UNDER ANY ARRANGEMENT WHICH DID NOT PRECLUDE ECONOMIC COOPERATION.

3. WHEREAS DIORI EXPRESSED OPTIMISM ABOUT FURTHER FLEXIBILITIES THAT HE FELT FMG MAY BE PROMPTED TO ALLOW TO END WAR, HE WAS LESS CERTAIN ABOUT OJUKWU AND ABOUT WHAT ENCOURAGEMENT HOUPHOUET COULD BE COUNTED UPON TO GIVE IN URGING HIM THIS DIRECTION. DIORI SAID THAT HOUPHOUET ONLY PRO-BIAFRAN AFRICAN HEAD OF STATE WHICH HAD NOT RECEIVED FMG EMISSARY FOR DISCUSSION PROBLEM OF ENDING WAR. FYI (PROTECT SOURCE) MOUDADA DIALLO, A MALIAN ASSIGNED ECA CONSEILLIER REGIONAL POUR QUESTIONS D'ENERGIE, TOLD ME DIORI VERY CONCERNED OVER STRAINED RELATIONS BETWEEN HIMSELF AND HOUPHOUET OVER NIGERIA QUESTION. STRAIN SO SERIOUS, DIORI ALLEGEDLY BEING QTE DITCHED UNQUOTE BY HOUPHOUET, WITH IMPLICATIONS THAT THIS COULD MAKE DIORI'S FUTURE MORE DIFFICULT, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW NIGER'S SERIOUS ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES, AND RUMORED DIFFICULTIES IN FRENCH ATTITUDES. END FYI.

4. IN RESPONSE MY QUESTION WHETHER OR NOT EXPECTED POOR ATTENDANCE CHIEFS OF STATE OAU MEETING RELATED AT ALL TO NIGERIA CIVIL WAR, DIORI REPLIED NOT AT ALL. RESPONDED BY REMINDING ME THAT IT IS ANNUAL OAU ORDINARY MEETING. HE SAID BOURGUIBA HAD BEEN RIGHT IN SUGGESTING OAU MIGHT MEET MORE EFFECTIVELY EVERY TWO YEARS. NOW, THERE ARE JUST TOO MANY MEETINGS, HE SAID.

5. THOUGH DIORI THINKS WAR TO BE ON THE QTE MARGINS UNQUOTE OF OAU DISCUSSIONS, HE NEVERTHELESS FORESEES A RESOLUTION COMING OUT OF THE MEETING WHICH WILL BE MORE FLEXIBLE IN POSITION THAN EITHER THE OAU ALGIERS OR OCAM KINSHASA RESOLUTIONS.

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ON THE NIGERIA WAR. OTHERWISE, HE GAVE NO INDICATION THAT HE EXPECTS ANYTHING MORE POSITIVE FOR ENDING THE WAR TO RESULT FROM THE ADDIS MEETING. GP-3.  
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PAGE: 01 MOSCOW 04547 271534Z

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ACTION: AFI 18

INFO: OCT 01, EUR 17, UCF 05, NIC 01, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, HI 02,

INR 07, LI 03, NSA 00, NSC 10, PI 04, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12,

AID 28, IGA 02, ACDA 16, RSR 01, 166 W

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RI 271455Z AUG 69

FMI: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO: SECSTATE WASHDC 3831

INFO: AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY LAGOS

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

CL: ON FILE DNE: NIT I ALI MOSCOW 4547

SUBJ: CURRENT SOVIET VIEW OF NIGERIA

REF: LAGOS 73951

POL 27 Biafra - Nigeria

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. CONTINUING MILITARY STALEMATE IN NIGERIA POSES QUESTIONS REGARDING FUTURE SOVIET ROLE THIS SITUATION. EMBASSY FEELS THAT MOSCOW, IF ASKED BY FMG, WOULD PROBABLY BE WILLING PROVIDE MORE MILITARY AID AS MEANS OF INCREASING ITS ALREADY SIGNIFICANT POSITION IN NIGERIA. IN FORESEEABLE FUTURE SOVIETS UNLIKELY TO PARTICIPATE IN EFFORTS TOWARD NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IF THEY BELIEVE SUCH ROLE WOULD SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZE THEIR INFLUENCE IN COUNTRY. END SUMMARY.

2. AS NIGERIAN STALEMATE CONTINUES, WITH GROWING INDICATIONS OF MALAISE AND WAR-WEARINESS IN NIGERIA (REFTEL), QUESTION ARISES OF HOW SOVIETS NOW SEE THEIR FUTURE ROLE. WHILE MOSCOW CURRENTLY BEING CRICIZED BY SOME STATES IN AFRICA AND ELSEWHERE FOR CONTRIBUTING MATERIALLY TO INHUMANE WAR, SOVIETS MAY BELIEVE THEY HAVE BUILT A POSITION OF SOME INFLUENCE IN LAGOS (FROM NEAR ZERO IN 1967) ALMOST WHOLLY ON BASIS THEIR MILITARY SUPPORT FOR FMG. ON OTHER HAND, NIGERIAN AMBASSADOR TELLS ME, POSSIBLY FOR US BENEFIT, THAT HIS GOVERNMENT, WHILE APPRECIATIVE OF SOVIET HELP, HAS INSISTED THAT SOVIET ADVISORS AND TECHNICIANS BE LIMITED

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TO: MINIMUM NECESSARY TO SERVICE MILITARY EQUIPMENT.

3. ONCE HOSTILITIES TERMINATE, SOVIETS HOPE THEY WILL HAVE OPPORTUNITY CONSOLIDATE GAINS AND PERHAPS EXPAND INTO OTHER SPHERES, WHILE ENJOYING PRESUMED FMG GRATITUDE. (OF COURSE, TERMINATION OF WAR WOULD ALSO GIVE US AND UK OPPORTUNITY IMPROVE PREVIOUSLY STRONG POSITIONS, DAMAGED BY FMG'S FRUSTRATION OVER THEIR LESS THAN FULL SUPPORT FOR LAGOS DURING WAR.)

4. HOWEVER, THE LONGER THE WAR CONTINUES, THE MORE DIFFICULT BECOME WESTERN RELATIONS WITH FMG, AND, AS EMBASSY LAGOS SUGGESTS, WORSENING STALEMATE COULD CAUSE FMG SEEK GREATER MILITARY HELP FROM USSR. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE BELIEVE SOVIETS WOULD BE WILLING PROVIDE MORE MILITARY HARDWARE AND PERHAPS EXPAND TRAINING, ESPECIALLY IF THEY DECIDE RESULT WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY WEAKENED FMG TIES WITH US AND US COST TO SOVIETS WOULD BE RELATIVELY SLIGHT, AND MOSCOW'S DEEPER INVOLVEMENT WOULD PROBABLY NOT RAISE OUTSIDE CRITICISM TO INTOLERABLE LEVEL. BULK OF AID EXTENDED OVER SHORT TERM WOULD BE MILITARY, PERHAPS COUPLED WITH PROMISES OF FUTURE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

5. MOSCOW'S POSITION AS MAJOR ARMS MERCHANT TO LAGOS RAISES QUESTION OF POTENTIAL SOVIET ROLE REGARDING INITIATIVES FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. KEY CONSIDERATION HERE IS WHAT ADVANTAGE MOSCOW THINKS IT WOULD GAIN THROUGH PARTICIPATION IN EFFORTS TO END WAR. WHILE USSR NOT OBLIVIOUS TO CRITICISM FROM AFRICAN STATES DEMANDING LOWER SOVIET MILITARY AID PROFILE IN NIGERIA, ON BALANCE SOVIETS PROBABLY STILL FEEL THEY CAN SAFELY RESIST PRESSURES FAVORING MOSCOW SUPPORT FOR INITIATIVES AIMED AT SETTLEMENT. MOREOVER, SINCE PRESENT SOVIET POSITION IN NIGERIA IS LARGELY BASED ON MILITARY SUPPORT OF FMG, MOSCOW PROBABLY FEELS ITS CHANCES FOR MEANINGFUL GAIN IN SUPPORTING PEACE INITIATIVES ARE SIGNIFICANTLY OFFSET BY BELIEF SUCH POLICY WOULD UDLY ANGER FMG. MARKED DETERIORATION OF SOVIET-FMG RELATIONS WOULD GRAVELY RISK LOSS HIGH PORTION OF SOVIET POSITION BUILT UP IN NIGERIA OVER PAST TWO YEARS.

6. SOVIETS CONTINUE HAMMER AT THEME OF "ONE NIGERIA" WHILE BEING RATHER CAUTIOUS IN DESCRIBING BIAFRAN LEADERSHIP, WITH WHOM THEY PROBABLY MAINTAIN SOME LOW-KEY CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION. IRRITATION WITH FMG SOMETIMES MILDLY REFLECTED IN SOVIET PRESS REGARDING LACK MILITARY PROGRESS, SEVERE ECONOMIC SITUATION, AND CORRUPTION PROBLEM. MOSCOW IMPLICITLY VIEWS PRESENT NIGERIAN

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LEADERSHIP AS "BOURGEOIS"; HOWEVER, IT ALSO ACKNOWLEDGES "PROGRESSIVE" NIGERIAN INFLUENCES, WHICH IT ENCOURAGES (BUT NOT TO EXTENT OF JEOPARDIZING OFFICIAL SOVIET-FMG RELATIONS). SOVIETS WERE EXERCISED ABOUT OTEGBEYER'S ARREST, AND IN PRESSING FOR HIS RELEASE, THEY DEMONSTRATED RESOLVE TO AID "PROGRESSIVES" WHEN NEEDED, AS WELL AS INDICATING THEIR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE CERTAIN DOMESTIC MATTERS IN NIGERIA.

7. EVIDENTLY FMG NEEDS LITTLE ENCOURAGEMENT FROM MOSCOW IN REQUESTING SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THEREFORE, SOVIETS WILL PRESUMABLY WAIT FOR NIGERIAN APPROACH SHOULD PRESSURE OF EVENTS FORCE FMG TO APPLY FOR GREATER HELP IN BREAKING MILITARY STALEMATE. WHILE MOSCOW MAY GIVE APPEARANCE OF BEING FMG'S RELUCTANT PARTNER, THERE IS LITTLE REASON TO DOUBT SOVIETS QUITE PLEASED WITH CURRENT POSITION IN LAGOS, AND WILL GO TO SOME LENGTHS TO PRESERVE IT.

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(R. Booth to B. Lunt)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Washington, D.C. 20520

RS/R FILES

Attention *Mrs. Mullen*  
Keep this study together.

August 27, 1969

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter to the President from Major-General  
Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria, dated August 1

In response to Mrs. Davis' request of August 20,  
the Department recommends that no reply is necessary at  
this time to General Gowon's letter which was a response  
to the President's message of July 15 to General Gowon.

*Theodore L. Eliot Jr.*

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Letter from General Gowon,  
dated August 1.

Clearances:

① AF/SN - WHBrubeck U/CF - RDavison  
AF - WWitman

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AF/SN:RLPerkins:11:deh Ext. 23406 8/26/69  
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POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA

C O P Y

1ST AUGUST, 1969.

My Dear President,


I have received Your Excellency's message of the 15th of July and have noted your renewed concern for the welfare of non-combatants in the civil war in my country. My Government has, from the beginning, attempted to remove relief from the field of international political and diplomatic intrigue. More recently, I have repeatedly stressed in all my declarations that it is not the intention of my Government to use starvation as a weapon of war against adversaries whom we regard, not as enemies, but as fellow citizens of Nigeria. It is clear, unfortunately, that Mr. Ojukwu intends to continue taking advantage of humanitarian concern for the suffering of innocent civilians to further his military and political objectives. I therefore share your hope that President Houphouet Boigny will be able to bring home to him the inhumanity of his present course of action.

I am glad, Mr. President, to note your appreciation of the fact that International Relief efforts could be exploited for partisan intervention. This indeed has unhappily been the case with some Relief Agencies which seem to be politically committed to the rebel cause. My Government's recent policy on relief operations has thus been motivated by the need to curb the propensity of some Relief Agencies to flout my country's sovereign rights and disregard the legitimate demands for its security. In this regard you have no doubt

/been

His Excellency  
Mr. Richard Nixon,  
President of the United States  
of America,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.  
U.S.A.

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
been informed that broad agreement has been reached between my Government and the I.C.R.C. on daylight relief flights. The I.C.R.C. has, however, undertaken to examine the ways and means of implementing the new policy and to keep my Government informed of their plans.

There is no doubt at all in my mind that the demands of the new policy on relief flights are the barest possible minimum and that only Mr. Ojukwu's refusal to allow daylight flights is holding up operations. In the meantime I have allowed the I.C.R.C. a one - shot operation to supply basic requirements to their relief centres in the rebel areas, to carry out the necessary change-over of personnel whose contracts have expired, and to evacuate other members of staff who may be in need of better medical treatment than is locally available.

As for the Cross River proposal, I recall having indicated to Professor Ferguson when last I received him that the plan was acceptable to my Government in principle but that it would be subject to the overall security interests of Nigeria and satisfactory agreement being reached on essential details. It would be unreasonable to expect me to approve any scheme that might involve a repetition of the unfortunate episode of the Italian oilmen who were recently murdered or taken hostage by the rebels. I am convinced, from bitter experience, that should the Cross River project commence without due regard to important details, the rebels would do everything possible to frustrate it. Propaganda from their many hidden persuaders would then be turned against my Government for not taking sufficient precautions and for embarking on the project merely for publicity advantage.

/You

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


You may recollect, Mr. President, that shortly after the publication of an eye-witness account of the slaying of the eleven Italian oil workers, Monsignor Carlo Bayer of Caritas made a statement expressing his doubts and alleging that they might have escaped from the rebels but subsequently lost their lives at the hands of Federal troops. This view received wide credence until the eye-witness account was fully corroborated. Nevertheless the damage had been done to my Government's reputation and only those who closely followed subsequent events knew that Monsignor Bayer's smokescreen was meant to cover the guilt of the rebels. In the light of such blind, but cleverly disguised, support for the rebels by some supposedly humanitarian personages it is essential that responsibility for the security of the vessels and their crew within the areas of military operations must first be assured. It is also quite clearly essential that the rebels must first enter into undertakings in this respect and this can only be done at a meeting of representatives of both sides. I am not surprised therefore that they have failed to respond to Mr. Ferguson's invitation to a meeting with my representatives in Monrovia or any mutually acceptable African capital.

Barring the political involvement of some unscrupulous Relief Agencies, there is nothing on our side to stop relief materials reaching the rebels as soon as possible, or even immediately. My Government is ready to receive relief flights passing through Lagos or any other designated airport in Federal territory with a maximum inspection period per aircraft of 30-60 minutes.

/We

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
We very much cherish our friendship with you and your country and I feel that we must endeavour to do whatever is humanly possible not to allow any extrenous forces to mar that cordial relationship based on mutual respect. That is why I strongly feel that in whatever we do in respect of the Cross River relief operations we must ensure that no harm comes to any of your nationals involved in it otherwise neither you nor I can withstand your own public opinion and pressure demanding that you personally intervene in order to save your nationals.

I am certain that our traditional friendship will stand the test of time and I very much hope that your administration will ever be associated with our true and sincere aspirations as a people, as a nation. Believe me, Mr. President, my interest in this crisis is to save the country and to save innocent lives. This is why I never believe in the maxim that 'all is fair in war and that starvation is a legitimate weapon of war'. The secessionist must not be allowed to get away with it or else we can never achieve that peace and saving of lives which we all so much hope for. We need the sympathy, understanding and co-operation of our good friends like you.

Finally, it would be helpful if some of the pressure usually brought to bear on my Government in these matters could be applied on the rebel regime in order to urge them to stop playing politics with the lives of the innocent civilians still under their control to whom my Government

/and

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and humanitarian organisations all over the world are so anxious to bring succour. In this regard, Mr. President, I feel that the very considerable influence of your Government can give an important and effective lead to all other well-meaning Governments and interested humanitarian organisations.

Yours most sincerely,

(Sgd.) YAKUBU GOWON

MAJOR-GENERAL YAKUBU GOWON  
Head of the Federal Military Government,  
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces  
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

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RS/R

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter to the President from Major-General  
Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria, dated August 1

In response to Mrs. Davis' request of August 20,  
the Department recommends that no reply is necessary at  
this time to General Gowon's letter which was a response  
to the President's message of July 15 to General Gowon.

POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Letter from General Gowon,  
dated August 1.

Clearances:

AF/SN - WHBrubeck / *WB* U/GF - RDavidson *W*  
AF - WWitman *WW*

*RP*  
AF/SN:RLPerkins:11:deh Ext. 23406 8/26/69

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By *MN* NARA Date *05/05*



Reference : 2

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,  
STATE HOUSE,  
DODAN BARRACKS,  
LAGOS, NIGERIA

1st August, 1969.

*My Dear President,*

12808

I have received Your Excellency's message of the 15th of July and have noted your renewed concern for the welfare of non-combatants in the civil war in my country. My Government has, from the beginning, attempted to remove relief from the field of international political and diplomatic intrigue. More recently, I have repeatedly stressed in all my declarations that it is not the intention of my Government to use starvation as a weapon of war against adversaries whom we regard, not as enemies, but as fellow citizens of Nigeria. It is clear, unfortunately, that Mr. Ojukwu intends to continue taking advantage of humanitarian concern for the suffering of innocent civilians to further his military and political objectives. I therefore share your hope that President Houphouet Boigny will be able to bring home to him the inhumanity of his present course of action.

I am glad, Mr. President, to note your appreciation of the fact that International Relief efforts could be exploited for partisan intervention. This indeed has unhappily been the case with some Relief Agencies which seem to be politically committed to the rebel cause. My Government's recent policy on relief operations has thus been motivated by the need to curb the propensity of some Relief Agencies to flout my country's sovereign rights and disregard the legitimate demands for its security. In this regard you have no doubt been informed that broad agreement has been reached between my Government and the I.C.R.C. on daylight relief flights. The I.C.R.C. has, however, undertaken to examine the ways and means of implementing the new

*/policy*

His Excellency  
Mr. Richard Nixon,  
President of the United States  
of America,  
WASHINGTON D.C.,  
U.S.A.

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policy and to keep my Government informed of their plans.


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As for the Cross River proposal, I recall having indicated to Professor Ferguson when last I received him that the plan was acceptable to my Government in principle but that it would be subject to the overall security interests of Nigeria and satisfactory agreement being reached on essential details. It would be unreasonable to expect me to approve any scheme that might involve a repetition of the unfortunate episode of the Italian oilmen who were recently murdered or taken hostage by the rebels. I am convinced, from bitter experience, that should the Cross River project commence without due regard to important details, the rebels would do everything possible to frustrate it. Propaganda from their many hidden persuaders would then be turned against my Government for not taking sufficient precautions and for embarking on the project merely for publicity advantage.

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/Bayer's

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Bayer's smokescreen was meant to cover the guilt of the rebels. In the light of such blind, but cleverly disguised, support for the rebels by some supposedly humanitarian personages it is essential that responsibility for the security of the vessels and their crew within the areas of military operations must first be assured. It is also quite clearly essential that the rebels must first enter into undertakings in this respect and this can only be done at a meeting of representatives of both sides. I am not surprised therefore that they have failed to respond to Mr. Ferguson's invitation to a meeting with my representatives in Monrovia or any mutually acceptable African capital.


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We very much cherish our friendship with you and your country and I feel that we must endeavour to do whatever is humanly possible not to allow any extrenous forces to mar that cordial relationship based on mutual respect. That is why I strongly feel that in whatever we do in respect of the Cross River relief operations we must ensure that no harm comes to any of your nationals involved in it otherwise neither you nor I can withstand your own public opinion and pressure demanding that you personally intervene in order to save your nationals.

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
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is a legitimate weapon of war'. The secessionist must not be allowed to get away with it or else we can never achieve that peace and saving of lives which we all so much hope for. We need the sympathy, understanding and co-operation of our good friends like you.

Finally, it would be helpful if some of the pressure usually brought to bear on my Government in these matters could be applied on the rebel regime in order to urge them to stop playing politics with the lives of the innocent civilians still under their control to whom my Government and humanitarian organisations all over the world are so anxious to bring succour. In this regard, Mr. President, I feel that the very considerable influence of your Government can give an important and effective lead to all other well-meaning Governments and interested humanitarian organisations.

Yours most sincerely,



MAJOR-GENERAL YAKUBU GOWON  
Head of the Federal Military Government,  
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces  
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

0209

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NID 959503  
By MNARA Date 01/21/05

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS



PO 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA  
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

XL SOC 12-1 48

SECRET 986 DA

PAGE 01 GENEVA 03053 271815Z

42  
ACTION SS: 30

INFO: OCT 01, SSO 00, NSCEI 00, CCO 00, 031 W

035600

O: 271729Z AUG 69  
FM: USMISSION GENEVA  
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2716

Doheny, Kevin  
(FATHER)

S: SECURE IT GENEVA 3053

EXDIS

SUBJ: FERGUSON-DOHENY DISCUSSION

1. SUMMARY: FATHER KEVIN DOHENY, HOLY GHOST PRIEST WHO LEFT BIAFRA IN JULY AND PLANNING RETURN IN SEPTEMBER, DISCUSSED SITUATION IN ENCLAVE WITH FERGUSON WEDNESDAY. FELT ICRC RELIEF FLIGHTS WOULD NOT RESUME BUT SAID FOOD SITUATION UNEVEN ACROSS ENCLAVE, MANAGEABLE IN CENTRAL PART, BUT EXTREMELY BAD ALONG PERIMETER. MADE STRONG PITCH FOR UNCONDITIONAL PEACE TALKS, FEELING TIME IS RIPE FOR SUCH INITIATIVE, SAID OJUKWU WOULD BE LESS RIGID THAN IN PUBLIC POSTURE.
2. DOHENY, CLOSE OJUKWU CONFIDANT, IS COUSIN OF SENATOR MANSFIELD, HAS TIES WITH SENATOR GOODELL AND CONGRESSMAN LOWENSTEIN, AND THROUGH BROTHER, WITH SPEAKER MCCORMACK AND CARDINAL CUSHING. PLANNING TO VISIT U.S. SHORTLY, WILL CHECK WITH DEPARTMENT AND UNCF, WISHES MEET ROGER MORRIS.
3. DOHENY ALSO REPUTED TO BE OJUKWU'S INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR. IS DEFINITELY KNOWN THAT HE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL RADIO COMMUNICATIONS IN BIAFRA AND HAS UNLIMITED ACCESS TO OJUKWU. END SUMMARY.
4. DOHENY CITED NEED TO REESTABLISH TRUST AND DIALOGUE BETWEEN TWO SIDES OR PEACE WILL BE LONG WAY OFF. SPEAKING WITHIN AFRICAN CONTEXT, SAID CONSIDERABLE NEGOTIATING ROOM BETWEEN THE "ANNOUNCED PRICE" AND THE "LAST PRICE" BUT NOT SURE OJUKWU WOULD ABANDON SECESSION.
5. URGING IMMEDIATE DIALOGUE WITHOUT CEASEFIRE, WITHOUT PRE-CONDITIONS, DOHENY SAID "I FEEL OJUKWU IS PREPARED TO GIVE

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0210

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 GENEVA 03053 271815Z

WAY CONSIDERABLY."

6. DOHENY SAID BIAFRANS BELIEVE KEY TO WAR IS LONDON, BUT DESPITE BRITISH SUPPORT OF FMG, "THERE IS INNATE RESPECT IN BIAFRA FOR BRITAIN." FELT A BRITISH FACT-FINDING MISSION TO BIAFRA WOULD BE WELL RECEIVED AND VISIT MOST USEFUL. SUGGESTED MALCOLM MACDONALD AND LORD HUNT AS MEMBERS OF MISSION, SAYING HE SPOKE WITH AUTHORITY.

7. DOHENY URGED US PRESSURE ON BRITAIN TO GET THE FMG-BIAFRA DIALOGUE STARTED. "THAT IS HOW IT CAN COME," HE SAID. STATED TALKS SHOULD BE AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL OR INVOLVE PERSONS "WHO SPEAK WITH AUTHORITY." SAID: "COOKEY CAN SPEAK WITH AUTHORITY FOR BIAFRA. HE IS A MAN OF HIGH STATURE IN BIAFRA."

8. ASKED ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF INTERMEDIARIES SUCH AS CANADA, DOHENY SAID "I HOPE BRITISH WILL ACT ON THEIR OWN INITIATIVE."

9. SAID MORALE HIGH IN BIAFRA AND OJUKWU ENJOYS FULL SUPPORT AND LOYALTY OF BIAFRANS. SAID AZIKIWE SHOULD HAVE CHECKED WITH BIAFRA BEFORE GOING TO LAGOS. DEPLORED ZIKI'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS.

10. COMMENTS: (A) DOHENY HAS OJUKWU'S CONFIDENCE AND IS QUITE SERIOUS ABOUT NEED FOR DIALOGUE. HE WISHES HIS VIEWS BE KEPT SECRET BUT IS WILLING TO DISCUSS WHOLE BIAFRAN ISSUE WITH DEPARTMENT. HE IS VERY KNOWLEDGEABLE, DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT BIAFRANS, BELIEVES THE GENOCIDE CHARGE IS HIGHLY EXAGGERATED IN BIAFRA BUT RECOGNIZES IT AS MAJOR FACTOR IN KEEPING BIAFRANS FIGHTING. (B) DOHENY INDICATED HE CAME GENEVA FROM DUBLIN TO "FILL LACUNA", HAD NEVER MET FERGUSON. FERGUSON OF OPINION THAT DOHENY PUTTING OUT SIGNALS RESULTING FROM COOKEY-HOUPHOUET - "AND FROM FRIENDS" TALKS WHICH TOOK PLACE TUESDAY NIGHT GENEVA. (C) FERGUSON SUGGESTED DOHENY THAT IF BIAFRANS HAVE A "PRICE" OTHER THAN THE "STATED PRICE" IT MIGHT BE USEFUL IF THEY SENT MESSAGE IN CLEAR TERMS BY KNOWN BIAFRAN OFFICIAL. FERGUSON SUGGESTED PIOUS OKIGBO OR SIR LOUIS MBANEFO AS POSSIBLES. TUBBY

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
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S/S-O	11	Date August 27, 1969	Dpty

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0212





11784

WH(MORRIS) APPVD NRN -  
 (R.Booth to R. Smith - 9/3/69  
 HB SECRET 9/1/69  
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

## RS/R FILES

Attention ~~has Michlett~~  
 Keep this study together.

August 27, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER  
 THE WHITE HOUSE

COPIES  
 S/S to:

AF  
 AF/W  
 AF/SN  
 U/CF  
 H  
 S/S-RF  
 S/S-P/C

Subject: Message to the President from  
 Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada

A letter dated July 29 to the Acting Secretary from the Canadian Ambassador transmitted a message from Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau to the President. The Prime Minister acknowledged the President's July 15 letter concerning the conflict in Nigeria and offered his Government's assistance in any manner that might be useful.

The Department maintains a close and continuing exchange of information on this topic with the Canadian Ambassador and his staff. In view of this satisfactory liaison and the conclusive nature of the Prime Minister's letter, the Department considers that no further response to the letter is necessary.

*L. Pawley*  
 Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.  
 Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Letter from Canadian Ambassador (S)

AF/SN:Rwach:11 x-23469 8/26/69 Clearances:  
 AF/SN - WHBrubeck

Mr. Westerfield  
 AF-35

SECRET S/S-S -

MICROFILMED  
 BY S/S: CMS

P O K 2 7 B I A F R A - N I G E R I A  
 X R P O K 2 7 - 9 B I A F R A - N I G E R I A

0213

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 959503
By	MN
NARA Date	10/5/05

CANADIAN EMBASSY

AMBASSADE DU CANADA

SECRET

1746 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D. C. 20036

July 29, 1969

Dear Mr. Richardson,

I have the honour to ask if you would convey to the President the following message from my Prime Minister concerning the situation in Nigeria:

"My dear President,

I wish to thank you for your thoughtfulness in writing to me as you did on July 15 with respect to the tragic conflict now raging in Nigeria. Your kind remarks with respect to Canada's effort to reduce the suffering in that country are very much appreciated.

I know that Canadian government officials have been in close and continuous contact with United States officials and I hope that this type of liaison will assist in finding some solutions to the many problems still existing.

I need only add that my government stands ready to take any useful step in this direction should there by any indication that some effective result would obtain.

With kind good wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Pierre Elliott Trudeau"

Yours sincerely,

*A. E. Ritchie*  
A. E. Ritchie  
Ambassador

The Honourable  
Elliot L. Richardson, Esq.  
Acting Secretary of State  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

0214

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND959503  
By MM NARA Date 05/05

WH(MORRIS) APPVD NRN - 9/3/69  
(R <sup>Reb</sup> to R. Smith). *MS*



SECRET  
S/S 11784

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 30, 1969

COPIES TO:  
P/C file  
S/S-RF.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Message to the President from Prime  
Minister Trudeau of Canada

The enclosed letter dated July 29 to the  
Acting Secretary from the Canadian Ambassador  
transmits a message from Canadian Prime Minister  
Trudeau to the President. The Prime Minister  
acknowledges the President's July 15 letter con-  
cerning the conflict in Nigeria and offers his  
government's assistance in any manner that might  
be useful.

The Department's recommendation concerning  
a reply will be forwarded at a later date.

*Wingate Lloyd*  
for John P. Walsh  
Acting Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Letter from Canadian Ambassador.

SECRET

S/S-S:WLlloyd:bjw 7/30/69

0215

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority *VND 950503*  
By *MNARA* Date *10/5/03*

CANADIAN EMBASSY



AMBASSADE DU CANADA

SECRET

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Washington, D. C. 20036

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Yours sincerely,

Pierre Elliott Trudeau"

Yours sincerely,

  
A. E. Ritchie  
Ambassador

The Honourable  
Elliot L. Richardson, Esq.  
Acting Secretary of State  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

0216

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 950503  
By MN NARA Date 01/05/05

FORM DS-1563  
12-63

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

CONTROL NO.

11784

**ACTION SLIP**

(To Remain With Correspondence)

SECRET  
ATTACHMENT

TO

UCF

DATE

7/30/69

SUBJECT

Letter to Acting Secretary from Canadian Ambassador dated July 29  
transmitting message to the President on Nigeria.

**ACTION**

\*Prompt handling is essential. Return basic correspondence with reply. If delayed call telephone extension below.

XXX ~~For appropriate action~~ For recommendation concerning reply.

For direct reply. Comeback copy required \_\_\_\_\_

Prepore reply. A response for signature by the \_\_\_\_\_

Clear with \_\_\_\_\_

Prepore a \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_

Refer to White House request of \_\_\_\_\_

Due in S/S by 8/4/69

For your information.

REMARKS

COPIES TO

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EUR?

SECRET

Wingate Lloyd 22156

SECRETARIAT STAFF

EXT.

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 950503  
By NARA Date 10/5/03

0217

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

SECRET Attachment

August 22, 1969

AF/AFW - Mr. Shenef  
Room 4252A

Per our telcon pls  
prepare E/K memo to dispose  
of this one for good.

Rush Taylor  
S/S-S

Attachment:

S/S 11784

SECRET Attachment

0218

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority ND 959503  
By MN NARA Date 03/05

CANADIAN EMBASSY

AMBASSADE DU CANADA



SECRET

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Washington, D. C. 20036

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
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Yours sincerely,

Pierre Elliott Trudeau"

Yours sincerely,

  
A. E. Ritchie  
Ambassador

The Honourable  
Elliot L. Richardson, Esq.  
Acting Secretary of State  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

0219

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority VND 9509503  
By MMNARA Date 05/05



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET

S/S 11784

July 30, 1969

COPIES TO:

P/C file

S/S-RF.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Message to the President from Prime  
Minister Trudeau of Canada

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The Department's recommendation concerning a reply will be forwarded at a later date.

*Wingate Lloyd*  
John P. Walsh  
Acting Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Letter from Canadian Ambassador.

SECRET

S/S-S:WLloyd:bjw 7/30/69

0220

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NID 959503  
By MM NARA Date 10/5/03

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

SECRET Attachment

August 22, 1969

AF/AFW - Mr. Sherry  
Room 4252A


Per our telcon pls  
prepare E/K memo to dispose  
of this one for good.

*ml for*  
Rush Taylor  
S/S-S

Attachment:

S/S 11784

SECRET Attachment



RS/R

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Message to the President from  
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Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Letter from Canadian Ambassador (S)

AF/SN:Rwach:11 x-23469 8/26/69 Clearances:  
AF/SN - WHBruback  
AF - Mr. Westerfield  
S/S-S -  
SECRET

0222

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By MNARA Date 10/5/05

FORM 55-1563-  
12-63

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

CONTROL NO.

**ACTION SLIP**  
(To Remain With Correspondence)

SECRET  
ATTACHMENT

11784

TO

YCF

DATE

7/30/69

SUBJECT

Letter to Acting Secretary from Canadian Ambassador dated July 29  
transmitting message to the President on Nigeria.

**ACTION**

\*Prompt handling is essential. Return basic correspondence with reply. If delayed call telephone extension below.

XXX ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ For recommendation concerning reply.

For direct reply. Comeback copy required \_\_\_\_\_.

Prepore reply. A response for signature by the \_\_\_\_\_.  
Clear with \_\_\_\_\_.

Prepore a \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_.

Refer to White House request of \_\_\_\_\_.

X

Due in S/S by 8/4/69

For your information.

REMARKS

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Wingate Lloyd 22156

SECRETARIAT STAFF

EXT.

0223

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Authority: NID 959503  
By: MN NARA Date: 10/5/03



SECRET/EXDIS  
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POL 27 Biafra-Nigeria

Department of State

TELEGRAM

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ACTION: Amembassy ROME

INFO: USMISsion GENEVA

STATE \_\_\_\_\_

EXDIS

GENEVA FOR FERGUSON

SUBJECT: Nigeria/Biafra

REF: 1) Rome 5252 2) Rome 5061 3) Rome 4617

1. At next suitable opportunity Embassy requested inquire of Casaroli or other appropriate Vatican official current status Pope's Kampala peace initiative. We intrigued by divergencies, mentioned para 4 ref tel 2, in Biafran position at Kampala. We would also be interested in outcome Monsignor Bayer trip to Biafra in late July to elicit Biafran minimal negotiating demands.

2. You may express our appreciation to Vatican for keeping us informed of developments and express our continuing interest in prospects for negotiated settlement this tragic war.

END

ROGERS

DRAFTED BY: RRP DRAFTING DATE: 8/26/69 TEL. EXT. APPROVED BY:  
AF/SN:RLPerkins:nb 23406 AF/SN:WHBruback:W3

CLEARANCES:

AF/SN:GBSheffy  
EUR - Miss Tibbets

S/S - Mr. Brown

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FORM DS-322 Rev  
4-68

02224

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
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S/S-Screener	27, 28 + 29	Post <i>None</i>	Dpty
S/S-S-CMS	30	Serial No. <i>144038</i>	
S/S-O	11	Date <i>8-26-69</i>	Dpty

PRINCIPALS	GEOGRAPHIC BUREAUS
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J 6	EA
D	EUR 16-17
C 7	NEA
J/PM	OTHER AGENCIES
S/PC	White House 2/3
S/CPR 10, 12	Vice President
U/CF	Defense
	State Rep
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8/20/69

0225





Department of State **TELEGRAM**

31

CONFIDENTIAL 275

Re Pol 7 Biafra

Re Pol 27 Biafra-Nigeria

PAGE 01 LONDON 06785 261818Z

45  
ACTION AFT 18

INFO: OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, UCFI 05, UPW 01, SRI 01, DORM 00, SCS 04, SCA 01,  
AID 28, USIE 00, SSO 00, NSCI 00, CCO 00, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02,  
INR 07, LI 03, NSAEI 00, NSCI 10, PI 04, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, RSR 01, 145 W  
028402

PIR 261706Z AUG 69  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2405  
INFO: AMEMBASSY ACCRA  
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM  
USMISSION GENEVA  
AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE  
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA  
USMISSION USUN

CIO: N: F: I: D: E: N: T: I: A: L: LONDON 6785

SUBJECT: NIGERIAN AZIKIWE TO MAKE STATEMENT IN LONDON

1. FONOFF'S: DONALD TEBBIT (ASST UNDER SECRETARY) INFORMS US THAT FORMER NIGERIAN PRESIDENT AZIKIWE HAS RETURNED TO LONDON AND THAT HE WILL MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF ONE NIGERIA AT PRESS CONFERENCE THURSDAY, AUG. 28. ACCORDING TO TEBBIT, AZIKIWE DRAFTED STATEMENT IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS RETURN FROM MONROVIA LAST FRI., AUG. 22, AND SHOWED IT TO GOWON'S PRIVATE SECRETARY, HAMZAT AHMADU WHO HAS BEEN FMG'S GO-BETWEEN WITH ZIK AND TRAVELED WITH HIM ON RECENT TRIP. AT FMG'S REQUEST AZIKIWE INTENDS TO TAPE RECORD HIS STATEMENT SO THAT IT CAN BE BROADCAST IN HIS OWN WORDS TO BIAFRAN CONTROLLED AREAS.

2. TEBBIT UNDERSTANDS THAT ZIK HAS AGREED TO GO TO LAGOS IN ABOUT 10 DAYS AND WILL SPEND TWO WEEKS THERE. HE INTENDS TO RETURN TO LONDON FOR APPROXIMATELY TWO WEEKS TO FINISH

CONFIDENTIAL

23

0226  
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Authority NND 959503  
By MNARA Date 10/5/05



POL 17 EQ GUIN. GABON  
X8 POL 27 BIAFRA NIGERIA  
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED 266

PAGE 01 LIBREV 00881 301146Z

531 ACTION AFI 18:

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, HI 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00,  
NSC 10, PI 03, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, AID 28, UCF 05, RBR 01

/133: W

056836

Libreville 881  
8-26-69

RI 261555Z AUG 69  
FM AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2776  
INFO AMEMBASSY SANTA ISABEL,  
AMEMBASSY MADRID  
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE  
AMEMBASSY LOME

UNCLAS LIBREVILLE 881

SUBJECT: BONGO AND EQUATORIAL GUINEAN VISITOR

1. JUST PRIOR TO DEPARTING 25 AUGUST FOR TOUR OF HAUT-OGOUE REGION, PRESIDENT BONGO MET WITH EG PUBLIC WORKS MINISTER ALFONSO OYONO. ACCORDING TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT-RUN PRESS, OYONO BROUGHT MESSAGE TO BONGO FROM PRESIDENT MACIAS. PRECISE CONTENTS OF MESSAGE NOT DIVULGED, BUT OYONO TOLD REPORTERS IT CONTAINED REQUEST FOR GABONESE AID TO EG.

2. ASKED BY NEWSMEN ABOUT CURRENT HISPANO-GUINEAN RELATIONS, OYONO SAID HE PLEASED TO REPORT THAT THESE HAD BEEN RE-ESTABLISHED FOLLOWING "EFFERVESCENCE" OF FEW MONTHS AGO. HE ADDED "WE EQUATO-GUINEANS PREFER AN OLD MASTER WHO KNOWS OUR PROBLEMS." ALSO NOTED THAT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN EG AND GABON WERE IN PROCESS OF BEING ESTABLISHED AND THAT EG COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAD APPROVED ACCREDITATION OF AMBASSADOR TO GABON.

3. QUERIED ABOUT NIGERIA-BIAFRA PROBLEM, OYONO REPLIED THAT EG POSITION IS ONE OF NEUTRALITY TEMPERED WITH SORROW OVER TRAGEDY WHICH THREATENS HAVE REPERCUSSIONS THROUGHOUT AFRICA.

2  
FUNKHOUSER

UNCLASSIFIED 23

0227

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Authority VND 950503  
By MNARA Date 01/5/03

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10/13/69  
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Classification

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy LAGOS

Info:

INFO: Amembassy LONDON  
PARIS  
US MISSION GENEVA  
USUN NEW YORK  
Amconsul IBADAN  
KADUNA

SUBJ: Nigeria Press Summary - August 24-25

1. NYTimes reported August 24 "Death rate from starvation reported rising again in Biafra". In article by Eric Pace, NYTimes said:

QTE: Relief administrators and leaders of the Biafran government say more than a thousand children are dying each day as a result of the blockade of encircling federal Nigerian Army.

They say the rate has risen 50% since Swiss-run ICRC was compelled to stop its food airlift. The stoppage came in June, after Nigerians shot down one of the planes flying the airlift, which was mounted from Dahomey and island of Fernando Po.

INNER QTE: The situation is not quite as bad as it was last year at this time, but it will soon be that--and perhaps worse, END INNER QTE the government's chief secretary, N.U. Akpan, said. He held a news conference at his office in Owerri, Biafra's provisional capital, 15 miles north of here.

Even in Owerri hunger has sent food prices soaring. In capital's best hotels, each pineapple slice is divided among four guests. And a hungry mouse

⑦

Drafted by: AF/P:WCPowell, imp 8/25/69 | Tel. Ext. 20322 | Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: WHB/WHBruebeck

FORM 8-65 DS-322

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

0228

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority VN10950503  
By MMNARA Date 01/3/03

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED

*Classification*

Page 2 of tel to Amembassy LAGOS

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Origin  
Info:

gnawed into a pillow in one room last night.

What Biafrans lack most are the protein-rich foods, notably dried fish, that they imported into their overpopulated region before blockade.

Dried fish and other foodstuffs as well as medicines are still being airlifted in by French Red Cross, Africa Concern--a Dublin-based group--and Joint Church Aid, a loose grouping of more than a dozen Roman Catholic, Protestant and Jewish charitable organizations.

But Biafran officials report that on a good night only about 150 tons of supplies are brought in while 300 to 500 tons a night are needed to prevent famine. The hundreds of thousands of refugees who were uprooted by civil war that broke out after Biafra seceded from Nigeria in 1967 and who have not been taken in by kinfolk are most acutely threatened.

Late last year as many as 6,000 people were dying a day before hastily organized relief shipments reduced toll.

There is hope now that harvests in next few weeks may relieve food situation. But farming has been badly disrupted by the war, and predictions differ widely as to how much relief homegrown crops will bring.

Biafran ~~xx~~ officials are uniformly pessimistic about chances of negotiating Nigeria's acquiescence in staging daylight relief flights. The

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:


Clearances:

UNCLASSIFIED

*Classification*

FORM DS-322  
8-65

02229



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

Origin

ACTION: Page 3 of tel to Amembassy LAGOS

Info:

relief planes try to avoid harassment by Nigerian jets by flying at night. UNQTE  
2. In August 25 article Times said "Rainy season impedes Nigerian forces and  
raises hopes Biafrans." According to Times, rains "impede Nigerian air-strikes,  
armor movements and harassment of incoming relief flights. In so doing they  
encourage Biafrans hold out in spite Federal blockade." Following is excerpted  
from article:

QTE: Talk of success at least is possible at this season largely because  
of increased imported supplies of arms.

Biafran officials say arms are mostly bought on commercial market but  
they decline to elaborate. Nigeria's forces made sweeping advances during  
last year's "udu nmili" when Biafrans lacked guns and bullets. But this year  
Biafran officials say their infantrymen are able to stalk and attack Nigerian  
armored cars that get bogged down in Biafran mud.

...In some ways, rains have greatly complicated Biafra's internal  
communications, but they have helped defensive stance as well. Many roadways  
that might otherwise provide avenues for Nigerian armor have been flooded  
or washed away.

The udu nmili cloudbanks also seem to discourage the pilots--said here

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Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

Clearances:

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FORM DS-322  
8-65

0230

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Authority VND 950503  
By MNARA Date 10/5/05

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# AM Department of State

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*Classification*

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Origin: ACTION: Page 4 of tel to Amembassy LAGOS

Info:

to be East German or Egyptian--of Nigeria's Air Force. The raids by Nigerian MIG's on Biafran targets have been fewer in recent weeks. UNQUOTE

JOHNSON

[ROGERS]

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Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

Clearances:

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8-65

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By *MN* NARA Date *10/5/05*

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POL 27 Biafra Nigeria  
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 557

PAGE 01 GENEVA 03024 251831Z

44

ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01, SSO 000/031 W

021258

PI 251800Z AUG 69  
FM USMISSION GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2688

S E C R E T GENEVA 3024

**ACTION COPY**

Geneva 3024  
6/5/69  
S

EXDIS

FROM FERGUSON

1. COOKEY AND OBI IN GENEVA.
2. INITIAL BILATERAL MEETING SCHEDULED FOR TUESDAY AUG 26 AT 3:00.
3. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO LONDON, LAGOS, PARIS, ADDIS ABABA, AND USUN NEW YORK.  
TUBBY

NOTE: NOT PASSED BY OC/T.

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SECRET

32

0232

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
SCATS

IN COMING

SECRETARIAT	Distribution by <i>Chas</i>	Ex Secy
S/S <u>8-9</u>	Classification SECRET	
S/S-Screener <u>28-29-30</u>	Post GENEVA	<i>Adm</i>
S/S-S-CMS <u>31</u>	Serial No. 3024	
S/S-O <u>11</u>	Date August 25, 1969	Dpty

PRINCIPALS	GEOGRAPHIC BUREAUS
S ✓ <u>4</u>	AF ✓✓ (a) <u>15</u>
U ✓ <u>5</u>	ARA
J ✓ <u>6</u>	EA
D	EUR ✓ <u>16</u>
C ✓ <u>7</u>	NEA
J/PM	OTHER AGENCIES
S/PC	White House ✓✓ <u>2-3</u>
S/CPR ✓ <u>10-12</u>	Vice President
U/CF	Defense ✓ <u>17</u>
	State Rep ✓ <u>18</u>
FUNCTIONAL BUREAUS	CIA ✓ <u>17</u>
E	ACDA
H	AID
INR ✓ <u>13</u>	AID/VN
IO	USIA
L	NSA
O	Treasury
P	
	OTHER
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0233





Re 27 Biafra - Nigeria  
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 045

PAGE 01 LIBREV 00875 290945Z

18  
ACTION AF 18

INFO OCT 01, UCF 05, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INRI 07, LI 03, NLAE 00,  
NSC 10, P 03, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, IO 13, AID 28, NIK 01,  
EUR 17, SR 01, ORMI 03, PC 04, RSR 01, 155: W

047919

R 250725Z AUG 69  
FM AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2772

CONFIDENTIAL LIBREVILLE 875

CORRECTED COPY

DEPT REPEAT AS DESIRED

SUBJECT: BONTT AND BIAFRA

WT CHANCE TO TOUCH POINTS STATE 135768 OCCURRED AT OYEM VILLAGE WHEN DIPLOMATIC CORPS RUBBED ELBOWS WITH BONGOS AND GABONESE RANK DURING FOLKLORIQUE INDEPENDENCE WEEKEND. THEN YESTERDAY, PRESIDENT INVITED ME TO PRESIDENCY TO RETOUR HORIZON, INCLUDING BIAFRA QUESTION.

2. OLD HANDS WILL FIND GABONESE FEELING OLD HAT, BUT FOR RECORD THEY FOLLOW:

A. AMERICA SHOULD NOT TRY TO REMAKE AFRICA IN ITS IMAGE, E.G., FEDERALISM, PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY, WAR OF SECESSION ANALOGY, ETC.

B. FEDERALISM IS DOOMED IN TRIBAL AFRICA WHENEVER FORCE TO MAKE IT RUN IS ABSENT, E.G., SENEGAL-MALI, SUDAN, RHODESIA-NYASALAND, ETC.

C. IBOS HAVE STRONG TRADITION OF LIBERTY SINCE PRE-SLAVERY DAYS AND HAD MORE AUTONOMY UNDER BRITISH COLONIAL RULE THAN AFTER SO-CALLED INDEPENDENCE.

(1)

CONFIDENTIAL

7

0234

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Authority NID 959503  
By MM NARA Date 10/5/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 LIBREV 00875 290945Z

D. BIAFRA IS STRONGER PHYSICALLY, MORALLY, AND INTELLECTUALLY THAN REST OF SO-CALLED NIGERIA; HENCE, IT SHOULD BE INDEPENDENT OR THE CAPITAL SHOULD BE THERE.

E. FRENCH UNSUCCESSFULLY TRIED TO FEDERATE GABON INTO ARTIFICIALLY UNIFIED EQUATORIAL AFRICA, WHICH IF CAPITAL HAD BEEN IN BRAZZAVILLE AS PLANNED, SIMILAR DISASTER WOULD HAVE STRUCK; GABONESE PROGRESS REFLECTS ITS INDEPENDENT STATUS.

F. ARGUMENT THAT BALKANIZATION IS BAD IS IRRELEVANT IN AFRICA WHICH IS STILL FAR BEHIND BALKANS OF WORLD WAR ONE VINTAGE; I SUE OF MINI-STATES IN UN ALREADY CROSSED OVER. WHAT REAL DIFFERENCE WOULD MORE MAKE? MAYBE THERE SHOULD BE SOME OVERALL UN SOLUTION FOR MINI-STATES.

G. BIAFRA WOULD AT LEAST REPRESENT STAUNCHLY ANTI-COMMUNIST, CHRISTIAN FORCE, COMPARED LAGOS WHICH IN UNHOLY ALLIANCE WITH BOTH COMMUNISTS AND ARABS.

H. AFRICA AND O.A.U. CAN'T SOLVE WAR; TRIBAL SOCIETIES REQUIRE A PERIOD OF "PALAVER," BUT ONLY COMMAND DECISION BY CHIEF CAN SETTLE PROBLEM.

I. ONLY US CAN FILL THAT ROLE; IT SHOULD KNOCK HEADS TOGETHER, STARTING WITH GOWMN AND OJUKWU OR THEIR SUCCESSORS, BUT CONCENTRATE PARTICULARLY ON BRITISH-AND FRENCH ROTTAGONISTS.

J. ALL AFRICANS WOULD ACCEPT SUCH DECISION AND SOLUTION BY OBJECTIVE AND, ABOVE ALL, POWERFUL UMPIRE; CERTAINLY OJUKWU WOULD (SIC).

K. GABON CAN PLAY A ROLE, HOWEVER MINOR; GABON NATIONAL MOTTO INCLUDES "DIALOGUE" AND "PEACE"; OJUKWU HAS VISITED BONGO IN LIBREVILLE THREE TIMES; SHOULD AMBASSADOR FERGUSON WISH TO VISIT LIBREVILLE, HE WOULD BE WARMLY WELCOMED AND MEETING COULD BE ARRANGED.

L. MANY PROFITING FROM THIS WAR, E.G., COMMUNISTS, FASCISTS, ADVENTURERS, INTERNATIONAL BUREAUCRACY, HOTELS, AND ECONOMIC OF STATES THROUGH WHICH SHIPMENTS MOVE; GABON WOULD, OF COURSE, PREFER THAT AMERICANS USE LIBREVILLE AS BASE FOR HUMANITARIAN

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By MNARA Date 10/5/03



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 03 LIBREV 00875 290945Z

EFFORTS (AIRPORT FACILITIES MORE THAN ADEAUATE), BUT STILL BETTER  
WOULD BE TO PUT 75 MILLION DOLLARS ALREADY SPENT INTO VABOMEKE  
RAILROAD PROJECT.

M. SOLUTION TO CONFLICT MIGMT INCLUDE REMOVAL OF BOTH  
GOWAN AND OJUKWU SINCE THEY NOW IMPLACABLE ENEMIES, LOOSE  
POLITICAL CONFEDERATION EMBRACING COMMON ECONOMIC BASE  
(COMMUNICATIONS, MONEY, DEVELOPMENT OF RESOURCES), INDEPENDENT  
POLICE AND SECURITY FORCES.

N. IN SUMMARY, US HAD BEEN LACKING WRONG HORSE ON  
BASIS PRINCIPLES WHICH IRRELEVANT AND IMPRACTICABLE IN AFRICA.  
IBOS ARE AS INDIGESTBLE IN AFRICA AS JEWS IN MIDDLE EAST  
BECAUSE OF THEIR RELATIVE SUPERIORITY, SELF-RELIANCE,  
ARROGANCE, INDUSTRY, AND LOVE OF PERSONAL FREEDOM.

3. COMMENT. AND WHO WANTS ANOTHER MIDDLE EAST?

GP=3  
FUNKHOUSER

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0236

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Authority NID 959503  
By MN NARA Date 05/05



48

01 12 2 11 S  
Pol 7 Biafra  
XR Pol 16 Biafra  
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

XR Pol 27 Biafra - Nigeria

CONFIDENTIAL 007

PAGE 01 DARI ES: 02483 251049Z

22

ACTION: AF 18

INFO: OCT 01, EUR 17, UCF 05, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPMI 04, HI 02, INRI 07, LI 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, IO 13, UPW 01, AID 28, SR 01, ORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 01, RSR 01, /157, H 01, M 01, R: 250841Z AUG 69, 018512

FM: AMEMBASSY DARI ES: SALAAM

TO: AMEMBASSY LAGOS

INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC 6620

AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY KAMPALA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MONROVIA

AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

C O D I N G: F I D E N T I A L D A R I E S : S A L A A M 2 4 8 3

S U B J : N I G E R I A : A Z I K I W E ! A N D T A N Z A N I A N R E C O G N I T I O N O F B I A F R A

R E F : L A G O S 7 5 5 5 P o l 7 Biafra

XR Pol 16 Biafra

1. DARI'S A-343 OF APRIL 8, 1968 WHICH WAS WRITTEN BEFORE TANZANIA RECOGNIZED BIAFRA, DISCUSSED REASONS BEHIND NYERERE'S PRO-BIAFRA LEANINGS. AIRGRAM REPORTED THAT "MICHAEL OKPARA AND FORMER NIGERIAN PRESIDENT AZIKIWE HAVE PAID VISITS TO TANZANIA, WHERE THEY HAVE USED THEIR PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH NYERERE AND THEIR REPUTATIONS TO GOOD ADVANTAGE." NOTHING HAS COME TO OUR ATTENTION SINCE A-343 WAS DRAFTED WHICH WOULD CHANGE OUR ESTIMATE THAT AZIKIWE'S INFLUENCE WAS ONE OF SEVERAL FACTORS PROMPTING NYERERE TO FAVOR BIAFRA.

2. AZIKIWE'S RECENT APPARENT CHANGE OF HEART DOES NOT RPT NOT AS YET SEEM TO HAVE HAD ANY EFFECT ON TANZANIAN POSITION. IN FACT, TANU PARTY PAPER "UHURU," REFERRING TO AZIKIWE'S VISITS TO LAGOS AND MONROVIA, DENOUNCED HIM IN ITS AUG 22 EDITORIAL AND CALLED HIM "STOOGE"

CONFIDENTIAL

0237

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Authority NID 959503  
By MNARA Date 10/5/03



6b  
POL 7 BIAFRA  
MR POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA  
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 058

PAGE 01 LAGOS 07644 251048Z

48  
ACTION: AFT 18

INFO: OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, AID 28, SRI 01, ORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 01, CIAE 00,  
DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, PI 04, RSC 01,

PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, UPW 01, UCFI 05, RSR 01, 7/157 W  
----- 018887

R 251048Z AUG 69  
FM: AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC 8570  
INFO: AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
USMISSION GENEVA  
USMISSION USUN

CONFIDENTIAL A. L. LAGOS: 7644

SUBJECT: AZIKIWE

THERE FOLLOWS TEXT OF UKHICOMER TELEGRAM OF AUGUST 22:

(BEGIN TEXT) 1. ARIKPO TOLD ME TODAY THAT AT MONROVIA AZIKIWE HAD AGREED TO COME BACK TO LIVE IN NIGERIA AND MIGHT BE HERE BY THE END OF THE MONTH.

2. AZIKIWE HAD ALSO SAID THAT:

A. HIS ORIGINAL OXFORD PROPOSALS WERE UNREALISTIC AND COULD ONLY HAVE HELPED ONUKWU (WITH WHOM HE WAS NOW QUITE DISILLUSIONED).

B. A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WAS REQUIRED.

C. THERE MIGHT BE SOME MORE STATES ABOVE THE EXISTING TWELVE E. G. PERHAPS A NORTHERN IBO STATE BASED ON ONITSHA AND ENUGU AND A SOUTHERN ONE BASED ON OWERRI, WHICH HE HOPED WOULD INCLUDE PORT HARCOURT.

CONFIDENTIAL

0238

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NID 950503  
By MN NARA Date 01/5/03

ORIGIN/ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE			POL 7 NIGERIA	
AF-5			AIRGRAM			FOR RM USE ONLY	
RM/R	REP	AF	A-160			X R POL 27 B AFRA NIGERIA	
1			NO. 1			TRANSMISSION INDICATOR	
ARA	CUR	FR	TO : Department of State			RECEIVED	
	5	EA	INFO : ADDIS ABABA, KAMPALA, KIGALI, SEAGOS			3 51 PM 2009	
NEA	CU	INR	FROM : Amembassy BUJUMBURA			DATE: August 23, 1969	
E	P	10	SUBJECT: Visit of Nigerian Commissioner TARKA				
	2	5	REF :				
L	FBO	AID					
AGR	COM	FRB					
INT	LAB	TAR					
TR	XMB	AIR					
ARMY	CIA	NAVY					
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OSO	USIA	NSA					
34	10	3					
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Radio Burundi announced on August 20, 1969 the visit of Mr. Joseph S. TARKA, Commissioner of Transport of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria. Commissioner TARKA had already visited Kenya and Rwanda before coming to Burundi and left Bujumbura on August 20th for Kampala.

TARKA was received by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Lazare NTAWURISHIRA, to whom he passed a personal message from Major General GOWON for President MICOMBERO. His visit received considerable radio coverage: it was mentioned twice in news broadcasts and a seven-minute interview with him was also broadcast. In this interview, TARKA stated that the purpose of his trip was to explain the Nigerian position to African governments before the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Summit conference in September. He stated also that the governments of Rwanda and Burundi had been "very receptive" to his approach, because he had explained the origins of the problem, and that they "understand" Nigeria's position and are "neutral". He expressed the hope that the Summit would find a "peaceful solution" to the problem.


Comment:

The position of the Federal Government of Nigeria has received considerable publicity in Burundi from the visit. The general emphasis of Tarka's presentation was

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Drafted by: POL/ECON:DHSimpson:ve 8/21/69 Contents and Classification Approved by: AMB:GWRenhardt  
Clearances:

0239



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Burundi A-160

2

on peace and negotiations, a good pitch here.


General public opinion in Burundi could be described as one of human as opposed to political sympathy for the Biafrans. It is clear that the GRB will not recognize Biafra and will probably make no waves on the subject at Addis in September.

RENCHARD



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POL 27 Biafra - Nigeria,  
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 ROME 05321 221419Z

44  
ACTION: AFI 18

INFO: OCT 01, EUR 17, UCF 05, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, 0  
LI 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, AID 28, 0  
UPW 01, SR 01, ORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 01, RSR 01, 157 W  
005683

R: 221350Z AUG 69  
FM: AMEMBASSY ROME  
TO: AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC 2030  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
USMISSION USUN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE: ROME 5321

SUBJ: ARIKPO STATEMENT IN ROME

REF: LAGOS 7394 - POL 27 Biafra - Nigeria

1. REGRET WE UNABLE PROVIDE TEXT OF ARIKPO'S REMARKS TO PRESS AT AIRPORT AUGUST 14. WE ARE TOLD THAT ONLY ANSA AND AFP WERE PRESENT, AND ANSA LIMITED ITSELF TO REPORTING ARRIVAL AND NAMES PEOPLE WHO MET HIM. AFP REPORT NOT AVAILABLE, BUT NIGERIAN EMBASSY SAYS ARIKPO DID NOT INTEND TO SAY ANYTHING DIFFERENT FROM WELL-KNOWN FMG POSITION, THAT IS, THAT TO SHOW ITS GOOD INTENTIONS, FMG WOULD NOT OBJECT TO INTERNATIONAL ARMISTICE CONTROL GROUPS BEING INTERPOSITIONED BETWEEN BIAFRA AND FMG FORCES. THIS AGREEMENT CONDITIONED, HOWEVER, ON BIAFRANI WILLINGNESS TO RENOUNCE SEcession AND ACCEPT NATIONAL UNITY.

2. EMBASSY ADDED THAT ARIKPO PASSED THROUGH ROME EN ROUTE FROM TRIPOLI TO OTHER NORTH AFRICAN CAPITALS ON MISSION TO DISCUSS FORTHCOMING OAU MEETING AT WHICH HE WILL ARGUE THAT OAU BEST QUALIFIED TO ARRANGE AN OBSERVER FORCE.

ACKLEY

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0241

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By MN NARA Date 01/15/05



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA  
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 653

PAGE 01 ABIDJAN 02361 221420Z

47  
ACTION AFI 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, UCF 05, UPW 01,

AID 28, SCS 04, SCA 01, SRI 01, ORM 03, RSR 01, /157 W

005695

R 221050Z AUG 69

FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4421

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY LAGOS

AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L A B I D J A N 2 3 6 1

SUBJECT: BIAFRA AT UNITED NATIONS.

1. IN COURSE TOUR D'HORIZON AUGUST 21, EMBOFF ASKED FONOFF, POLITICAL AFFAIRS DIRECTOR, ATTOUNGPRE, WHETHER IVORY COAST INTENDED RAISE BIAFRAN ISSUE AT UN. LIKE OTHER FONOFF OFFICIALS QUERIED RECENTLY THIS SUBJECT, HE SAID MATTER NOT YET DECIDED. HOWEVER, HE ADDED THAT LAST TIME QUESTION HAD BEEN CONSIDERED, IVORIAN AMBASSADOR TO UN SIMEON LAKI HAD RECOMMENDED AGAINST RAISING BIAFRAN ISSUE ON GROUNDS MAJORITY DELEGATIONS EITHER PRO-FMG OR BELIEVED QUESTION SHOULD BE HANDLED IN OAU FRAMEWORK. ON THE BASIS THIS RECOMMENDATION IVORY COAST HAD NOT PURSUED MATTER. NOW QUESTION WAS BEING CONSIDERED AGAIN BUT HE IMPLIED BASIC SITUATION HAD NOT CHANGED.

2. COMMENT: IN LAST ANALYSIS DECISION WILL BE MADE BY HOUPHOUET, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SWAYED BY CONSIDERATIONS OF PRACTICALITY.

GP-3  
MORGAN

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0242

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Authority NID 950503  
By MN NARA Date 01/5/03



Pal FR - GABON  
Xp Pal 27 Biafra Nigeria  
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

30

xR, P/N 6 CHICOM

Libreville, Gab  
8-2-69

CONFIDENTIAL 295

PAGE 01 LIBREV 00865 230917Z

16  
ACTION AF 18

INFO OCT 01, EA 10, IO 13, UCF 05, C1AE 00, DODEI 00, JPM 04, HI 02, INR 07,  
LI 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, AID 28,  
EUR 17 (RSR 01), UPW 01/158 W

R 221505Z AUG 69  
FM AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2768  
INFO AMEMBASSY TAIPEI  
USUN 129

C O N F I D E N T I A L LIBREVILLE 865  
SUBJECT: BONGO AND CHINA

REFB STATE 135768, EMB 826

CHALK UP ANOTHER BROWNIE POINT FOR BONGO WHO CONFIRMED  
TO ROVING CHINESE AMBASSADOR YANG AUGUST 21 THAT GABON  
WOULD ONCE AGAIN

A. COSPONSOR MOTION THAT CHINA IS "IMPORTANT" ISSUE  
ANDI

B. VOTE AGAINST SEATING COME CHINA SHOULD FORMER  
FAIL.

AS IS WELL KNOWN, IT IS NOT EASY FOR BONGO TO OPPOSE  
FRANCE PUBLICLY ON THIS OR ANY OTHER MAJOR ISSUE.  
GP 3  
FUNKHOUSER

(B)

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Authority NND 950503  
By MN NARA Date 10/5/03



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA  
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 LUANDA 00373 230802Z

21  
ACTION: AFI 18

INFO: OCT 01, EUR 17, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, HI 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00, G

NSC 10, PI 04, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, AID 28, ACDA 16, IO 13,

UCF 05, MC 02, RSR 01, 165 W

011895

R 221550Z AUG 69  
FM: AMCONSUL LUANDA  
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC 1055  
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA  
INFO: AMEMBASSY GABERONES  
AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE  
AMEMBASSY LISBON  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY PARIS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE! LUANDA 373

SUBJ: MILITARY AIRCRAFT POL 27

REF: LONDON 6329 (NOTAL), GABERONES 339 (NOTAL)

1. MILITARY AIRCRAFT, BELIEVED C-160 TRANSALL, TRANSITED LUANDA, ARRIVING 1710, 8/21, DEPARTED 0800, 8/22, ORIGIN/ DESTINATION BOTH UNKNOWN.

2. AIRCRAFT MARKINGS: FRENCH COLORS APPEAR ON UPSWEPT TAIL, AND NO. 331 PAINTED ON LEFT-REAR AND RIGHT-CENTER FUSELAGE. "SA AIR FORCE" LETTERED IN BLACK ON LEFT AND "SA LUGMAG" ON RIGHT FUSELAGE.

3. PORTUGUESE UNWILLING DIVULGE INFO RE AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN LUANDA. STOPOVER WAS FOR REFUELING.  
DEI VOS

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0244

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Authority NND959503  
By MNARA Date 05/05



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA  
Department of State XE POL 3 OAU  
TELEGRAM

(11) SECRET 941

PAGE 01 NIAMEY 01029 221632Z

48

ACTION AFI 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, AGR 20, STR 08, EI 15, COM 08, TRSY 11, CIAE 00,

DODE 00, JPM 04, HI 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01,

PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, AID 28, SCS 04, SCA 01, SRI 01, ORMI 03, UCF 05,

UPW 01, RSR 01, NIC 01, ACDA 16, NEA 13, 249 W

006699

RI 220800Z AUG 69

FM AMEMBASSY NIAMEY

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 300

INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA

AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

AMEMBASSY LAGOS

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MONROVIA

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE

21380

SCI CIR EIT NIAMEY 1029

SUBJ: NIGERIA ATTITUDES ON OAU MEETING AND NIGERIA WAR

REF ID: STATE 137716 -> POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

XE POL 3 OAU

SUMMARY: GONI HAS NO IDEAS HOW NIGERIA ISSUE WILL BE HANDLED AT ADDIS OAU MEETINGS. NOR IS IT AWARE OF ANY NEW PROPOSALS TO SETTLE CONFLICT. OAU RESOLUTION ON NIGERIA MAY STRESS AID TO WAR VICTIMS. GONI CONCERNED OVER GROWING SOVIET INFLUENCE IN AREA BECAUSE OF NIGERIA AND FEARS FURTHER FRAGMENTATION AFRICAN CONTINENT UNLESS CONFLICT SETTLED. END SUMMARY.

1. BOTH PRESIDENT DIORI AND SECSTATE MINFONAFF SIDIKOU STATED, IN SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS WITH AMBASSADOR AUG 18 AND 19, THEY HAVE NO IDEAS ON HOW NIGERIA ISSUE WILL BE HANDLED AT ADDIS OAU COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND CHIEFS OF STATE MEETING. THEIR VIEWS ABOUT LIKELY RESOLUTIONS, ETC., THEY STATED, ARE EXPECTED TO BECOME CLEARER FOLLOWING THE AUG 20 VISIT ARIKPO AND

(2)

SECRET

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By MN NARA Date 01/01/03



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 NIAMEY 01029 221632Z

ZINSOU AT NIAMEY, AND AFTER THEY KNOW DETAILS ABOUT AZIKIWE, TUBMAN, GOWON DISCUSSIONS. SINCE NIGER FINDS GREAT DIFFICULTY IN KEEPING AWARE ALL DEVELOPMENTS ON NIGERIA WAR, THERE MAY BE SOME PROPOSALS TO SETTLE CONFLICT ABOUT WHICH THEY DO NOT KNOW. THEY WERE UNAWARE, THEY SAID, OF ANY SPECIFIC NEW PROPOSALS AND WERE CATEGORIC IN THEIR POSITIVENESS THAT NONE HAD BEEN CIRCULATED AS AGENDA ITEM FOR EITHER MEETING.

2. DIORI AND SIDIKOU FULLY EXPECT, HOWEVER, THAT RESOLUTION ON NIGERIA TO COME OUT OF MEETING. DIORI HOPES THAT ANY RESOLUTION MIGHT URGE BOTH SIDES IN CONFLICT TO URGENTLY ACCOMMODATE THEMSELVES TO ARRANGEMENTS TO GET FOOD AND MEDICINES TO WARI VICTIMS. HE FELT THAT IT SHOULD ALSO BE THE SENSE OF THE MAJORITY OF OAU MEMBERS THAT QTE THE SENSELESS UNQUOTE KILLING BY NIGERIANS OF EACH OTHER SHOULD END.

3. WHEN TALKING FURTHER ABOUT THEIR LACK OF OPTIMISM ABOUT WHAT THE OAU CONSULTATIONS CAN DO IN FACT TO END THE WAR, DIORI REFERRED TO HIS AUG 3 SPEECH AT THE OCCASION OF NIGERIA'S 9TH ANNIVERSARY OF ITS INDEPENDENCE. THEN HE WELCOMED THE POP'S INITIATIVES, AND ANY OTHER IMPARTIAL INITIATIVES WHICH AIMED AT ENDING THE WAR IN A QTE ONE NIGERIA CONTEXT UNQUOTE. THIS STATEMENT DID NOT ALTER THE OBJECTIVES HE HAD ALWAYS HELD. WHEN HE HAS TALKED ABOUT HOW ESSENTIAL IT IS FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE NIGERIAN CONFLICT TO BE AN AFRICAN ONE, THE AIM HAS BEEN TO PRECLUDE FURTHER SPLINTERING OF AFRICAN STATES. THERE ARE, TO HIS VIEW, ALREADY TOO MANY STATES FOR SEPARATE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL VIABILITY.

4. SIDIKOU WAS MORE EXPLICIT IN STATING THAT IT IS ALREADY ABUNDANTLY CLEAR TO SOME AFRICANS THAT THE WORDS QTE SOLUTION HAS TO BE AFRICAN ONE UNQUOTE IS BEING TAKEN TOO LITERALLY. FOR SOME WORLD POWERS, HE SAID, IT HAS BECOME A CONVENIENT EXCUSE TO AVOID ENGAGEMENT. NIGERIAN CONFLICT IS ALREADY A WIDER ISSUE THAN AFRICA. EXTERNAL INTERVENTION IS ALREADY AND HAS BEEN A FACT. THE INTERVENTION TO BE AVOIDED SHOULD BE INTERVENTION WHICH AIMS AT FURTHER FRAGMENTATION OF THE AFRICAN CONTINENT.

5. SIDIKOU ARGUED THAT, BECAUSE OF LACK OF COMMON UNDERSTANDING BY FRANCE, U.S., AND GREAT BRITAIN OF THEIR JOINT INTERESTS, SOVIETS ARE BEING ALLOWED TO PURSUE THIS STRATEGY.

SECRET

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By MUNARA Date 01/5/03



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 NIAMEY 01029 221632Z

WHICH PROSPERS ON INSTABILITY, WEAKNESS, AND FURTHERS FRAGMENTATION. THE NIGERIAN CONFLICT AND ITS CONTINUATION, THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN EGYPT, SUDAN, ALGERIA, AND THE OPPORTUNITY THAT INSTABILITY IN CHAD AFFORDS, OFFERS, ACCORDING TO SIDIKOU, THE SOVIETS CHANCE FOR INFLUENCE IN CONTINUOUS AFRICAN STARTS FROM NORTH AFRICA AND THE MEDITERRANEAN INTO THE HEART OF AFRICA ACROSS TO THE GULF OF GUINEA THROUGH NIGERIA. FREEDOM THAT INDIVIDUAL AFRICAN STATES NOW ENJOY IN SPITE OF THEIR WEAKNESS COULD END SHOULD THE SOVIETS SUCCEED IN EXTENDING THEIR INFLUENCE INTO AFRICA. THE CONTINUATION OF THE NIGERIAN WAR MAKES MORE LIKELY IN ANY EVENT FURTHER FRAGMENTATION AND THE RE-CREATION OF A PRE-CONFERENCE OF BERLIN SITUATION WHEN THE AFRICAN CONTINENT FIRST CAME UP FOR GRABS. DIORI COMMENTED THAT U.S. EFFORTS TO PROVIDE RELIEF TO VICTIMS OF WAR WAS A MODEL OF APPROPRIATE ACTION. HE WAS VERY CRITICAL OF THE FRENCH.

6. WHEREAS DIORI AND SIDIKOU TALKED MORE WITH PIOUS HOPE THAN CONFIDENCE ABOUT RESULTS EXPECTED FROM OAU MEETING IN OBTAINING SETTLEMENT IN NIGERIAN CONFLICT, BOTH WERE MORE EXPRESSIVE THAN IN ANY CONVERSATIONS HERETOFORE ABOUT HANDICAPS WAR CAUSING NIGER. NIGER'S SALE OF MEAT TO NIGERIA HAS FURTHER DECLINED. SHORTAGE OF IMPORTED GOODS IN NORTHERN NIGERIA HAS RESULTED IN FAMILIES CROSSING INTO NIGER FOR MEDICINES, TRADE GOODS, ETC. RESULTING SCARCITY PROVOKED RISE IN PRICES, SHORTAGES FOR NIGER POPULATION, AND ADDED BUDGETARY BURDEN ON NIGER'S LIMITED PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES. SIDIKOU SAID THEY CANNOT TALK PUBLICLY ABOUT THESE HANDICAPS. FOR GEOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, ETHNIC TIES THEY CANNOT TAKE INITIATIVES DIFFERENT FROM THOSE THEY NOW FOLLOW, THOUGH THEY SEE NEITHER ADVERSARY IN CONFLICT AS 100 PERCENT VIRTUOUS. GP-3  
ADAMS

SECRET

27

0247

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Authority NID 959503  
By MNARA Date 10/5/05

Pol 27 Biafra - Nigeria 141048

## OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED  
Classification

ONLY

12

21 AUG 69 15 58z

840171

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy LAGOS

Info:

INFO: Amembassy ADDIS ABABA  
LONDON  
PARIS  
US MISSION GENEVA  
USUN NEW YORK  
Amconsul IBADAN  
KADUNA

SUBJ: ~~AM~~ Nigeria

Following exchange ensued during the Secretary's August 20 press conference:

Q. Mr. Secretary, as head of State Department, do you see any reasons for optimism in regard to the Nigerian war now in its second year?

A. No, unfortunately, I don't. It's a tragic war. We applaud the efforts of so many people who have attempted to help, the latest being the efforts of Pope Paul. The Chiefs of State of the OAU are going to meet next month. All we can say is that we hope some negotiated settlement could be worked out.

We have made, as you know, the largest contribution in terms of food and medicine. In other words, we have done more than our part in a humanitarian way. And we have urged others to attempt ~~AM~~ help in resolving the problem. It is one of those problems that occur in foreign affairs and it's extremely difficult. I must say that I don't see any particular hope.

(8)

JOHNSON

JOHNSON

Drafted by:

AF/P:WCPowell

Clearances:

Tel. Ext.

20322

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

AF/P:WCPowell

S/PRS:Mr. McCloskey (Substance)  
AF/W:Mr. Melbourne (Info)

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Classification

FORM DS-322  
8-65

0248

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Authority 141048  
By MN NARA Date 10/5/03



Pol 27 BIAFRA- NIGERIA  
XR Pol 3 OAU

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 688

PAGE 01 MONROV 03783 211405Z

47  
ACTION: SS: 70

INFO: OCT 01, CIAE 00, 071 W

129032

R: 211237Z AUG 69  
FM: AMEMBASSY MONROVIA  
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC 7456  
INFO: AMEMBASSY ACCRA  
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA  
AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE

S: EL CIR ETT MONROVIA 3783

LIMDIS

SUBJ: OAU MEETINGS AND NIGERIAN WAR

REFR: STATE 137716 - XR Pol 3 OAU

PRESIDENT TUBMAN TOLD BRITISH AMBASSADOR THAT GOWON PLANS TO LEAD FMG DEL TO OAU CONFERENCE AT ADDIS. GOWON THOUGHT MILITARY SITUATION WOULD PERMIT HIS ABSENCE FROM LAGOS. PROTECT SOURCES.

HOWISON


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 ARA 9  
 EA 11  
 EUR 10  
 NEA 8

ACDA 5

## Task Force

## Functional

TRSY 6

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Other  
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 USIA 4 ✓  
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
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37.

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

141306

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

Origin  
Info:

ACTION:

THE WHITE HOUSE

PASS SAN FRANCISCO FOR SECRETARY ROGERS

FOR SECRETARY ROGERS FROM TED ELIOT  
EXDIS

I am sending by tonight's courier to San Clemente  
supplemental memorandum from Dave Newsom for your talk  
with President on Nigeria. Principal recommendation is  
for Dave to travel to London and Lagos next week. Dave  
is prepared join in San Clemente discussion if you wish.

21 AUG 69 20 46 FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

908171

JOHNSON

Drafted by S/S: TLEliot, Jr:jmj  
8/21/69 Tel. Ext. 22540 Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by: S/S - Mr. Eliot

Clearances:

FORM DS-322  
8-65 Row

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
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S/S-O <u>11</u>	Date <u>8/21/69</u>	Dpty

PRINCIPALS	GEOGRAPHIC BUREAUS
S ✓ 4	AF ✓ 14
U ✓ 5	ARA
J ✓ 6	EA
D	EUR
C ✓ 7	NEA
J/PM	OTHER AGENCIES
S/PC ✓ 10 and 12	White House
S/CPR	Vice President
U/CF ✓ 13	Defense
	State Rep
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U ✓ 5	ARA
J ✓ 6	EA
D	EUR
C ✓ 7	NEA
J/PM	OTHER AGENCIES
S/PC ✓ 10 and 12	White House
S/CPR	Vice President
U/CF ✓ 13	Defense
	State Rep
FUNCTIONAL BUREAUS	CIA
E	ACDA
H	AID
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By MN NARA Date 01/15/03

ORIGIN/ACTION

AF-5

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AGR	COM	FRB
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# AIRGRAM

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POL 27 BIAFRA NIGERIA

XR OS 14 NIGERIA

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XR POL 18 NIGERIA

A-394

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : IBADAN, KADUNA AUG 22 4 01 PM 1969

FROM : Amembassy LAGOS RECEIVED  
ANALYSIS BRANCH

SUBJECT : Economic Conditions in Port Harcourt. DATE: August 21, 1969

REF :

Enclosed is the text of an article in the August 16 issue of The Economist which contains a correspondent's eyewitness account of current economic conditions in Port Harcourt. While we do not wish to comment on the author's various impressions, opinions and conclusions, the author's erroneous assertion that there is no electric power in Port Harcourt should be mentioned.

Certain areas of Port Harcourt and a number of business installations do have power from movable, engine-driven generators, and from the small pre-war diesel units at the Trans-Amadi power station.

OLSON



Enclosure: As stated.

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
FORM DS-323

Drafted by:

ECON: ROBluckersej 8/20/69

Contents and Classification Approved by:  
ECON: WGJones, Economic Counselor

Clearances:



0254

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Authority VND 950503  
By MNARA Date 10/5/05

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Page 1  
Enclosure

LAGOS A 394

NIGERIA - FORLORN PORT

FROM OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT

Port Harcourt in peacetime was the second largest port in Nigeria and the most important town in eastern Nigeria. With a population of 200,000, it was a centre where the archetypal Ibo could fulfil his flair for trade and business. The commercial exploitation of oil and the setting up of the Shell-BP refinery nearby made it something of a boom town. Today it stands--most of it--forlorn, overgrown and run down. The Ibos, who had been its life-blood, left when it fell to federal troops in May last year; since then the only Ibos in the area have been the refugees in their camp.


But the Biafrans, before they left, did not sack the town. Confident that they would be returning, they chose to destroy only installations that would be of immediate use to the enemy, such as the power generators and turbines and essential pieces of apparatus at the refinery. Also singled out for destruction was any British-owned building; other foreign firms had taken the trouble to draw attention to their non-British origins by painting statements to that effect on their walls.

The people who are now squatting in the buildings are not Ibos but people of the Rivers state tribes, many of whom came in from the bush with little or nothing in the way of possessions. There is still no power, which affects all aspects of life, particularly activities at the docks. Since the cranes are electrically operated, loading and unloading can be done only by the ships' own derricks and this rules out large cargoes. Very little comes into Port Harcourt and very little goes out: in the warehouses on the quay piles of palm produce waiting for evacuation lie rotting. Communications are rudimentary; telegrams from Lagos take five days and there is almost no contact with the countless villages that are accessible only by water. And, ironically, there is a dearth of petrol. Your correspondent, though he had one of the few non-military vehicles in the town at his disposal, was unable to travel any distance because of the petrol shortage.

It is hoped that some power will be restored by the end of this month, and that the refinery will be operational in a year's time. If so, this will be an impressive achievement, for not only does it assume no more Biafran interference (and there are reports this week that Biafran troops are massing to the north) but also no more Nigerian interference. Conditions are at best difficult, but the task of the British contractors engaged on the work has been rendered even more so by the army's requisitioning of all 30 houses needed for the accommodation of expatriate workers.

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Page 2  
Enclosure

LAGOS A 394

Despite all this, the market is busy, some shops are open and the main hotel is fully booked. But it will be a long time before Port Harcourt returns to anything like its former prosperity. The Rivers people are delighted to have their own state, not it seems because of any positive desire for self-government but merely because they are thereby free of the ubiquitous Ibo. However, they are not an enterprising or an exceptionally talented people: that the military governor of the state, Lieut-Commander Diete-Spiff, had to be plucked from being a junior naval officer to become state governor at the age of 25 is indicative of the poverty of non-Ibo leadership.

In the words of the governor, the town is back in the early 1930s. Change is bound to come. How it will come is much harder to say. Colonel Obasanjo's 3rd marine commando division, which now dominates the town, will one day depart, to the relief of all. But the future of Port Harcourt will be determined less by the men at the top than by the people who live there. In this context one must ask what will become of the 12,800 refugees in the Red Cross camp just outside the town, 10,000 of them Ibos. At the moment they are being well cared for in the most difficult circumstances. There are more than 1,600 children in a school with few benches and fewer books; there is a special feeding centre which cares for children with distended stomachs and stick-like limbs; and there is a hospital with one American doctor and seven nurses. More people arrive daily, but so far only 20 have found employment. The fate of these Ibos is all-important, for if they cannot be reintegrated successfully hope for a united Nigeria is an even more lost cause than it looks already. It is difficult to see them being given positions of responsibility so long as they constitute a potential fifth column in federal Nigeria. And it could be that eventually it will be the task of the Ibos to reintegrate the Rivers people; the war is by no means over.

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By MNARA Date 10/5/05

## ORIGIN/ACTION

RM/R	REP	AFX
1		5
ARA	EUI	FE
NEA	CU	INR
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L	FBO	AIO
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
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OSD	USA	NSA
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AUG 27 P: 4 39

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35  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
**AIRGRAM**

16 27 Biafra Nigeria  
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A-288

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RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AUG 27 2 49 PM 1969  
RS/AN  
ANALYSIS BRANCH  
DATE: August 21, 1969  
FROM : Amembassy WELLINGTON  
SUBJECT: Prime Minister's Statements on Nigerian Civil War  
REF : Embtel 1463, August 13, 1969

Transmitted herewith are copies of the texts of messages which have passed between the New Zealand Government and the United Nations Secretary-General on the subject of the Nigerian civil war, together with the texts of replies from General Gowon and Colonel Ojukwu received by Prime Minister Holyoake following his representations about the relief aspects of the war.

HENNING J. F. H. [Signature]  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DEPT. OF EAST ASIAN & PACIFIC AFFAIRS  
630 AUG 29 PM 2 06 1969  
Action Assigned [Signature]  
Action Taken [Signature]

Date of Action 9/10  
Action Office Symbol [Signature]  
Name of Officer [Signature]

FORM DS-323

4-62

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Drafted by: G. B. Hall/gh (August 18 1969)

Contents and Classification Approved by:  
Hendrik van Oss, DCM

Clearances: RCSchrader, 2nd Secretary

0257  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority VND 959503  
By MM NARA Date 10/5/05

DECLASSIFIED

E A

Enclosure to Wellington A: 288

EXCHANGE WITH U THANT

Mr Holyoake's message to U Thant was as follows:

"I feel impelled by the imminence of what could prove an irretrievable tragedy on a scale the world has not yet known, to make a special appeal to you to use your personal influence, and the good offices of your position as Secretary-General, to see whether an arrangement cannot be secured for the flow of international relief supplies into Biafran-held territory to be resumed as a matter of urgency. My government has not taken sides in the civil war as such, and does not propose to do so. We are also fully aware of the difficulties (some of them issues which the parties to the conflict would regard as matters of principle, some of them reflecting strategic and practical considerations) which must be faced in attempting to separate the relief issue from that of the civil war as a whole.

"In messages to General Gowon and to the rebel leader Colonel Ojukwu, I am urging them to reconsider the attitudes of their respective sides towards these difficulties. But it does seem to me that there must in such a situation surely be some place for the simple expression of the worldwide concern for the innocent civilian victims of the fighting, and for a call (which need not have any relationship to a ceasefire or to any other issue directly affecting the conduct of the war) upon both sides to accept that the international community as a whole does have a legitimate concern. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is, in my Government's view, the best - and it may be in present circumstances, the only possible - rallying point and spokesman for such a call on behalf of the world community."

The United Nations Secretary-General replied on 25 July:

"I well understand your concern and that of the Government and people of New Zealand regarding the fratricidal conflict in Nigeria. I fully share this concern and it grieves me deeply that it has not been possible up to now to put an end to the struggle which has resulted in so many victims and brought so much destruction to Nigeria."

In your message you address a special appeal to me to use my personal influence and the good offices of my position as Secretary-General, to see whether an arrangement might not be secured so that the flow of international relief supplies into the secessionist-held territory could be resumed as a matter of urgency. You are no doubt aware of the circumstances which led to the choice of the International Committee of the Red Cross as the agency through which the assistance of a humanitarian nature to the civilian victims of the conflict provided by international, governmental and private sources, would be channelled. Through these cooperative

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By: MNARA Date: 03/05

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efforts, it was possible to bring a significant measure of relief to the affected population and to stem the tide of famine and disease which was causing such a grievous toll. It was with great dismay that we saw the difficulties arise recently in the relations between the Government of Nigeria and the ICRC, and the interruption of the airlift of relief supplies.

The President of the International Committee of the Red Cross recently went to Nigeria and held talks with the Government for the purpose of transferring the relief operations carried out by the ICRC to Nigerian organisations while at the same time ensuring the resumption of flights during the transition period. Upon his return to Geneva, the President of the ICRC has designated a high-level representative, Mr Bignami, to continue these negotiations. Mr Bignami is already in Nigeria in the discharge of his mandate.

Through my representative, I am following closely the developments concerning the resumption of aid - whether by air, land or water - and if no breakthrough is reached within a short time, I shall consider very seriously issuing an appeal for the leaders of both sides to lay aside the conditions which stand in the way of the full resumption of relief flights."

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Authority VND959503  
By MNARA Date 10/5/03

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RS/R

Enclosure to Wellington A: 288

PRESS STATEMENT

30 July 1969

NEW ZEALAND ACTION ON NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

The Prime Minister released today the texts of messages which had passed between the New Zealand Government and the United Nations Secretary-General, U Thant, in which New Zealand called for an initiative by the United Nations to clear the present obstructions to international relief work in the war areas.

As I mentioned in Parliament last week, when the question of relief supplies for refugees in Biafra was raised in discussion of the Estimates, the Government has been following the civil war situation very closely, and has made a number of approaches to other governments or authorities on issues which have aroused our particular concern here in New Zealand. It is often neither helpful nor desirable to make public all the details of such diplomatic exchanges. But I recognise the very substantial degree of personal involvement and anxiety about the situation felt by a great many New Zealanders. It seems to me that much of this concern has stemmed from a belief that the Government has not been taking any action to make New Zealand views known. I have accordingly decided to publish the exchange with U Thant, as a concrete illustration of what the Government has in fact been doing.

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
"As my message to U Thant makes quite clear", said Mr Holyoake, "the Government believes that it is only if the particular issue of relief operations can be treated as a separate and distinct problem from the wider issues of the civil war itself, that there is any real hope of concerted international action. New Zealand has taken no political sides on the civil war as such, and while we have always given our full support to efforts to bring the two sides together to talk, we recognise the very great political difficulties which stand in the way of proposing new international initiatives towards mediation, or an eventual settlement. In these circumstances we have concentrated on that aspect which we feel is both most urgent and most readily capable of being treated separately."

The Prime Minister pointed out that the key to the current problems over relief operations into Biafran-held territory was held by the two parties to the conflict themselves. "I accordingly also sent messages to General Gowon and Colonel Ojukwu making it clear that New Zealand finds it particularly difficult to understand why both sides in the civil war seem unwilling to accord the international relief operations the primacy and urgency which Nigeria's friends outside believe to be essential if the declared objectives for which the war is being fought are to have any real meaning."

"I feel bound to say that I find it hard to escape the conclusion that at this stage, the onus seems to be primarily with the Biafran leaders to match the recent conciliatory offers by the Federal authorities on the detailed issues of

/inspection

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inspection and routing of relief flights... But of course both sides regrettably tend to regard the relief issue as essentially secondary to the prosecution of the war, and it is on this aspect which the Government will continue to press. I am sure that we have the support of all New Zealanders in this course."

Mr Holyoake added that the issue of British arms supplies to the Federal Government had also been raised by many of those who have written to him in recent weeks. "I may mention that I have recently exchanged views on this and other aspects of the civil war, and in particular on the possibilities of additional British mediatory steps, with Mr Harold Wilson. I am satisfied that he is fully aware of New Zealand views on these points."

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By MNARA Date 01/10/05

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Enclosure to Wellington A: 288

PRESS STATEMENT

5 August 1969

NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

The Prime Minister (Rt Hon. Keith Holyoake) today made public the texts of the replies which he had received from General Gowon and Colonel Ojukwu to his recent representations about the relief aspects of the Nigerian civil war.

"When I released on 30 July the messages exchanged with U Thant", said Mr Holyoake, "I indicated that I had also sent messages direct to the leaders of both sides involved in the war. In view of the current public concern about the continued delay in reaching agreement on the resumption of relief air flights into Biafran territory, I feel it would be helpful to publish at this stage the comments I have received from the two leaders.

"From the leader of the Federal Government, Major-General Gowon, I received a substantial reply setting out the issues as seen by the Federal authorities. The text of this is below. The reply I received from Colonel Ojukwu, however, can only be described as very disappointing. His reply simply said:

'His Excellency, the Biafran Head of State, shares his concern at the unfortunate situation in Nigeria. As a neighbour and fellow African state, Biafra is naturally anxious that the suffering in Nigeria be minimised and that relief be enabled to reach the victims especially in the Western State where the fighting is most serious.'

"The mention of fighting in the Western State is presumably a reference to recent riots over taxation in the Western areas of Nigeria."


The following is Major-General Gowon's reply:

"I am very grateful for your message and especially for seeking authoritative information in a matter which appears to have been misunderstood because of distortion by supporters of secessionists. My Government has done nothing to obstruct the flow of relief to areas of need on both sides of fighting lines. It is true that my Government has prohibited all night flights into secessionist area but this is because the rebels have been taking advantage of relief flights to send in their gun running planes. It surely cannot be argued that it is any function of relief agency to provide a cover for

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
gun running and my Government cannot be expected to acquiesce in any actions which directly or indirectly prolong the war. Having prohibited relief flights my Government offered full facilities for daylight relief flights from whatever points outside Nigeria they might originate.

The only requirement imposed by my Government was that the aircraft should land for inspection of cargoes at any designated airports in Federal territory. Furthermore, we offered to allow a team of international observers to be present at inspection and estimated the period per aircraft at between 20 and 30 minutes. The secessionists have not enabled relief agencies to operate by daylight because they would no longer provide the necessary cover for their gun running planes.

Furthermore, they have indicated that the fact of accepting relief flights that have touched down in Federal territory has political connotations in subjecting them to Federal authority. Obviously therefore the rebel leaders consider their military and political objectives as being paramount even to the exclusion of reliefs. All well meaning governments and humanitarians should bring pressure to bear on the rebels to accept my Government's daylight relief flight policy which incidentally has been accepted by the ICRC and other relief agencies."

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA  
Department of State *R*

**TELEGRAM**

*POL 27 3 OAU*

SECRET 151

PAGE 01 ACCRA 02690 211803Z

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ACTION AFI 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, SR 01, ORM 00, SCS 04, SCA 01, UCFI 05, UPW 01, TO 13,  
AID 28, CIAE 00, DODEI 00, JPM 04, HI 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAEI 00, NSC 10,  
P 04, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, RSI 01, 157 W

R 211555Z AUG 69

FMI AMEMBASSY ACCRA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6919

INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY LAGOS

AMEMBASSY LONDON

130716

S: EICR EIT ACCRA 2690

SUBJ: OAU MEETINGS AND NIGERIAL WARI

REF: A. STATE 137716 B. ACCRA 2589

NOFORN

1. MINEXTAFF AFRICA DIVISION DIRECTOR ANTWI TOLD EMBOFF THAT GOG STILL CONSIDERING INTRODUCING PROPOSAL AT OAU MEETINGS TO MODIFY CONCOMI MANDATE AND LOADEN ITS MEMBERSHIP TO INCLUDE PRO-BIAFRAN STATES (REF. B).

2. HOWEVER, ANTWI COMMENTED THAT GOG INFORMAL APPROACHES SO FAR HAD RECEIVED ONLY "LUKEWARM" RESPONSE IN OTHER AFRICAN CAPITALS. WHILE PRAISING GHANAIAN INITIATIVE, OTHER GOVERNMENTS HAVE AVOIDED COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO ANY CONCRETE ACTION IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSAL.

3. ANTWI SAID GOG STILL PROCEEDING WITH ITS INFORMAL SOUNDINGS. HE SAID DECISION ON WHETHER TO FORMALLY INTRODUCE PROPOSAL WILL BE MADE AFTER COMMISSIONER ANIN ARRIVES IN ADDIS AND TAKES FINAL READING ATTITUDES OTHER DELEGATIONS.

FOLEY

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By MMNARA Date 05/05



31  
Poe 27 Biafra-Nigeria  
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

*fra Def 12-5 Biafra*  
CONFIDENTIAL 892 *Df/12-5 Nigeria*

PAGE 01 COPENH 03211 211547Z

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ACTION AF 18.

INFO: OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, SR 01, ORMI 03, SCS 04, SCA 01, UCF 05, UPW 01  
CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, HI 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00, NSCI 10, PI 04,  
RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, EI 15, DOT 12, RSR 01, MC 02, ACDA 16,

/174-W

129757

R: 211515Z AUG 69  
FM: AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN  
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC (2720)

CONFIDENTIAL COPENHAGEN/3211

SUBJ: NIGERIA/BIAFRA: U.S. ARMS EMBARGO

REF: STATE 130557 *cir - Def 12-5 Nigeria*  
*fra Def 12-5 Biafra*

AS: FAR AS POST AND DANISH AUTHORITIES CONCERNED NO  
U.S. NATIONALS OR U.S. REGISTERED AIRCRAFT OPERATING IN,  
BEING SOLD OR RELEASED FROM DENMARK FOR USE BY EITHER  
SIDE IN NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR. GP=4.  
DUDLEY

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Copenhagen - 3211  
8-21-69

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Authority NND959503  
By MNARA Date 10/5/05



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA  
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 KADUNA 00801 211844Z

42  
ACTION AFT 18

INFO OCT 01, UCFI 05, UPW 01, SRI 01, ORMI 03, SCSEI 00, SCA 01, AID 28, IO 13,

EUR 17, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, HI 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAEI 00, NSC 10,

PI 04, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, RSR 01, 153 W

131023

R: 211207Z AUG 69 ZFFI RUTAIJ, RUTAMA

FM: AMCONSUL KADUNA  
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC 1273  
INFO: AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA  
AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN  
AMCONSUL IBADAN

UNCLAS KADUNA 0801

CIO: RIREC TELD - CIO: PI Y (TEXT)

SUBJECT: NEW NIGERIAN ON GOWON'S MONROVIA TRIP


1. EDITORIAL IN AUGUST 21 NEW NIGERIAN STATES THAT IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF MONROVIA MEETING IS THAT PRESIDENT TUBMAN HAS HAD UP TO DATE BRIEFING ON FMG STAND RE: SETTLEMENT CONFLICT WHICH TUBMAN CAN PASS ON TO OAU CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE. AZIKIWE'S PRESENCE IN MONROVIA WAS SIGNIFICANT, NEW NIGERIAN SAYS, IN THAT "HE WILL HELP TO REMOVE SOME DOUBTS OF LIBERIAN PRESIDENT", PARTICULARLY AS AZIKIWE WAS FORMERLY OOUKWI'S ENVOY IN MONROVIA. LONG TERM EFFECT OF MEETING HOWEVER MAY BE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AZIKIWE AND FMG. EDITORIAL NOTES THAT AZIKIWE STILL HAS STRONG FOLLOWING AND URGES HIM TO PUBLICLY DECLARE "HIS SUPPORT FOR PRINCIPLES OF ONE NIGERIA."

2. FRONT PAGE NEWS ITEM SAME ISSUE ENTITLED "PEACE IN SIGHT?" REPORTS ON GOWON'S COMMENTS TO PRESS ON ARRIVAL LAGOS AND INCLUDES NOTE THAT "OUR CORRESPONDENT IN MONROVIA" REPORTED RUMORS "FROM DIPLOMATIC SOURCES" THAT OOUKWI WAS IN ABIDJAN WHILE GOWON WAS IN MONROVIA. NEW NIGERIAN OFFERS NO EXPLANATION AS TO REASON FOR RUMORED TRIP TO ABIDJAN.

3. SMALL ITEM ON BACK PAGE REPORTS THAT LIBERIAN GOVT ORDERED

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 KADUNA 00801 211844Z

OFF-LOADING OF TWO AIRCRAFT ENGINES FROM SS AFRICAN RAINBOW. ENGINES WERE SENT BY "CATHOLIC RELIEF SUPPLY" OF NEW YORK CONSIGNMENT TO ONE DANIEL F. YOUNG IN SAO TOME. ARTICLE STATES THAT "SOURCES CLOSE TO THE (LIBERIAN) GOVERNMENT" SAID THEY CONTACTED AMEMBASSY MONROVIA "TO FIND OUT THE USE THE REBELS WOULD HAVE FOR ENGINES". EMBASSY REPORTEDLY EXPLAINED THAT ENGINES WERE FOR RELIEF AIRCRAFT IN SAO TOME "BUT LIBERIAN GOVT. WAS NOT SATISFIED WITH EXPLANATION." STEPHAN

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By MNARA Date 05/05/03



POL 7 NIGERIA

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 OUAGAD 00898 220754Z

19  
ACTION AF 18

INFO OCT 01, UCF 05, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00,  
NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, AID 28, IO 13, RSR 01

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003543

Quagadougou 898  
60-18-8  
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R 211720Z AUG 69  
FM AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2563  
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
AMEMBASSY LAGOS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE OUAGADOUGOU 898

SUBJ: NIGERIAN FONAFFAIRS COMMISSIONER VISITS OUAGADOUGOU

1. NIGERIAN COMMISSIONER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OKOI ARIKPO ARRIVED OUAGADOUGOU TODAY WITH SPECIAL MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT LAMIZANA FROM GEN. GOWON. THERE WAS NO LOCAL ANNOUNCEMENT BEFOREHAND THAT VISIT ABOUT TO TAKE PLACE BUT RADIO NEWSCASTS TODAY ANNOUNCED ARRIVAL. SAID ARIKPO HAS MET WITH FONMINISTRY AFRO-MALAGASY AFFAIRS DIRECTOR GERARD KANGO OUEDRAOGO.

2. INFORMATION DIRECTOR BASSOLETH TELLS MEI ARIKPO'S VISIT IN CONNECTION WITH FMG CAMPAIGN FOR SUPPORT AT ADDIS ABABA OAU MEETING. SAID ARIKPO PLANS LEAVE HERE TOMORROW.

DECON: 8/21/70.

DAVIS:

BT


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100-11 FEB 1969

THE SECRETARY OF STATE Attention Mr. Mulcahy  
WASHINGTON Keep this study together.  
*8/3*

S/S 12794

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August 20, 1969

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
THE WHITE HOUSE

*Declassified 7/8/75*  
per E. Mulcahy AF  
FOI 5B 328

In response to your suggestion that we might give considerable thought to a more active U.S. role in helping to resolve the Nigerian conflict, we have been examining possibilities. Prolongation of the war could bring additional difficulties for U.S. interests in the region and we should examine urgently what we can do. We propose to begin by a quiet exploration of peace initiatives being undertaken or contemplated by others as a basis for determining if and where we might effectively take an initiative.

Already in the context of our relief efforts we have had political talks with the British and French, the Vatican, and various interested African governments such as Ethiopia and Ivory Coast. These have demonstrated increasingly the concern of these nations over the need for a political solution.

In the immediate future, the Special Coordinator for Nigerian Relief, Ambassador C. Clyde Ferguson is to leave for Europe. Without damaging his prime humanitarian mission, he also will further explore the positions of the contending parties.

As a result of recent consultations with the Under Secretary, I am creating this week a Special Nigeria Staff, with Mr. William Brubeck as Director, which will step up the attention we are paying to peace-seeking possibilities. Mr. Brubeck, after an initial period of orientation last week, is currently discussing the situation with U.S. private citizens who have been involved. During the month of September he will be visiting various Western European and African countries specifically to examine their political views on the conflict and their possible helpfulness in seeking to bring about

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BY S/S: CMS

S: WP Rogers

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By MN NARA Date 10/5/05

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negotiations to end the war.

We believe that to make our exploration positive and effective we need also to find ways to maintain good relations with the Federal Military Government in Lagos since these relations have been subject to strains from the war and relief operations. We have considered this consistent with our general U. S. policy objective that the retention of Nigeria as an entity in any eventual solution to the conflict is in the interest of both the stability and development of the area.

I will keep you advised of any developments so that you will have an opportunity to pass judgment on any action which we take in this regard which might result in any publicity.

  
William P. Rogers

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S:WP.Rogers:ark

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Washington, D.C. 20520

F750008-1505

August 19, 1969

THE SECRETARY

Because Ambassador Ferguson is out of town and in order not to delay getting the attached memorandum to you in accordance with your request, Dave Newsom has not cleared it with Ambassador Ferguson. He believes, however, that Ambassador Ferguson would have no difficulties with it.

*TL*  
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.

S/S 12640

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By MN DARA Date 015703

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

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8/18/69

S/S - Mr. Eliot

The attached memorandum has not been seen by Ambassador Ferguson, who has been away from Washington today and is returning tomorrow. However, I have no reason to believe that it would not have his concurrence.

*dn*  
David D. Newsom

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POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA

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PAGE 01 GENEVA 02964 191506Z

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INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, UCF 05, E 15, INT 06, COM 08, CIAE 00, DODE 00,  
JPM 04, HI 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, PI 04, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20  
USIA 12, SR 01, ORM 03, AID 28, RSR 01, /180/W

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R 191343Z AUG 69  
FM USMISSION GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2624  
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON

GENEVA 2964  
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SUBJECT NIGERIA

MARKPRESS RELEASE TODAY CARRIES LENGTHY STATEMENT BY MOJEKWU DATED LISBON AUGUST 15 ATTACKING SHELL-BP PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY WHICH WAS (A) MAINSTAY FMG "NEAR-BANKRUPT" REGIME, AND (B) PRINCIPAL REASON FOR UK'S (MAJOR BP SHAREHOLDER) ALL-OUT PROFMG POLICY. STATEMENT MAKES APPEAL TO SHAREHOLDERS AND MILD BOYCOTT PITCH AGAINST SHELL-BP.

"ONE WONDERS, HOWEVER, WHETHER SHAREHOLDERS OTHER THAN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ARE AWARE OF THEIR INVOLVEMENT THAT A SHARE OF SHELL OR BP INCLUDES A SHARE IN THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MOST SHAMEFUL WAR IN THE HISTORY OF AFRICA. I AM SURE IF THIS WERE REALISED, MANY SHAREHOLDERS WOULD PROTEST VIGOROUSLY TO THE CHAIRMEN OF THESE COMPANIES.

"I HAVE HEARD OF A PLAN TO BOYCOTT SHELL AND BP PETROL UNTIL THESE COMPANIES SEE SENSE!" SAID MR. MOJEKWU. "WITH THE LIVES OF MY COUNTRYMEN AT STAKE, I WARMLY APPLAUD IT, AND HOPE THAT IT SPREADS!" AND CONCLUDES SAYING:

"WHO KNOWS, THE SOLUTION MAY STILL LIE IN THE OIL COMPANIES HAVING BUSINESSLIKE DISCUSSIONS WITH BOTH SIDES. IN ANY CASE, IT HAS NOT BEEN TRIED SO FAR."

TUBBY

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

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PAGE 01 KADUNA 00795 191108Z

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ACTION AFI 18

INFO OCT 01, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10,  
P 04, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, UCF 05, IO 13, AID 28, UPW 01,  
EUR 17, RSR 01, 148 W

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R 191035Z AUG 69  
FM AMCONSUL KADUNA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1271  
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
AMCONSUL IBADAN

UNCLAS KADUNA 0795

SUBJECT: NEW NIGERIAN ON AZIKIWE

IN AUGUST 19 EDITORIAL NEW NIGERIAN EXPRESSES HOPE THAT EX-PRESIDENT AZIKIWE'S STOPOVER IN LAGOS AND HIS PRESENCE IN MONROVIA DURING GOWON'S VISIT WILL PRODUCE "SOMETHING POSITIVE". EDITORIAL NOTES THAT AZIKIWE WAS PRESUMABLY DRIVEN TO "BIAFRAN" CAUSE BY HIS REVULSION AT "SUFFERINGS OF NIGERIANS, ESPECIALLY IBOS" IN 1966, BUT HE "CARRIED OUT HIS BRIEF WITH A HINT OF SLIGHT DISTASTE" AND IT IS KNOWN THAT HE "WAS IN DISAGREEMENT WITH OJUKWU'S" SECESSION. NEW NIGERIAN ADDS THAT FMG'S WARM RECEPTION FOR AZIKIWE PROVES "ITS WILLINGNESS TO EXPLORE ALL AVENUES TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT" EVEN IN FACE OF "NIGERIAN PUBLIC OPINION WHICH DEMANDS MILITARY SOLUTION". NEW NIGERIAN HOPES THAT AZIKIWE'S VISIT MEANS THAT RESPONSIBLE IBOS ARE COMING AROUND TO VIEWS OF UKPABI ASIKA, THIS WILL DEMORALIZE REBELS BUT NOT NECESSARILY BRING PEACE AS "AZIKIWE'S INFLUENCE WITH OJUKWU IS NOW NIL".  
STEPHAN

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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ACTION SS: 30

INFO OCT 01, 1969 W

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RI 181445Z AUG 69  
FM: AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC 551

S: EIC RE: ADDIS ABABA 3653

EXDIS - N O F O R M - PROTECT SOURCE

IN COURSE OF DISCUSSION WITH OAU SECRETARY GENERAL DIALLO TELL AUGUST 18, HE TOLD ME IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE AND WITH REQUEST WE PROTECT SOURCE THAT HE HAD LEARNED FROM NIGERIANS THAT THEIR DIFFICULTY WITH THE CROSS RIVER PLAN WAS THE VIOLENT OPPOSITION OF THE RIVERS STATES PEOPLE WHO HAVE THREATENED TO LEAVE THE GOVERNMENT AND ATTACK SHIPS IF RIVER CRAFT USED FEED BIAFRANS. HE DOUBTED VERY MUCH IF FORMULA COULD BE WORKED OUT WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO ACCEPT THIS ROUTE AND TO GUARANTEE SAFETY OF VESSELS USING IT.

HALL

ADDIS ABABA

03653  
01-1969

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

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S/S	8-9	Classification SECRET	
S/S-Screener	28-29-30	Post ADDIS ABABA	<u>Dpty</u>
S/S-S-CMS	31	Serial No. 3653	
S/S-O	11	Date 8/18/69	Dpty

PRINCIPALS		GEOGRAPHIC BUREAUS	
S ✓	<u>4</u>	AF <u>✓</u> <u>13-14</u>	
U ✓	<u>5</u>	ARA	
J ✓	<u>6</u>	EA	
D		EUR	
C ✓	<u>7</u>	NEA	
J/PM		OTHER AGENCIES	
S/PC		White House <u>✓</u> <u>2-3</u>	
S/CPR		Vice President	
U/GF	<u>✓</u> <u>10</u>	Defense <u>✓</u> <u>15</u>	
		State Rep <u>✓</u> <u>16</u>	
FUNCTIONAL BUREAUS		CIA <u>✓</u> <u>17</u>	
E		ACDA	
H		AID	
INR ✓	<u>12</u>	AID/VN	
IO		USIA	
L		NSA	
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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 527

PAGE 01 ACCRA 02633 181647Z

47  
ACTION AFI 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, UCF 05, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, HI 02, INR 07,  
LI 03, NSCI 10, PI 04, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, NSA 02, AID 28

RSR 01/149 W

107330

PI 181045Z AUG 69  
FM AMEMBASSY ACCRA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6883  
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA  
AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA  
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE

S: EIC R: EIT ACCRA 2633

C O I R R E C T E D I C O P Y P R E T E X T R E F I L I N E 137716 VICE  
STATE 2008

SUBJ: POSSIBLE GHANAIAN INITIATIVE RE CONCOM

REF: A. STATE 137716 B. ACCRA 2539 (NOTAL)

1. AS NOTED REF: B, GOG IS NOW ONLY TAKING INFORMAL SOUNDINGS RE POSSIBILITY EXPANDING CONCOM MEMBERSHIP TO INCLUDE PRO-BIAFRAN STATES. IT HAS NOT RPT NOT DECIDED WHETHER TO FORMALLY PROPOSE SUCH EXPANSION AT UPCOMING OAU MEETINGS. BELIEVE GHANAIANS WOULD BE HIGHLY EMBARRASSED IF WE RAISED THIS WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS ON OUR OWN INITIATIVE.

2. THEREFORE, REQUEST THAT DEPARTMENT COMMENTS PARA 2 REF: A RE GHANAIAN INITIATIVE BE CONSIDERED FYI ONLY AND NOT RAISED WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS BY ADDRESSEE EMBASSIES.  
FOLEY

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*POB 27 Bight-Nigeria*  
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

*XLRPOB 27-9 Bight-Nigeria*

CONFIDENTIAL 518

PAGE 01 LAGOS 07429 161302Z

47  
ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01, 1969 W

099391

R 161235Z AUG 69  
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8443

**ACTION COPY**

*6/9/69 Bight  
b6 b7c*

CONFIDENTIAL LAGOS 7429

EXDIS

SS DEPT PLEASE PASS TO GENEVA, ABIDJAN, AND PARIS

SUBJECT: NIGERIAN RELIEF CROSS RIVER

REF STATE 137393 *out*

TEXT CARTEL AGREEMENT AND ATTACHED NOTE TO KOLO  
DELIVERED DEP PERM SEC MINEXTAFF ENAHORO NOON TODAY.  
GP-3.  
OLSON  
BT

NNN

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
Monthly Count 160

INCOMING

SECRETARIAT		Distribution by <u>R. Brown</u>	Ex Secy
S/S	8-9	Classification CONF.	
S/S-Screener	28-30	Post LAGOS	<u>Dpty</u>
S/S-S-CMS	31	Serial No. 7429	
S/S-O	11	Date 8/16/69	Dpty

PRINCIPALS		GEOGRAPHIC BUREAUS	
S	4	AF	<u>✓/14-15</u> ✓✓
U	5	ARA	
J	6	EA	
D		EUR	
C	7	NEA	
J/PM		OTHER AGENCIES	
S/PC		White House	<u>✓✓2-3</u> ✓✓
S/CPR		Vice President	
U/CF	10	Defense	<u>✓ 14</u> ✓
		State, Rep	<u>✓ 17</u> ✓
FUNCTIONAL BUREAUS		CIA	<u>✓ 18</u> ✓
E		ACDA	
H		AID	
INR	✓ 12	AID/VN	
IO		USIA	
L	✓ 13	NSA	
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POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 07430 161322Z

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ACTION AF 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, E 15, AID 28, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02,  
INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12,  
UCF 05, COM 08, RSR 01, /170 W.

P R 161250Z AUG 69

FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8444

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

099451

CONFIDENTIAL LAGOS 7430

SUBJ: ATTACK ON GULF OIL TERMINAL

REF: LAGOS 7198 AND 7271

1. FBIS AUG 15 CARRIES RADIO BIAFRA CLAIM THAT BIAFRAN AF PLANES HAVE RAIDED AND COMPLETELY DESTROYED OIL TERMINAL AT OGIDIGBE OFF FORCADOS RIVER. THIS CLAIM REPEATED ON BBC AUG 16. CLAIM UNDOUBTEDLY BASED ON AUG 10 ATTACK WHICH DAMAGED ONE STORAGE TANK AND THREE HELICOPTERS AT GULF ESCRAVOS TERMINAL.

2. STRAND OF GULF STATES THERE HAS BEEN NO FURTHER INCIDENT AT ESCRAVOS SINCE AUG 10. IN SAME TELCON, STRAND SAID HAD LEARNED TWO PLANES ATTACKED GULF INSTALLATIONS AUG 10 RATHER THAN ONE AS BELIEVED BY GULF EARLIER IN WEEK. THIS CONFIRMS REPORT RECEIVED AUG 15 FROM RELIABLE INDUSTRY SOURCE OBTAINED FROM EYEWITNESSES. SOURCE STATES ONE PLANE FIRED SIX ROCKETS AT TANKS AND OTHER FIRED SIX AT HELICOPTERS. DAMAGES SAME AS REPORTED REFTELS. SOURCE ALSO REPORTS TWO MIGS OVERLEW TERMINAL ABOUT THREE MINUTES AFTER REBEL RAIDERS WITHDREW. NAF ALSO CONFIRM. NO INDICATION THAT MIGS ENGAGED RAIDERS, WHICH COULD HAVE DISAPPEARED INTO LOW CLOUD COVER IN THIS PERIOD OF TIME. GP-3  
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INDICATE:  
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ACTION: Amembassy ACCRA  
ADDIS ABABA  
KINSHASA  
LONDON  
MONROVIA  
NIAMEY  
PARIS  
YAOUNDE

INFO: Amembassy LAGOS

STATE \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: OAU Meetings and Nigerian War

1. Dept is interested in preliminary views of CONCOM governments,

British and French, re manner Nigerian issue likely to be handled  
at OAU Council Ministers and then Chief of State meetings. We  
understand agenda calls for CONCOM report to Chiefs, presumably  
presented by HIM.

2. Addressees are authorized to make discreet soundings at  
appropriate levels host governments. Only proposal of which we  
so far aware is Ghana suggestion CONCOM be expanded by addition one  
or two pro-Biafra chiefs of state, probably taken from the four  
recognizing states. We tend to favor this idea as providing direct  
OAU channel acceptable to Ojukwu which might prove useful, as well

DRAFTED BY: *RLP* DRAFTING DATE: 8/15/69 TEL. EXT: 23391 APPROVED BY: *JF*  
AF/W:RLPerkins:nb 8/15/69 AF - Mr. Newsom

CLEARANCES:

AF/I - *RLP*  
ERHEUR/BMI - Mr. Waller *Waller*  
EUR/FBX - Mr. Maresca *JJM/RP*  
AF/W - Mr. Melbourne *RW/RP*

FORM DS-322  
4-68

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ACTION: Amembassy ACCRA  
ADDIS ~~XXABABA~~  
KINSHASA  
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PARIS  
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Page 2

INFO: Amembassy LAGOS

as refurbishing somewhat public image of CONCOM. On other hand, we realize group of six already unwieldy in terms of arranging meetings. Also effective activities of group were largely carried out by HIM as its chairman.

3. Further, would be interested in learning what is anticipated in way of FMG and Biafran representation at meeting; possibility corridor talks; type of resolution, if any; likely result; whether it would be largely replay of Algiers united Nigeria resolution or whether it might contain new elements, perhaps at least on humanitarian side.

END

JOHNSON

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DRAFTING DATE

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PAGE 01 TRIPOLI 01968 151124Z

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ACTION AF 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPMI 04, HI 02, INRI 07, LI 03,  
NSAE 00, NSCI 10, PI 04, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, US&A 12, UCF 05, RSR 01

AID 28, 7147 W

092096

R 150814Z AUG 69:  
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4502  
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS  
AMEMBASSY BENGHAZI  
AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY RABAT  
AMEMBASSY TUNIS  
US MISSION USUN 156  
AMEMBASSY BAIDA

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TRIPOLI 1968

SUBJ: NIGERIAN PROBLEM AND THE UN

REFS: STATE CIRC 133458, TRIPOLI 1951

1. IN AIRPORT INTERVIEW WITH LIBYAN NEWS AGENCY  
IMMEDIATELY AFTER ARRIVAL IN TRIPOLI AUG 13 ON GOODWILL  
VISIT, NIGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER OKOI ARIKUO EXPLICITLY  
TIED UN TO SEARCH FOR SETTLEMENT NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR  
2. ARIKUO REITERATED HIS GOVERNMENT'S READINESS TO ENTER  
INTO NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF CIVILI  
WAR "WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF COMPLETE UNITY", BUT ASSERTED  
"WE WILL NEVER ACCEPT NEGOTIATIONS WITH CONDITIONS  
IMPOSED UPON US". MINISTER EMPHASIZED RESPECT NIGERIA HAS  
FOR RESOLUTIONS OF UNITED NATIONS, AND DECLARED "SOLUTION  
WE EXPECT IS ONE STEMMING FROM THAT ORGANIZATION"

3. MINISTER ALSO TOLD INA REPORTER HIS TALKS WITH GOL

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POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA  
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 07395 151356Z

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ACTION AF 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, UCF 05, ACDA 16, CIAE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07,  
L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, AID 28,

RSR 01, /163: W

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R 151222Z AUG 69  
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8422  
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMCONSUL IBADAN  
/AMCONSUL KADUNA 4082  
CINCSTRIKE  
DIA

S E C R E T LAGOS 7395

JOINT EMBASSY/DATT MESSAGE


SUBJ: NIGERIA: THE MOOD IN AUGUST

1. WHILE NO ONE THINKS THAT THE FMG IS IN DANGER OF LOSING THE WAR, THE MOOD THESE DAYS IS ONE OF TOUCHINESS AND FRUSTRATION OVER THE FAILURE TO BRING THE CONFLICT TO A CLOSE. NEARLY THREE MONTHS HAVE ELAPSED SINCE THE RESHUFFLE OF MILITARY COMMANDERS, AND IT HAS BEEN EVEN LONGER SINCE NIGERIAN GROUND FORCES HAVE BEEN ABLE TO REPORT A SIGNAL VICTORY. THE NAF HAS SO FAR BEEN UNABLE TO CURTAIL THE FLOW OF ARMS SUPPLIES INTO REBEL TERRITORY AND TO DEAL WITH THE DEVELOPING REBEL AIR FORCE.

2. WE BELIEVE THAT EVENTS HAVE FORCED GOWON TO GIVE UP HOPE - ALTHOUGH NOT HIS DESIRE - OF A SOLUTION OTHER THAN MILITARY AND THAT HE HAS IN FACT INSTRUCTED HIS COMMANDERS TO GET ON WITH THE WAR.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 LAGOS 07395 151356Z

3. THE INABILITY OF THE COMMANDERS TO COMPLY THUS FAR IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO LACK OF MILITARY EXPERTISE AND THE SAME FACTORS WE OUTLINED IN LAGOS 2775 OF MARCH 28, 1969-- INEFFICIENCY, INEPTNESS, POOR LEADERSHIP, ETC., ON THE FMG SIDE, AND TOUGHNESS AND BACK-TO-THE-WALL MOTIVATION ON THE REBEL SIDE. WITHIN THE LAST FOUR MONTHS, BOTH THE 1ST AND 3RD DIVISIONS HAVE UNDERGONE AT LEAST TWO REORGANIZATIONS IN WHICH TACTICAL BOUNDARIES HAVE BEEN CHANGED AND UNITS HAVE BEEN READJUSTED AND RELOCATED. IN THE CASE OF THE 1ST DIVISION THERE HAS BEEN A MAJOR CHANGE IN THE TACTICAL MISSION OF THIS ORGANIZATION WITH THE ASSUMPTION OF THE ONITSHA SECTOR FROM 2ND DIVISION. COLONEL OBASANJO RECENTLY TOLD A CONSULAR OFFICER FROM IBADAN HE WAS HOPEFUL OF HAVING THE 3RD DIVISION REORGANIZED AND READY FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN EARLY AUGUST. IT WAS APPARENTLY IN DEPLORABLE STATE WHEN HE TOOK IT OVER FROM ADEKUNLE IN MAY.

4. THE NIGERIAN AIR FORCE IS CURRENTLY IN ONE OF ITS PERIODIC SLUMPS: ITS RADAR AT PORT HARCOURT IS NOT WORKING PROPERLY, AND VERY FEW OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT ARE AVAILABLE FOR REBEL AIRCRAFT INTERDICTION OR GROUND SUPPORT FOR FEDERAL ARMY. (SOONER OR LATER, HOWEVER, THEY WILL BRING DOWN ANOTHER AIRCRAFT, AND IT COULD BE EITHER A RELIEF FLIGHT OR AN ARMS FLIGHT.)


5. ON THE OTHER HAND, FMG FORCES ARE NOT ACTUALLY SUFFERING REVERSSES NOR DOES THERE APPEAR GREAT CAUSE FOR ALARM IN THIS RESPECT. FMG ATTEMPTS TO BREAK THROUGH FROM ONITSHA TO NNEWI HAVE BEEN THUS FAR REBUFFED, BUT DATT HAS LEARNED THAT A FRESH ASSAULT ON NNEWI IS IN PREPARATION KEYED TO A MAJOR OFFENSIVE DIRECTED TOWARD ORLU FROM OKIGWI (DATT MSG 0366 AUGUST 69 NOTAL). DATT HAS ALSO HEARD THAT GOWON WILL SHORTLY VISIT THE DIVISION COMMANDERS, PRESUMABLY WITH A VIEW TO UPLIFTING MORALE AND SPURRING ON THIS OFFENSIVE. (THE LAST VISIT OF THIS NATURE WAS IN FEBRUARY.)

6. ON THE SOUTHERN FRONT, THE 3RD DIVISION IS SLOWLY TAKING SHAPE, AND, ALTHOUGH OBASANJO IS BEING EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS, IS MAKING SOME PROGRESS. IF THE OFFENSIVE IN THE NORTH IS TO SUCCEED, HE WILL HAVE TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE FROM THE SOUTH.

7. WHAT IT SEEMS TO BOIL DOWN TO IS THAT THE FMG, DESPAIRING OF STOPPING THE ARMS FLOWN INTO BIAFRA BY AERIAL INTERDICTION, IS FINALLY GEARING UP TO TRY TO CLOSE OUT BIAFRAN AIRSTRIPS FROM

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PAGE 03 LAGOS 07395 151356Z

THE GROUND.

8. IF THIS ATTEMPT IS SUCCESSFUL, THE END OF THE WAR COULD BE IN SIGHT, AND THE MORALE PROBLEM WILL TAKE CARE OF ITSELF. HOWEVER, IF IT IS UNSUCCESSFUL AND A FURTHER PERIOD OF INACTIVITY RESULTS, IS WIDESPREAD WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT, AND WAR-WEARINESS, PARTICULARLY AMONG THE YORUBAS, SEEMS TO US TO BE ON THE INCREASE.

9. SUCH A SITUATION, COUPLED WITH THE EDGINESS OF THE FMG OVER THE PRESSURES TO WHICH THEY ARE BEING SUBJECTED ON RELIEF MATTERS, COULD VERY WELL INDUCE THE FMG TO TURN TO THE SOVIETS FOR MORE AIRCRAFT AND MATERIEL AS WELL AS TECHNICAL ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE.

10. THUS FAR NEITHER THE FMG NOR THE USSR HAS DESIRED SUCH A DEVELOPMENT, BUT DESPERATION COULD CAUSE THE FMG TO COME AROUND. AS FOR THE SOVIETS, THEY ARE ALREADY SO INVOLVED THAT THEY MIGHT WELL GO ALONG IF THE NIGERIANS WILL PAY THE PRICE.


11. IF SO, THE FMG CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE TO ATTEMPT TO KEEP FURTHER SOVIET ASSISTANCE ON A CASH BASIS, AND THE ECONOMY IS SOUND ENOUGH TO PERMIT THIS. HOWEVER, IF THE SOVIETS EMERGE AS THE PRINCIPAL INSTRUMENTALITY TO ENABLE THE FMG TO FINISH OFF THE WAR, THEIR POST-WAR POSITION IS BOUND TO BE ENHANCED.

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SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. pol 49-14


DATE: 8-15-69 MSG NO.: 7402 TYPE: TE  
FROM: Lagos TO: See State  
SUBJECT: Shooting in Lagos Suburb  
DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: X OTHER: \_\_\_\_\_

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

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POL 27 Biafra-Nigeria  
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 07394 151315Z

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ACTION AFI 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, AID 28, UCFI 05, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02,

INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12

RSR 01, 147 W

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R 151220Z AUG 69  
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8421  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY ROME  
USMISSION GENEVA  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L L A G O S 7394

SUBJ: POSSIBLE NIGERIAN PEACE PLAN

1. EMBASSY RECEIVED FBIS ITEM (C141754) FROM PUERTO RICO REPORTING TEXT OF AFP STORY ON STATEMENTS ALLEGEDLY MADE BY MEMBERS OF PARTY ACCOMPANYING FMG EXTERNAL AFFAIRS COMMISSIONER ARIKPO AT ROME AUGUST 14. ITEM SOMEWHAT GARBLED AND WE REQUESTING SERVICE.
2. STORY SAYS WHEN "MEMBER OF ARIKPO'S PARTY" ASKED ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF SETTLING CONFLICT WITH BIAFRA THEY "POINTED OUT THAT LAGOS ALREADY HAD SUBMITTED A PLAN GRANTING AUTONOMY TO BIAFRA UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS". AFTER GARBLED PORTION, ITEM REFERS TO "...CONTROL OF THREE OBSERVERS (ENGLISH, CANADIAN AND POLISH). THE IBOS COULD PROPOSE A FOURTH OBSERVER, THE SOURCES STATED".
3. WE RECOGNIZE THIS COULD SIMPLY BE A REFERENCE TO EXISTING FMG OFFERS TO SET UP AN "EXTERNAL OBSERVER FORCE" AS PART OF FMG PROPOSAL SETTLEMENT, BUT THE REFERENCES TO AUTONOMY AND UN AUSPICES DO NOT JIBE WITH THE FMG'S POSITION.
4. FOR ROME. APPRECIATE ANY INFO YOU CAN DEVELOP ON WHAT

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PAGE 02 LAGOS 07394 151315Z

ACTUALLY SAID BY "MEMBERS ARIKPO PARTY".

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By MNARA Date 10/5/05

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Intelligence  
Note - 602

August 15, 1969

To : The Acting Secretary  
Through: S/S  
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *h.l.c.d.*  
Subject: Oil Production and Biafran Air Attacks

Nigeria rests on the brink of an expansion of oil production that was expected to reach 1 million barrels a day by the end of 1969. This target could almost certainly have been realized in the absence of hostilities, and might possibly still be achieved. However, actual production fell from 594,000 bbl/day in April to 496,000 in June, and perhaps to 475,000 or less in July. Although Biafran ground and air attacks accounted directly for only a small part of this drop, they have shown that all of the oil producing facilities are vulnerable. Biafra seems able at the least to delay the expected expansion; a few successful attacks could force additional and more serious cuts in production. Petroleum exports are a major source of exchange financing for the war effort.

Shell-British Petroleum was producing half a million barrels a day just before the civil war began in July 1967. Production resumed in October 1968 and was expected to reach about three quarters of a million barrels by the end of 1969. Production averaged 375,000 barrels in April and May, all exported through the terminal at Bonny. About 275,000 barrels came from areas in the former Eastern Region that had been recaptured from the Biafrans. In June Biafran ground forces reached the Imo River field (see #4 on attached map), cut the pipeline, started fires, and probably caused Shell-BP to withdraw its

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This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from nominal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level,

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By: MNARA Date: 10/5/03

Pal 27 Biafra - Nigeria

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## OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Origin

ACTION: Amembassy Libreville PRIORITY

Info:

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Classification

SUBJECT: Nigeria/Biafra

Ref. State 135768

You should consider para D ref tel for your background info only and not  
rpt not for discussion with Bongo at present time.

①

JOHNSON

Drafted by: AF:WWitman:apg 8/14/69 Tel. Ext. 22446 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: AF - William Witman

Clearance: AFW - RMMelbourne Rm AF/C - JMCKesson (subst.) AF - Mr. Newsom (subst.)

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FORM DS-322  
8-65

Classification

0291

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By MN NARA Date 10/5/03

ORIGIN/ACTION

RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR
E	P	IO
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AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
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	NSC	6

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A-381

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(with UNCLASSIFIED enclosure)

TO : Department of State RECEIVED

INFO : GENEVA, IBADAN, KADUNA, LONDON, PARIS, CINCSTRIKE, DIA

AUG 15 11 54 AM 1969

FROM : Amembassy LAGOS ANALYSIS BRANCH

DATE: 14 August 1969

SUBJECT: The Rebels (Protection Against) Offences Edict: A  
A Mid-Western Reaction

REF : Lagos A-320 of July 10, 1969

Par 27 Nigera

The Embassy has belatedly received a copy of the Supplement to the Mid-Western State Gazette, giving the text of the Rebels (Protection Against) Offences Edict of 1969, which is to be retroactive to September 20, 1967. The full text is transmitted as an enclosure to this airgram.

The edict specifies a five year prison sentence, at hard labor, for anyone failing to report a rebel soldier; for anyone who harbors comforts or assists a known or reasonably suspected rebel soldier; or anyone who assists a person to escape punishment under the edict.

Comment. The edict, though not draconian, has tough provisions, and could be liberally used in the various "security drives" and "questioning of suspicious" persons which have been reported from time to time in recent weeks from the Mid-West. The edict is an obvious response to the worry caused by increased rebel infiltration during June, 1969 (described in Lagos A-320). The Mid-West State Government now has additional legal power to crack down on suspected infiltrators and their sympathizers, but we have yet to see how widely this instrument will be used. So far, it seems that the edict has not been applied on a large scale.

OLSON

Enclosure:  
As stated Exempted from automatic decontrolFORM  
4-62 DS-323

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 In  Out

Drafted by: POL:FPicard:mjr

8/11/69

Contents and Classification Approved by:

POL:ERamsaurJr

Clearances:

28

0292

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority 4ND950503  
By MNARA Date 10/5/03

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 1 of 2  
Encl. No. 1  
A- 381 from Lagos

C O CONSTITUTION (SUSPENSION AND MODIFICATION)  
P Y DECREE, 1966

Y REBELS (PROTECTION AGAINST) OFFENCES EDICT, 1969

MID-WESTERN STATE OF NIGERIA

EDICT No. 17 of 1969

Date of Commencement: 20th September, 1967

The Military Governor of the Mid-Western State of Nigeria hereby issues this Edict as follows:

1. This Edict may be cited as the Rebels (Protection Against) Offences Edict, 1969 and shall be deemed to have come into force on the 20th day of September, 1967.

2. In this Edict--

"rebel" means any person who within the State took up arms or takes up arms under the command and control of Mr. Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu including the said Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu as well as any person who joins such a person in prosecuting his purpose. "State" means Mid-Western State of Nigeria.

3. Any person who knows or reasonably suspects any other person to be a rebel soldier and fails to report such other person to the Police shall be guilty of an offence, and shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term of five years with hard labour without an option of a fine.


4. Any person who receives, harbours, comforts, assists or maintains any other person, whom he knows or reasonably suspects to be a rebel soldier, or any person who gives such other person succour in any way whatsoever, shall be guilty of an offence, and shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term of five years with hard labour without an option of a fine.

5. Any person who receives or assists another person who has to his knowledge committed an offence under this Edict, in order to enable that other person to escape punishment, shall be guilty of an offence, and shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term of five years with hard labour without an option of a fine.

6. Any person who  
(a) aids and abets the commission of any of the offences under this Edict; or

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Page 2 of 2  
Encl. No. 1  
A- 381 from Lagos

(b) counsels or procures any other person to commit any of the said offences, shall be guilty of an offence, and shall receive the same punishment as provided for under that particular section.

7. Any person who knows that an offence has been committed by a person in respect of any of the provisions of this Edict and fails to report to the Police shall be guilty of an offence, and shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term of five years with hard labour without an option of a fine.

8. Where an offence punishable under this Edict has been committed by a body Corporate, Company or a Firm, any person who at the time of the commission of the offence was a Director, General Manager, Secretary, Manager or Supervisor, or any responsible or highly placed official of that body Corporate, Company or Firm, shall be criminally responsible to the same extent as if the offence had been committed by him, and he shall be liable on conviction to suffer the punishment prescribed for that particular offence, unless he can prove that the offence was committed without his knowledge, connivance or consent and that he exercised due diligence to prevent the commission of the offence having regard to all the circumstances.

9. Any person charged with an offence under this Edict shall be tried summarily by a Judge of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the offence was committed.


10. Where any of the provisions of this Edict is inconsistent with the provision of any other law or enactment of this State, the provision of this Edict shall to the extent of such inconsistency prevail.

Made at Benin City this 12th day of July, 1969.

Lt.-Col. S. O. Ogbemudia,  
Military Governor,  
Mid-Western State of Nigeria

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Re: [unclear]

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA  
XR POL 27-9 BIAFRA-NIGERIA  
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 PRETOR 02340 132309Z

87  
ACTION AFI 18

INFO: OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSAEI 00, NSCI 10, P 04, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, UCF 05, UPW 01,

AID 28, SR 01, ORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 01, ACDA 16, RSR 01, 173 W

080854

RI 131520Z AUG 69

FMI AMEMBASSY PRETORIA

TO: SECSTATE WASHDC 3430

INFO: AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY GABERONES

AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE

AMCONSUL LUANDA

AMEMBASSY LAGOS

AMEMBASSY PARIS

Pretoria 8-13-69  
0340

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE: PRETORIA 2340

REF: LONDON 6329 *To: Pol 27 Biafra - Nigeria*

SUBJ: SA SUPPORT FOR BIAFRA

(2) 1. MINDEF P.W. BOTHA WAS QUOTED IN PRETORIA NEWS AUG 11, IN CONNECTION WITH REPORT IN REFTEL, THAT "WRITER OF ARTICLE APPARENTLY HAS CAPACITY FOR FANTASY. HIS STORIES ARE TOO EXAGGERATED TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY".

2. BOTHA ALSO NOTED THAT THROUGH ICRC, SA HAS GIVEN FINANCIAL AID TO BIAFRA FOR EMERGENCY RELIEF, FOR WHICH PURPOSE SA PARLIAMENT HAS VOTED MONEY.

3. MAIL AUG 13 CARRIED ABOVE PLUS REPORT THAT BOTSWANA GOVT DENIED THAT AIR FIELD IN ITS TERRITORY USED. ROUNTREE

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By MM NARA Date 10/5/05



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POL 27 Nigeria

Department of State

TELEGRAM

XL POL 27 Biap - Nigeria

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Tripoli 1951  
12/8/61

PAGE 01 TRIPOLI 01951 131152

18  
ACTION AFT 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 013, SCS 04, SCA 01, SRI 01, ORM 03, AID 28, CIAE 00,  
DDDE 00, JPM 04, HI 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAEC 00, NSCI 10, PI 04, RSC 01,

PRS 01, SG 20, USIA 12, UPH 01, UCF 05, RBR 01, 157 W  
076009

PI RI 130859Z AUG 69  
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4490  
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS

AMEMBASSY BENGHAZI  
AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY RABAT  
AMEMBASSY TUNIS  
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POL 27 Biap - Nigeria  
8/12/61 9 Biap - Nigeria

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TRIPOLI 1951

SUBJ: GOODWILL MISSION BY NIGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

REFS: TRIPOLI 1942, 1845

1. RADIO LIBYA ANNOUNCED EVENING AUGUST 12 THAT NIGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER (UNNAMED) BUT PRESUMABLY OKOI ARIKUOJI IS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN TRIPOLI AFTERNOON AUG 13 ON FIRST LEG OF TOUR OF SEVERAL AFRICAN COUNTRIES. HE IS REPORTED TO BE CARRYING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM NIGERIAN PRESIDENT GENERAL OAKUBU GOWON TO KING IDRIS. (SINCE KING NOW IN TURKEY ON VACATION, IT IS UNLIKELY ARIKUOJI WILL BE ABLE TO DELIVER MESSAGE IN PERSON.)

2. OIC TRIPOLI BRANCH FOREIGN MINISTRY TOLD IN CONFIDENTIALLY PRIOR PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT THAT VISIT NIGERIAN MINISTER EXPECTED TO LAST MINIMUM TWO DAYS, AND WILL INCLUDE TRIP TO BAIDA TO SEE PRIME MINISTER.

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By MM NARA Date 10/3/03



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Department

TELEGR

Pol 27 Biafra - Nigeria

X2 Pol 17-1 US - Gabon

13 AUG 69 17 20Z

INDICATE:  
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 CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy LIBREVILLE

STATE \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: Nigeria/Biafra

REF: Libreville 826, State 133458

89L-581

1. Suggest ~~xx~~ you may wish to introduce subject Nigeria/Biafra during your next substantive conversation with Bongo. You should constitute not raise matter in manner which would appear to ~~xxxxxx~~ demarche or ~~xx~~ to be responding to instructions from Washington. Would be of interest, however, to explore Bongo's own thinking and this could be done as normal part of general tour d'horizon of African and world problems.

2. Following, for your guidance, is a recapitulation of major elements of Nigerian problem as we see them:

a. Despite increased air capability of both sides, ground war appears stalemated and no military solution in sight.  
Numerous ~~xx~~ reported peace initiatives from many quarters ~~xx~~ show little sign of success.

b. US policy continues to emphasize relief to those in need without military or direct political involvement in conflict.

(2) DRAFTED BY:

AF/C:JAMcKesson, AF/W:RWFville:nb 8/13/69 DRAFTING DATE 28355 APPROVED BY: AF/C - John A. McKesson

CLEARANCES:

AF/W - RMMelbourne

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FORM DS-322  
4-68

0297

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Authority VND 950503  
By MNRARA Date 10/5/03



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**Department of State**  
**TELEGRAM**

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ACTION: Amembassy LIBREVILLE Page2

President Nixon has written personal letters to world leaders, relief agencies, General Gowon, and through Houphouet-Boigny, Ojukwu urging cooperation in resuming relief deliveries to Biafra. Ambassador Ferguson has followed up with discussions with representatives of both sides and European leaders in effort, together with other interested parties, establish daylight airlift and Cross River water corridor. USG prepared continue support for international relief effort, which illustrated by \$75 million contribution thus far.

d. We feel Nigerian conflict is first Nigerian, secondly African, and for solution to be meaningful and lasting, peace formula must come from African sources. We intend maintain recognition of FMG and American embargo on arms to both sides. We are willing, however, abide by any peace formula agreed to by adversaries. We hope friends of Biafra will exert their influence in support of reasonableness just as friends of FMG should press it toward same goal in relation both resumption of relief for Biafra and formula for peace negotiations.

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DRAFTING DATE

TEL. EXT.

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FORM DS-322  
4 - 68

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By MN NARA Date 05/05



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Department of State  
**TELEGRAM**

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ACTION: Amembassy LIBREVILLE Page 3

e. For US policy on UN role, see State reftel.

END

RICHARDSON

DRAFTED BY:

DRAFTING DATE

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FORM DS-322  
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Authority VN17950503  
By MNARA Date 01/01/03

37

August 13, 1969

Honorable Edward I. Koch  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Congressman Koch:

The Secretary of State has asked that I reply to your letter of July 31 about the Nigerian civil war. This war remains among the highest priority issues before the Department. The suffering of noncombatants on both sides of the line is a matter of great concern to us.

To assure that sufficient assistance would reach the civilian victims of the war, President Nixon on February 22 announced the appointment of Dr. C. Clyde Ferguson as Special Coordinator of our government's relief program. His activities have a dual purpose, (a) to make certain that enough food, medicine, transportation and money are available to meet the requirements, and (b) to obtain agreement on surface and air corridors through which supplies could be channeled to the secessionist enclave. Nearly \$75 million worth of food, medicine, transportation and money have been made available by the U.S. since the beginning of the war (a fact sheet is attached).

Until June 5, cargo aircraft of the International Committee of the Red Cross and Joint Church Aid flew each night 200 to 300 tons of food into the enclave from airfields at Cotonou and on the Islands of Fernando Po and Sao Tome. On June 5, the Nigerian Air Force shot down a Swedish Red Cross DC-7 under charter to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Shortly thereafter the ICRC terminated its airlift and began negotiations with both the Federal Military Government (FMG) and Biafran authorities on a daylight airlift proposal. These negotiations are still continuing. Joint Church Aid, on the other hand, after a temporary curtailment resumed

(2)

U/CF/R Sanderson

POL 27 BIAFRA NIGERIA  
XRPOL 27-9 BIAFRA  
AUGUST 13, 1969  
- NIGERIA -  
AUGUST 13, 1969

0300

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Authority VND959503  
By MMNARA Date 03/05


flights delivering more than 100 tons of food nightly

The United States Government has assisted the ICRC in obtaining two landing ships medium similar to those used in World War II which are capable of carrying 900 tons of relief each and discharging their cargo virtually anywhere on a water route. Ambassador Ferguson has proposed to both the FMG and the Biafran authorities a plan to utilize LSM's on the Cross River to the enclave. To obtain agreement on the proposal Ambassador Ferguson twice discussed this matter with Generals Gowon and Ojukwu. Both the FMG and the Biafran authorities gave their initial agreement to this plan and at present discussions with both parties are continuing in order to reach an understanding on operating details. If this plan is accepted, and we are hopeful it will be, a safe and adequate means will have been obtained for transport of relief to the Biafran enclave.

Efforts to resolve the conflict have been undertaken by His Holiness Pope Paul VI, His Imperial Majesty of Ethiopia, Emperor Hails Selassie, the Organization of African Unity and other governments. While the efforts of all these parties are still in process, we feel it would be premature to bring the question before the United Nations, an action which extensive consultations have indicated would be opposed by the Secretary-General, most African members, and several nations on the Security Council. We have moreover viewed this problem as an African one, preferably to be solved through African channels. We feel that any extra-African intervention, be it American or other, is unlikely to contribute to a meaningful and lasting peace in the area.

It is doubtful that American economic sanctions against either the FMG or Biafra would be effective. Our balance of trade with Nigeria is favorable from our viewpoint. Nigeria could easily find alternate suppliers for the principal items we export to it. We have no trade with Biafra. The U.S. has embargoed arms sales to both sides since the outbreak of hostilities.

0301



The Federal Military Government has been accused from several quarters of pursuing a policy of genocide against Ibo tribesmen. A number of reports by international observer teams have specified that there is no indication the Nigerian Government is practicing genocide. As in any wartime situation, particularly a civil war, isolated atrocities have been perpetrated by both sides.

In the final analysis, it must be realized that the Nigerian conflict is a real war being fought by both sides for political objectives which both believe are worth fighting and dying for. Both have so far failed to subordinate immediate political and military considerations to the supply of food and medicine to those in need. Until one side or the other decides it is to its advantage to compromise presently irreconcilable goals, progress toward agreement on meaningful peace negotiations and viable relief routes will be elusive. Nevertheless, we intend to do everything possible to encourage any initiative offering hope of success. Our influence upon either side is limited, however, and there is deep doubt whether extra-African intervention, be it American or other, would contribute to a meaningful and lasting peace in the area.

I am enclosing a copy of the Under Secretary's July 15 statement before the Subcommittee on Refugees of the Senate Judiciary Committee which contains a more complete narrative of our actions to bring about a resumption of relief supplies to the Biafran enclave. I am also enclosing a copy of the statement made by Ambassador Ferguson before the same subcommittee and a paper on the relief situation listing among other things the extent of the American contribution.

Please continue to call on us whenever you believe the Department can be of assistance.

Sincerely yours,

*W.B. Macomber*

William B. Macomber, Jr.  
Assistant Secretary for  
Congressional Relations

Enclosures:

As stated

U/CF:RDavidson:ls 8/9/69  
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Clearances:

U/CF:SCSchott  
AF/W:RWFaville

0302

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Authority *ND 959503*  
By *MN* NARA Date *10/3/05*

FORM DS-1563  
12-63

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

CONTROL NO.

**ACTION SLIP**  
(To Remain With Correspondence)

11974

TO U/CF - Mr. Thomas

DATE August 5, 1969

SUBJECT Ltr to Sec. dtd 7/31 fm Rep. Koch re Nigeria, asking for a report.

**ACTION**

\*Prompt handling is essential. Return basic correspondence with reply. If delayed call telephone extension below.

For appropriate action.

For direct reply. Comeback copy required \_\_\_\_\_.

A response for signature by Mr. H - Amb. Macomber  
Prepore reply.

Clear with AF

Prepare o \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_.

Refer to White House request of \_\_\_\_\_.

Due in XXXXXX H by 8/8/69

For your information.

REMARKS

DUE DATE IS FIRM

COPIES TO

S - Mr. Okun (w/att)  
AF - Mr. Alexander (w/att)

*gfk*  
Wingate Lloyd  
SECRETARIAT STAFF  
22156  
EXT.

0303

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Authority ND 959503  
By MN NARA Date 05/03

FORM DS-1563 I. KOCH  
12-63 NEW YORK  
TO U/C - M ON  
RONAUTICS

**Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515**

July 31, 1969

Honorable William Rogers  
Secretary of State  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Secretary Rogers:

I know that you are concerned as so many of us are that killing of innocent children is occurring in Nigeria as a result of the civil war between the Federal Nigerian Forces and those of Biafra.

The reports in the press which indicate that millions of people may in fact die of imposed starvation would indicate that genocide may in fact be taking place in that country. I have supported our country's taking whatever diplomatic steps and economic sanctions as would be necessary to save those innocents who are caught up in a struggle over which they have no control.

Some of those with whom I have associated myself on this subject are now pressing for recognition of Biafra by our government. I have not taken such a position because I believe that it would be wrong for our government to involve itself in the political disputes of the civil war. I do believe, however, that our country has an obligation to take diplomatic and economic measures and press this matter at the United Nations to prevent the crime of genocide. I fear that we are not doing enough and I respectfully request that you

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8/4/69

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1969 AUG 4 AM 11 59  
RS/AN  
ANALYSIS BRANCH

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Signed Edward J. Koch  
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
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By M. NARA Date 10/5/05

Honorable William Rogers

Page two

bring me up-to-date as to what is taking place and a statement on what our country is doing and what it plans to do in the area of diplomatic and economic sanctions. Lastly, I should like to know why we have not submitted the matter to the Security Council so as to have this subject debated there.


Sincerely,



Edward I. Koch

EIK:aj

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

Department of State

**TELEGRAM**

11/24/76  
11/24/76

CONFIDENTIAL 632

PAGE 01 LAGOS 07271 121800Z

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ACTION AFI 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, ACDA 16, UCF 05, UPW 01, IO 13, EI 15, COMI 08, SR 01,  
ORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 01, AID 28, IGA 02, OPR 02, CIAE 00, JPM 04, H 02,  
INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, PI 04, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, RSR 01, /188/W  
070531

PI 121702Z AUG 69

FMI AMEMBASSY LAGOS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8346

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

DIA

CINCSTRIKE

CDR NFE ID DERNIT I ALI LAGOS 7271

SUBJECT: ATTACK ON GULF TERMINAL

REF: A) LAGOS 7198; B) STATE 134458

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

1. GULF MANAGER, STRAND, MAKES CLEAR THAT HE INTENDS TO CONTINUE NORMAL OPERATIONS. STRIKE WAS NOT UNEXPECTED AND ESCRAVOS TERMINAL HAS BEEN ON INCREASED ALERT FOR SEVERAL WEEKS WITH EMPHASIS ON FIREFIGHTING DRILLS AND TRAINING. GULF HAS NO DEPENDENTS OUTSIDE LAGOS. ONLY EMPLOYEES AT ESCRAVOS ARE THOSE ESSENTIAL TO OPERATION OF TERMINAL AND OFFSHORE PRODUCTION AND DRILLING FACILITIES. THEY LIVE IN BACHELOR QUARTERS, ROTATING TO LAGOS OR ABROAD FOR TIME OFF. BELIEVE THERE ARE FEW EMPLOYEES AT ESCRAVOS WHO COULD BE SPARED WITHOUT ADVERSELY AFFECTING OPERATIONS AND STRAND SAYS NONE ARE BEING REMOVED. WE HAVE HAD RUMORS THAT VARIOUS HELICOPTER AND OTHER CONTRACT PERSONNEL WANTED TO LEAVE AREA BUT STRAND SAYS THIS CONFINED TO A NUMBER OF CONTRACT DRILLERS WHO NOW APPARENTLY WILLING TO REMAIN.

2. GULF IS FULLY AWARE OF POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER

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By MM NARA Date 10/5/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 LAGOS 07271 121800Z

ATTACK AND DANGERS INVOLVED. WE HAVE ADVISED STRAND OF POSSIBILITY OF INCREASED BIAFRAN AIR ACTIVITY IN NEXT FEW WEEKS. DEFATT HAS INVITED HIM TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH FOR ANY INFORMATION WE MAY HAVE ON FUTURE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS THAT WOULD BE RELEVANT HIS SITUATION. WHILE GULF COULD REDUCE PERSONNEL EXPOSURE BY SUSPENDING DRILLING OPERATIONS, WHICH WOULD NOT AFFECT CURRENT PRODUCTION RATES, WE THINK MAIN TARGET FOR FUTURE ATTACK WOULD CONTINUE TO BE TERMINAL. LOCAL GULF MANAGEMENT, TRADITIONALLY INDEPENDENT AND CLOSE-MOUTHED ABOUT ITS BUSINESS, HAS NOT ASKED OUR ADVICE AND WE RECOMMEND AGAINST OFFERING ADVICE AT THIS TIME ABOUT REDUCING PERSONNEL AT ESCRAVOS.

3. DEPT WILL RECALL THAT CHARGE ASKED GOWAN TO PROVIDE PROTECTION FOR GULF AND OTHER OIL INSTALLATIONS IN EARLY JUNE (LAGOS 4991). ALSO CHARGE IN TALK WITH ENAHORO EXTAFF YESTERDAY DISCUSSED ATTACK ON ESCRAVOS AND POINTED OUT PROTECTION STILL INADEQUATE. ENAHORO REPLIED "WE ARE GETTING SOME MORE GUNS THIS WEEK." BELIEVE ANY FURTHER PRESSURE WILL BE OF LITTLE VALUE. FMG IS AWARE OF SIGNIFICANCE OF OIL INDUSTRY FOR ITS IMMEDIATE FUTURE, UNDERSTANDS WHAT BIAFRANS ARE UP TO IN TRYING TO KNOCK IT OUT, AND APPRECIATES NEED FOR PROTECTION. FOR INSTANCE, OIL COMPANIES WERE SUMMONED TO DODAN BAR-RACKS AUGUST 2 AND REQUESTED BY MILITARY TO PROVIDE LIST OF ALL THEIR ACTIVITIES WITH PROMISE THAT ARMY WOULD PROVIDE PROTECTION. AS REPORTED REFTEL, MILITARY HEADQUARTERS LAGOS PROMISED STRAND YESTERDAY TO PROVIDE WHAT ADDITIONAL PROTECTION THEY CAN. PLAIN FACT IS THAT FMG IS SIMPLY NOT ABLE TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE PROTECTION UNLESS IT BRINGS IN ADDITIONAL AAA WEAPONS AND FOREIGN OPERATORS OR ACQUIRES AIR FORCE CAPABILITY TO KNOCK OUT ALL INTRUDER AIRCRAFT. COMPANIES WELCOME ADDITIONAL AAA GUNS AROUND FACILITIES, ALTHOUGH REGARDING THEM AS MIXED BLESSING BECAUSE OF TROOPS' INCOMPETENCE AND INEVITABLE PETTY INCIDENTS.

4. STRAND, INCIDENTALLY, IS VERY CRITICAL OF USG SUPPORT OF BIAFRAN RELIEF EFFORTS. HIS VIEW, SHARED BY MUCH OF OIL INDUSTRY HERE, THAT ONLY WAY TO END WAR IS TO SHUT OFF RELIEF AND STOP ALL FLIGHTS INTO ENCLAVE.

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PAGE: 03 LAGOS: 07271 121800Z

5. TEXACO (AMOSEAS) INFORMS US THAT AS RESULT OF RECENT STRIKES AGAINST OIL FACILITIES IT WILL PROBABLY POSTPONE STARTUP OF PRODUCTION. COMPANY NOW READY START PRODUCING AT 15,000 BPD FROM OFFSHORE PENNINGTON FIELD BUT TO DO SO MUST BRING IN STORAGE TANKER TO BE STATIONED SEVEN MILES OFFSHORE. THEY SEE NO POINT IN RISKING TANKER UNTIL SITUATION CLARIFIES. MOBIL OIL HAS ALSO EXPRESSED ITS CONCERN FOR SAFETY OF DRILLING OPERATIONS OFFSHORE OF SOUTHEASTERN STATE BUT NO INDICATION AT PRESENT THAT THEY INTEND TO SLOW DOWN OR SUSPEND. PHILLIPS, TENNECO, AGIP AND SAFRAP ALL ESSENTIALLY INACTIVE AT MOMENT FOR LACK OF ANYTHING USEFUL TO DO IN THE AREAS  
OLSON  
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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
DISTRIBUTION	ACTION: Amembassy LAGOS PRIORITY INFO: Amembassy LONDON DIA CINCSTRIKE		
②	Subj: Rebel Attack on Gulf Installation Ref: Lagos 7198 JOINT STATE DEFENSE MESSAGE 1. Would appreciate more information on Gulf reaction to Escravos terminal attack. It encouraging to note Gulf does not plan curtail production, but would like to know whether they plan evacuate any employees or dependents and what advice Embassy feels should be given Gulf. 2. Would also appreciate Embassy's views on whether FMG should be pressed by USG to provide additional protection.		
	RICHARDSON		
DRAFTED BY: AF/W:GBSherry:ba CLEARANCES:	DRAFTING DATE 8/11/69	TEL. EXT. 23391	APPROVED BY: AF/W - D. S. Spigler KJ

AF-Amb. Witman (sub)

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FORM DS-322  
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## OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

Re 27 Biafra - Nigeria  
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6/16/69 e/

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy LAGOS

Info:

INFO: Amembassy LONDON  
PARIS  
US MISSION GENEVA  
USUN  
Amconsul IBADAN  
KADUNA

STATE

SUBJ: Nigeria Press Summary - August 10, 1969

In WashPost Aug 10, Mort Rosenblum says QTE Nigerians claim roads but Biafrans control bush. UNQTE Writer says Nigerian third division slowly advancing on Owerri from Port Harcourt but neutral observers believe Nigerians may skirt city to cut vital Owerri to Orlu road before trying seize both cities. Article says Imo River ~~xxx~~ oil field threatened by Biafran Units and fighting reported Friday three miles east of Onitsha. According story, 800 to 1000 Biafrans linked with main forces and cut road traffic forcing Nigerians use longer supply route from midwest. Rosenblum says floods have forced FMG troops leave some midwest territory to Biafrans. On Biafra's east, writer says fighting has flared along Cross River around Ikot Okporo, and FMG fears hostilities might spread to Calabar. Some

Drafted by:  
AF/P:WCPowell:al

Clares:

Tel. Ext.  
08/11/69 20362

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

AF/P - W. Clinton Powell

FORM DS-322  
8-65

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By MNMARA Date 01/5/05

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
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ACTION:

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informants, says story, believe this principle reason Lagos has held-up approval ICRC river route. Also claims fear exists that Biafrans might QTE somehow UNQTE take two neutral relief boats for military service. Article says light aircraft believed piloted by Swedes make QTE selective and sometimes damaging attacks on FMG territory. UNQTE Also says FMG Midwest oil installations hard hit by mosquito planes but Benin well protected.

END

RICHARDSON

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Telegraphic transmission end  
classification approved by:

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 903

PAGE 01 ACCRA 02539 120852Z

16

ACTION: AFI 18

INFO: OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, UCF 05, UPW 01, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, PI 04, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12

AID 28, RSRI 01, 1/148, W

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RI: 111608Z AUG 69

FM: AMEMBASSY ACCRA

TO: SECSTATE WASHDC 6828

INFO: AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY LAGOS

AMEMBASSY LONDON

CL: O N F I D E N T I A L ACCRA 2539

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE GHANAIAN INITIATIVE RE: CONCOM

1. MINEXTAFF AFRICAN DIVISION DIRECTOR ANTWI TOLD EMBOFF THAT GHANAIAN AMBASSADORS IN AFRICAN CAPITALS HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SOUND OUT INFORMALLY HOST GOVERNMENTS REGARDING POSSIBILITY OF AMENDING CONCOM MANDATE AND EXPANDING ITS MEMBERSHIP.

2. IF SOUNDINGS FAVORABLE, ANTWI SAID GOGI PLANNING TO PROPOSE AT UPCOMING OAU SUMMIT MEETING THAT CONCOM MANDATE BE

MADE "MORE EVEN HANDED" IN TERMS OF BIAFRA AND THAT CONCOM BE EXPANDED BY 2-3 MEMBERS TO INCLUDE ONE OR TWO AFRICAN STATES WHICH RECOGNIZE BIAFRA.  
FOLEY

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Pol 27 Biafra - Nigeria

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

31

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PAGE 01 LONDON 06329 112041Z

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ACTION AFI 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, RSR 01, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,  
NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, AID 28, MC 02,  
ACDA 16, IO 13, UCF 055/165. W

063252

RI 111915Z AUG 69  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2091  
INFO AMEMBASSY GABERONES  
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE  
AMCONSUL LUANDA  
AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA  
AMEMBASSY PARIS

London - 6/22/69  
6/21/69

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SUBJECT: BRITISH PRESS REPORTS SOUTH AFRICAN SUPPORT FOR ONUKUWU

1. SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (CONSERVATIVE) CARRIES STORY AUG 10 ASSERTING: "SOUTH AFRICA HAS NOW BEGUN TO RIVAL FRANCE AS MAIN PROVIDER SECRET ARMS FOR BIAFRA." REPORTER GORDON BROOK-SHEPHERD GOES ON TO ASSERT THAT HERCULES AIRCRAFT OF SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE FLY TWO OR THREE TIMES A WEEK FROM PIETERSBURG WITH ARMS CARGOES TO "RENDEZVOUS" IN KALAHARI DESERT IN BOTSWANA. ARMS ARE THEN TRANSFERRED TO SOUTH AFRICA

IF 4/7'S ON CHART  
ARE TO BIAFRANS. #

2. ACCORDING TO STORY AIRCRAFT COMPLETE RUN INTO BIAFRA THROUGH LUANDA AND SAO TOME AND CARGOES INCLUDE "ENTIRE FIELD GUNS UP TO 25 POUNDS, WITH AMMUNITION, AS WELL AS MORTARS AND LAND MINES." BROOK-SHEPHERD CLAIMS OTHER SOUTH AFRICAN ARMS RUNS ARE MAKING INCREASING USE OF LIBREVILLE, WHERE ARMS SHIPMENTS ARE TRANSFERRED TO FRENCH FLIGHTS INTO BIAFRAN ENCLAVE.

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PAGE 02 LONDON 06329 112041Z

FULL TEXT BEING POUCED ADDRESSEES:  
CLEVELAND

NOTE: AS RECEIVED

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POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA  
Department of State

TELEGRAM

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8-11-69  
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CONFIDENTIAL 866

PAGE 01 LAGOS 07233 111812Z

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ACTION AF 18

INFO: OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, AID 28, SRI 01, ORM 03, SCA 01, SCS 04, UPW 01,  
UCF 05, SSO 00, CCO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02,  
INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, E 15, RSR 01,

/160 W

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P R 111700Z AUG 69  
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8320  
INFO USMISSION GENEVA  
AMEMBASSY LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL LAGOS 7233

SUBJ: NIGERIAN RELIEF - TEXT AUGUST 8 ICRC NOTE TO FMG

1. ENAHORO, DEP PERMSEC EXTAFF, GAVE CHARGE COPY ICRC NOTE TO GENERAL GOWON. NOTE ACKNOWLEDGES RECEIPT GOWON'S AUGUST 5 MESSAGE AND IS SIGNED BY NAVILLE. BEGIN TEXT:

DURING MY STAY IN LAGOS, YOU CONVEYED TO ME YOUR GOVERNMENT'S CONDITIONS FOR DAYLIGHT FLIGHTS. WITHOUT IN ANY WAY ADOPTING A POSITION, I HAVE HAD THE PROCEDURE PROPOSED BY YOU SUBJECTED TO EXAMINATION FOR ITS TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY. THE FINDINGS THEREOF WERE CONTAINED IN THE NOTE WHICH WAS DELIVERED TO YOU ON 25TH JULY. CONCOMITANTLY WE ADVISED THE OTHER PARTY OF YOUR CONDITIONS.

THAT PARTY INFORMED US THAT IT AGREED TO EMERGENCY NIGHT FLIGHTS BUT REJECTED YOUR CONDITION THAT THE AIRCRAFT ON MERCY FLIGHTS BE INSPECTED IN FEDERAL TERRITORY. THIS REPLY WAS COMMUNICATED TO US ON 30TH JULY AND YOUR AMBASSADOR IN GENEVA WAS INFORMED ON 1ST AUGUST.

IN VIEW OF THIS SET-BACK AND IMPELLED BY THE CONVICTION OF ITS IMPERATIVE AND URGENT DUTY TOWARDS CIVILIAN POPULATION IN THE BIAFRAN ENCLAVE WHOSE PLIGHT DETERIORATES DAILY, THE ICRC DECIDED IN PLENARY SESSION ON 31ST JULY TO DRAW UP A PLAN WHICH WE BELIEVE WILL OFFER THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT

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PAGE 02 LAGOS 07233 111812Z

THE GUARANTEES THEY HAVE A RIGHT TO DEMAND FOR THEIR OWN SECURITY.

THIS PLAN PROVIDES, IN PARTICULAR, FOR INSPECTION BY AN INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION OF THE CARGOES DURING LOADING. THIS, TO OUR WAY OF THINKING, IS THE ONLY MEANS OF ENSURING EFFECTIVE INSPECTION.

WE DO NOT CONTEST YOUR GOVERNMENT'S RIGHT TO PRESCRIBE TECHNICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE FORWARDING OF RELIEF, BUT THIS FINAL STIPULATION IN ARTICLE 23 OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION NEITHER CHANGES NOR ATTENUATES IN ANY WAY THE MEANING AND SCOPE OF THAT ARTICLE WHICH LAYS ON A BLOCKADING POWER THE DUTY OF GRANTING FREE PASSAGE FOR MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL SUPPLIES AND RELIEF FOOD FOR QTE CHILDREN UNDER FIFTEEN, EXPECTANT MOTHERS AND MATERNITY CASES UNQTE. THE SAME ARTICLE SPECIFIES THAT RELIEF CONSIGNMENTS SHALL BE FORWARDED AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.

I THEREFORE HOPE, AFTER THE LONG PERIOD OF NEGOTIATIONS DURING WHICH THE ICRC HAS PROVED ITS MODERATION AND DESIRE TO RESPECT NIGERIAN SOVEREIGNTY, THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL GIVE A QUICK AND FAVOURABLE REPLY TO OUR PROPOSAL.

AS YOU ARE AWARE, THE DONOR STATES WHICH HAVE GIVEN OUR OPERATIONS THEIR CONSTANT SUPPORT AND WHICH WE HAVE ALWAYS KEPT INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS, HAVE APPROVED OUR NEW PLAN, WHICH IN OUR OPINION IS PROOF THAT IT IS A REASONABLE PROPOSITION.

IT IS MY EARNEST HOPE THAT, IN THE NAME OF THE HUMANE FEELINGS WHICH YOU EXPRESSED IN THE COURSE OF OUR DISCUSSIONS, YOUR RESPONSE WILL DEMONSTRATE YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE URGENT NEED FOR A RESUMPTION OF THE RELIEF OPERATIONS.

2. EMBASSY COMMENT: IN CONVEYING ABOVE NOTE TO CHARGE, ENAHORO REMARKED THAT IT FAILED TO ANSWER FMG'S QUESTIONS. IT DOES STATE OTHER PARTY REJECTED INSPECTION ON FEDERAL TERRITORY, BUT GIVES NO REPEAT NO REASON. NOTE ALLEGES DONOR STATES HAVE APPROVED PLAN. WHILE ENAHORO DID NOT QUESTION THIS IN CONVERSATION WITH CHARGE, EXPECT IT MAY YET COME UP. APPRECIATE DÉPT'S COMMENTS. CHARGE ASKED HOW FMG PLANNED RESPOND, REPLY TO WHICH WAS SHRUG OF SHOULDERS. CHARGE URGED FMG MAKE EFFORT BE CONSTRUCTIVE IN REPLY TO KEEP DIALOGUE GOING. WE NOT REPEAT NOT HOWEVER AT ALL CONF.

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PAGE 03 LAGOS 07233 111812Z

DENT FMG WILL FIND POSSIBLE. CERTAINLY THEY WILL NOT REPEAT NOT UNDERSTAND ICRC INTERPRETATION ARTICLE 23 AND MAY WELL ASK WHY BIAFRANS DO NOT FIND INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION ON FMG TERRITORY ADEQUATE MEET BIAFRAN SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. GP-3

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POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA  
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 522

PAGE 01 LAGOS 07199 111343Z

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ACTION: AF/18

INFO: OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, HI 02, INR 07, LI 03,  
NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, UCF 05, UPW 01,  
AID 28, RSR 01, /148, W

RI 111130Z AUG 69  
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8299  
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
USMISSION USUN

060501

CHQNN: FRI D ENIT I A LI LAGOS: 7199

SUBJECT: UN AND NIGERIAN PROBLEM  
REF ID: STATE 133458: Pol 27 biafra Nigeria

1. FRENCH CHARGE TOLD EMBASSY OFFICER LAST WEEK IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION ABOUT IVORIAN INTENTIONS TO RAISE NIGERIAN QUESTION IN UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THAT FRANCE WOULD SUPPORT SUCH A MOVE BY THE IVORY COAST. HE ADDED THAT "OF COURSE" FRANCE ITSELF WOULD NOT INITIATE ANY UN CONSIDERATION BUT WOULD SUPPORT "AN AFRICAN INITIATIVE".

2. FRENCH CHARGE (CESAIRE) HAS HAD CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE IN UN POLITICAL AFFAIRS, AND WE ARE INCLINED TO THINK VIEWS IN PARAGRAPH ONE REPRESENT AS A MINIMUM HIS OWN VIEWS AND PROBABLE RECOMMENDATION. HOW MUCH IT REPRESENTS PROBABLE FRENCH ACTION, WE CANNOT TELL FROM HERE.

GP-3  
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POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA

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**TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 403

PAGE 01 LAGOS 07198 111212Z

50  
ACTION AF 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, E 15, SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, CCO 00, CIAE 00, JPM 04  
H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, PI 04, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, AID 28,  
SCS 04, SCA 01, UCF 05, IO 13, ACDA 16, RSR 01, /171 W  
060169

O/P 111135Z AUG 69  
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8298  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY  
AMCONSUL IBADAN  
AMCONSUL KADUNA  
DIA  
CINCSTRIKE

C O N F I D E N T I A L L A G O S 7198

SUBJECT: GULF OIL TERMINAL ATTACKED BY REBEL AIRCRAFT

JOINT STATE DEFENSE MESSAGE

1. GULF'S OIL TERMINAL AT ESCRAVOS, MIDWESTERN STATE, WAS ATTACKED AT 10:30 AM AUGUST 10 BY ROCKETS FROM SINGLE PIPER CUB TYPE AIRCRAFT. AIRCRAFT APPROACHED FROM SEAWARD (SOUTHWEST) AT TREE TOP LEVEL FIRED ONE ROCKET INTO 200,000 BARREL OIL TANK CAUSING FIRE THEN CIRCLED AND FIRED ONE ROCKET INTO GROUP OF HELICOPTERS PARKED ON TERMINAL'S LANDING STRIP. SEVEN PERSONS, INCLUDING FOUR AMERICANS INJURED IN ATTACK ON HELICOPTERS; ONE NIGERIAN SUBSEQUENTLY DIED OF INJURIES. WOUNDS OF AMERICANS RELATIVELY MINOR. THREE HELICOPTERS WERE STRUCK, ONE OR TWO OF WHICH MAY BE SALVAGEABLE.

FIRE AROUND OIL TANK WAS EXTINGUISHED IN FIFTEEN MINUTES; DAMAGES NOT YET ASSESSED, TANK BELIEVE REPAIRABLE BUT WILL BE OUT OF SERVICE FOR WEEKS OR MONTHS. OIL PRODUCTION SHUT DOWN AT TIME OF ATTACK BUT WILL PROBABLY BE RESTORED TO NORMAL 200,000 BPD BY AUGUST 12. GULF HAS NO PLANS AT THIS TIME TO CURTAIL PRODUCTION.

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PAGE 02 LAGOS 07198 111212Z

2. SINGLE 20 MM OERLIKON AAA GUN AT TERMINAL GOT OFF A FEW SHOTS AND PUT SOME HOLES THROUGH STAFF QUARTERS. MANAGER OF GULF HAS SEEN LTC OULEYE, NIGERIAN ARMY OPERATIONS OFFICER WHO PROMISES DO WHAT THEY CAN TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL PROTECTION BUT MADE NO FIRM PROMISES ON ADDITIONAL AA WEAPONS. GULF NOW SANDBAGGING PUMPING INSTALLATIONS IN TERMINAL AND CONSIDERING BUILDING GUN TOWERS IN EXPECTATION OF GETTING SOME OF ADDITIONAL WEAPONS EXPECTED ARRIVE FROM UK SHORTLY.

GP-4.

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By MNARA Date 01/5/03

4/4 DATE: ENCL: 8m  
(Drafting Office and Officer)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**Memorandum of Conversation**

DATE: August 11, 1969

SUBJECT: Courtesy Call of Tanzanian Ambassador  
PLACE: Mr. Newsom's Office  
PARTICIPANTS: David D. Newsom, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs  
G.M. Rutabanzibwa, Ambassador of Tanzania  
Edward Marks, Acting Country Officer for Tanzania  
COPIES TO: AF  
AF/E  
Amembassy DAR ES SALAAM

After an exchange of pleasantries, Ambassador Rutabanzibwa mentioned a group of people in New York called the Tanzania Group and their interest in developments in Tanzania. A founder, or influential figure in the group, was Lady Gresham, an American who was now a Tanzanian citizen and a Member of Parliament. The Ambassador went on to discuss the general subject of American and other Western views of Tanzania. He was particularly sorrowful, and wry, about journalists who had seriously misinterpreted developments in Tanzania and who even today persisted in labeling his country as "Communist", or "Socialist", and a base for Chinese Communist entry into Africa.

Mr. Newsom asked about Tanzanian views of American activities in Africa. The Ambassador replied that he and many others felt that the U.S. was not very interested in Africa, and was not doing much there. When queried as to whether this was in regard to politics or to economic assistance, the Ambassador concluded after some discussion that USG activity was minimal in both fields.

The Ambassador then went on to explain Tanzanian social and political goals, in fairly orthodox Nyerere terms. He emphasized that Tanzania's programs should not be given non-Tanzania labels - such as socialism - but should instead be viewed strictly in terms of Tanzanian criteria.

In extending the discussion to the question of Nigeria, Ambassador Rutabanzibwa responded to a question by Mr. Newsom as to the essential basis of Tanzanian recognition of Biafra by stating that the question was essentially humanitarian. Tanzanians could not approve of a situation where people -

FORM DS-1254

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NIGERIA

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. POL 49-13

DATE: 8-11-69 MSG NO.: 1947 TYPE: TE

FROM: Tripoli TO: See State

SUBJECT: Nigeria/Benfra: US Arms Embargo

DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: X OTHER: \_\_\_\_\_


BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

X CONTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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NIGERIA

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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CONFIDENTIAL 091

PAGE 01 LUANDA 00349 112051Z

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ACTION AF: 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, RSR: 01, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSAE: 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC: 01, PRS: 01, SS: 20, USIA 12, UCF 05, AID 28,

ACDA 16, MC: 02, IO 13, E 15, DOT 12, TRSY 11, COM 08, /211 W  
063354

R 111440Z AUG 69

FM AMCONSUL LUANDA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1041

INFO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

AMEMBASSY LAGOS

AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMCONSUL LOURENCO MARQUES

AMCONSUL SALISBURY

CONFIDENTIAL A LUANDA 349

SUBJECT: NIGERIA/BIAFRA: U.S. ARMS EMBARGO

REF: STATE 130557, LUANDA 83 (NOTAL), LUANDA 147 (NOTAL)

1. ROBERT HALL (LUANDA 83) BELIEVED TO HAVE MADE AT LEAST ONE FLIGHT TO BIAFRA WITH ARMS CARGO PRIOR TO MARCH 1969. ALTHOUGH CONSULAR OFFICER HAS NOT SINCE VISITED SAO TOME AND CONGEN UNABLE VERIFY HALL'S PRESENCE OR PRESENT ACTIVITIES.

2. CONSTELLATION MENTIONED LUANDA 147 BELIEVED ENGAGED RUNNING ARMS MARCH-APRIL FROM DAR ES SALAAM TO BIAFRA VIA LUANDA, LIBREVILLE. LOCAL EMPLOYEE OF FUEL COMPANY SAID AIRCRAFT COMMANDER WAS AMCIT WHO PAID FOR FUEL IN CASH DOLLARS, IDENTIFYING SELF AS "CAPTAIN OLYMPUS" AND AIRCRAFT AS BELONGING TO "PHOENIX AIRLINES." EMPLOYEE WAS INSTRUCTED NOT TO INQUIRE FURTHER. PIDE CONTACT CONFIRMED TO CONGEN OFFICER THAT CREW OF AIRCRAFT WAS AMERICAN, BUT WOULD NOT DIVULGE FURTHER INFO. THIS PARTICULAR AIRCRAFT, WHICH SIMILAR TO UNMARKED RHODESIAN CONSTELLATION, UNDERGOING REPAIRS AT LUANDA AIRPORT, NO LONGER BELIEVED OPERATING VIA LUANDA, BUT MAY MAKE REFUELING STOPS AT NEGAGE AIR BASE IN UIGE.

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**TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 LUANDA 00349 112051Z


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
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0325



RS/R - file 8/26/70

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Page 2  
Maseru A-127

1. The Government, a bit skeptical in any case about the OAU, would chide that organization for its inability to help bring a solution to the Nigerian problem.
2. The opposition Congress Party would blame the western nations en masse, but particularly Britain, claiming that the Nigerian civil war was deliberately created by the west to further its neocolonial interests.
3. Other observers (few in number) would merely express sorrow that the problem had not yet been solved.

It is doubtful that these attitudes have changed in recent months.

  
BARTH

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Authority: ND959503  
By: MN NARA Date: 03/05

## ORIGIN/ACTION

EUR-6

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AIRGRAM

A-517

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TO : Department of State RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATEINFO : COPENHAGEN, HELSINKI, LAGOS, ~~OSLO~~<sup>OSLO</sup>, REYKJAVIK,  
GÖTEBORG *Aug 12*

ANALYSIS BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy STOCKHOLM DATE: August 8, 1969

SUBJECT : Social Democratic Comment on Von Rosen Activities

REF : Stockholm's 2167

Enclosed is an informal translation of an article by a Social Democratic Riksdag member, Torsten HANSSON, concerning Swedish attitudes towards the Nigerian-Biafra conflict and the repercussions of Count von Rosen's air operations in support of Biafra. The article, which appeared on July 30 in left-wing Aftonbladet, displays a degree of realism and clear-headedness often lacking in Swedish pronouncements about foreign policy issues.

CAMERON

BUREAU  
OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
COMMUNICATIONS CENTER

1968 AUG 14 AM 10 05

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FORM DS-323  
4-62

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 In Out

Drafted by:

POL:WBoche, Jr:ssn

Contents and Classification Approved by:

POL:CABorg

Clearances:

MRM  
USIS:MLMoe.

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DECLASSIFIED  
Authority *VND 959503*  
By *MN* NARA Date *10/5/05*

UNCLASSIFIED Page 1 of Encl. No. 1 to A-517  
from Stockholm

CARL GUSTAF von ROSEN: PRIVATE PHILOSOPHER

(Article by Torsten Hansson, M.P. (Soc.Dem.) published in Aftonbladet 7/30. Mr. Hansson has recently visited Lagos, where he met representatives for the Government and the trade unions.)

Rumours have reached us to the effect that Capt. C-G von Rosen is back in Biafra to resume the activities in which he was involved there on his last holiday. This relapse perhaps gives renewed interest to some thoughts about his activities which I jotted down during a fortnight's visit to Lagos in June, but which I deemed after my return home not of sufficient immediate interest to publish.

The discussion here in Sweden after von Rosen's first plunge into the war centred on two questions: was it a bold and selfless act, and did the rocket attacks bring the conflict any nearer a solution? There is strong emotional engagement in this country on behalf of the victims of the war in Nigeria, which has found its expression in support for the aid programmes. This emotional engagement offered a good climate for publicity concerning von Rosen and his men.

Today it must be clear to all that his actions did not produce the result von Rosen originally said he was aiming at. His effort in the air was supposed to support the political efforts of the breakaway state and reduce the suffering of the people of Biafra. What has happened? The two sides are today further from the negotiating table than they were when the action started, the strategic position of the breakaway state has deteriorated still further, and the conditions on which aid work could be carried on have been completely jeopardised.

But what has proved to be a particularly regrettable consequence of von Rosen's holiday war from the Swedish point of view is the spontaneous and negative reaction in Africa, not only in Nigeria. The firmly-established good-will we imagined our neutrality and our contributions to the aid effort should have given us seems to have been wiped out at a single blow. When we read at home in Sweden of the flag-burning episode in Lagos, it was possible to hope that this was only a little, centrally-directed propaganda action. In actual fact, however, there exists in Nigeria today a widespread and articulate hatred of Sweden. Unfortunately, this has also had repercussions in other African countries.

What, then, is the reason for Sweden's being criticised so severely?

Other mercenaries have served with the rebels without their own countries being exposed to the same attacks as Sweden.

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from Stockholm

There are two basic reasons. The first is that the holiday war is regarded as an appalling insult and display of arrogance towards the blacks. A statement printed in the New Nigerian of 19 June expressed the feeling perhaps better than any other: "The superior white man with five other white mercenaries in single-engined training-planes is reported to have knocked out 'eleven Nigerian aircraft' in a series of raids."

Von Rosen reminds me of Gullberg's thinking postman, who was going to "intervene once and for all and arrange everything for the best." To the Nigerians, he appears as a survival from the colonial age, when a handful of armed whites could compel and humiliate whole African peoples. To the Swedes, who applauded his efforts, von Rosen infused new life into the Charles XII complex - the misconception of a little nation, politically insignificant for centuries, about why she once played a role in events.

But the colonial age is as dead as Charles XII. A complex world of new nations demands a right to recognition, respect, and a say in developments. If we reject war once and for all as a means of solving international problems, then we must accept that world politics is a delicate structure of agreements, understanding and respect between sovereign states. The people of Africa have long been prevented by the West from seeking their role and their place in the international community. Africa is therefore a particularly sensitive but living part of the world political structure. Von Rosen has plunged into this delicate and complex construction and tried to solve the problem according to his own individual and limited view.


How can this be, and how can it be allowed to happen? We have felt it necessary to have legislation to prevent the export of arms to countries at war. But we have no legislation to prevent the personal participation of Swedish citizens in wars. The volunteer brigades in the Spanish and Finnish Wars still have such a good ring that it might be inopportune to propose legislation in this field.

And yet it is precisely the increasing complexity of world affairs and concern for our own political freedom of action which should render such legislation apt. Should it not be open to us to prevent private individuals wilfully affecting our foreign relations and jeopardising the political course we have determined under democratic forms?

An important reason, in addition to the humiliation, why Sweden should have attracted such severe criticism in Nigeria is the confidence formerly felt in this neutral, non-imperialist country. Conversations with Foreign Minister Arikpo and trade union leaders Adebola and Grodlock in Lagos confirm precisely this psychological effect. The young nations

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from Stockholm

are searching for ideals and models. By tradition, Western thinking and planning have appeared a valuable guide. War and imperialism have of course been doubtful features of Western civilisation, but the African states have attempted, to the last, to build on the humanist ideals and the administrative practice instilled in the colonial period. In this connection, Sweden has (undeservedly) come to represent the West, as it may appear to an African, with the negative features peeled away. Now Sweden has let them down, and the Nigerians feel exposed and at a loss. A break with the whole of the Western political and ideological pattern may be at hand.

What should we do?

The repercussions of von Rosen's holiday war may be long-lasting and difficult to eradicate. A large portion of the influence we have laboriously built up over a period of years fell under the rocket-fire at Benin City, Ughelli and Port Harcourt. The work of reconstruction must begin with ourselves. Continuous discussion of the political principles on which our attitude towards the developing countries is based would increase our psychological preparedness against over-hasty private commitments in conflicts.

Source: British Embassy Press Release, July 31, 1969

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA  
7R PS 7-6 US-NIGERIA  
Department of State

**TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 495

PAGE 01 LAGOS 07175 081923Z

48  
ACTION AF 18

INFO: OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, LI 03,  
NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, PRS 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, AIDI 28,  
E 15, COM 08, INT 06, TRSY 11, SCS 04, SCA 01, SR 01, ORMI 03, ACDA 16,  
UCF 05, UPW 01, OPR 02, RSR 01, 217 W

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RI 081715Z AUG 69  
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0000

CONFIDENTIAL LAGOS 7175

SUBJ: EVACUATION OF DEPENDENTS FROM WARRI

REF: LAGOS 6899

1. EVACUATION OF SHELL-BP DEPENDENTS, WHICH APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT FASTER THAN EXPECTED, HAS CAUSED INCREASED NERVOUSNESS AMONG AMERICAN OIL PEOPLE AT WARRI. WARRI IS NOTORIOUS FOR RUMOR-MONGERING AND SOME PEOPLE THERE FEAR THAT SHELL-BP KNOWS SOMETHING ABOUT MIDWESTERN SECURITY SITUATION WHICH IT NOT REVEALING. RUMOR STARTED THERE AUGUST 7 THAT EMBASSY HAD RECOMMENDED ALL AMERICAN DEPENDENTS LEAVE. BELIEVE WE HAVE SCOTCHED THIS BY REPEATING TO INTERESTED COMPANIES OUR ADVICE OF LAST WEEK THAT WE SEE NO INCREASED DANGER TO DEPENDENTS IN WARRI AREA AND THAT COMPANIES MAKE THEIR OWN DECISION WHETHER FOLLOW SHELL-BP EXAMPLE.

2. THUS FAR HAVE HEARD OF ONLY ONE U.S. DEPENDENT LEAVING AREA. ANOTHER COMPANY IS INVESTIGATING LAGOS HOUSING AND MAY MOVE ITS TEN DEPENDENTS TO LAGOS WITHIN A MONTH. A THIRD WITH TEN DEPENDENTS HAS OFFERED TO PUT THEM UP IN LAGOS HOTELS BUT HAS NO TAKERS.

3. HAVE HEARD REPORT THAT MAJOR REASON FOR SHELL-BP DECISION WAS FEAR THAT BIAFRAN AIRCRAFT WOULD ATTACK SHELL-BP HOUSING ESTATE AT EDGE OF WARRI AS PART OF SPECIFIC CAMPAIGN AGAINST

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POL 27 Biafra + Nigeria

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PAGE 01 BONN 10492 082124Z

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ACTION AFR 18

INFO: OCT 01, EUR 17, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, HI 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00,  
NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, UCF 05, AID 28, SRI 01,  
ORM 03, IO 13, UPW 01, RSR 01, /152: W

049120

R: 081810Z AUG 69  
FM: AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4748  
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE  
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY PARIS

CONFIDENTIAL 1 A L BONN 10492

SUBJ: THE FRG AND NIGERIA

1. PARLIAMENTARY STATE SECY GERHARD JAHN OF THE FONOFF RETURNED ON AUG 1 FROM A FIVE DAY TRIP TO AFRICA. THE PURPOSE OF HIS TRIP WAS TO SIGN IN YAOUNDE THE SECOND ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT OF 18 AFRICAN COUNTRIES WITH THE EEC.

2. JAHN TOOK THIS OPPORTUNITY TO VISIT EMPEROR HAILE SELASSIE IN ADDIS ABABA, WHERE HE DISCUSSED THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR. THE FONOFF (BUENEMANN, ACTING CHIEF AFRICA) TELL US THAT HAILE SELASSIE WAS VERY OUTSPOKEN ON THE SUBJECT AND THAT HE ACCUSED GENERAL OJUKWU OF CAUSING THE BIAFRAN PEOPLE UNTOLD HARM AND MISERY BY PERPETUATING THE WAR. THE EMPEROR WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT A RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT COULD BE FOUND IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. JAHN TOLD HIM THAT THE FRG STANDS READY TO MAKE AVAILABLE ITS GOOD OFFICES FOR ANY TASKS THAT MAY HELP END THE CONFLICT OR REDUCE THE SUFFERING.

3. BUENEMANN SAID THAT THE FONOFF WAS PUZZLED AS TO HOW OJUKWU WAS ABLE TO CONTINUE THE FIGHT. THIS SEEMED PARTICULARLY POINTED IN VIEW OF OJUKWU'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT RELIEF FLIGHTS FROM LAGOS SINCE THE PROHIBITION OF THE OTHER RELIEF FLIGHTS BY

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By MN NARA Date 10/5/03

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POL 7 NIGERIA  
XR POL GHANA-NIGERIA  
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

XR POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

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PAGE 01 ACCRA 02514 081338Z

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ACTION AF 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, ID 13, UCF 05, UPW 01, AID 28, SR 01, DRM 03, SCE 00,  
SCA 01, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10,  
P 04, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, RSR 01, 153 W  
----- 045756

R 081212Z AUG 69  
FM AMEMBASSY ACCRA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6814  
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON

UNCLAS ACCRA 2514

SUBJECT: GDWN VISIT

1. GENERAL GDWN RECEIVED WARM RECEPTION IN ACCRA DURING ONE-DAY VISIT. ON ARRIVAL GDWN WELCOMED BY NLC CHAIRMAN AFRIFA, OTHER NLC MEMBERS, RANKING GOVT OFFICERS, DIPLOMATIC CDRPS AND LEADERS LARGE NIGERIAN COMMUNITY. DURING DAY, GDWN MET WITH NLC, VISITED MILITARY ACADEMY AT TESHIE (WHICH GDWN ATTENDED) AND LAID WREATH GENERAL KOTOKA'S GRAVE.
2. IN WELCOMING REMARKS AFRIFA NOTED SINCE NLC CAME INTO POWER, GHANA AND NIGERIA HAVE "MOVED FORWARD SHOULDER TO SHOULDER TOWARDS THE FORGING OF GENUINE AND LASTING FRIENDSHIP." SAID VISIT CLEAR DEMONSTRATION VALUE TWO COUNTRIES PLACE ON THEIR FRIENDSHIP.
3. IN REPLY GOWON URGED ALL FRIENDLY COUNTRIES APPEAL BIAFRANS GIVE UP SECESSION AND WORK WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF ONE NIGERIA. SAID FMG DETERMINED CONTINUE SEARCH FOR PEACE THROUGH DIALOGUE AND PREPARED OFFER EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES AND SECURITY ALL NIGERIANS REGARDLESS ETHNIC ORIGIN.
4. RE GHANA'S SCHEDULED RETURN CIVIL RULE, GOWON WISHED FUTURE CIVILIAN GOVT WELL AND HOPED PRESENT MUTUAL COOPERATION WOULD CONTINUE. SAID FMG DETERMINED RESTORE CIVILIAN

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Pol 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA

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Department of State

**TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 MONROV 03572 081402Z

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ACTION SS: 70

INFO OCT 01, CIAE 00, 1071 W

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R 081207Z AUG 69  
FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7353  
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS

CONFIDENTIAL MONROVIA 3572

LIMDIS

SUBJ: PUBLIC OPINION ON NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

REF: STATE 123842: POL 27 Biafra - Nigeria  
VR Pol 27-9 Biafra - Nigeria

1. CHARACTERISTICALLY, LIBERIAN OPINION ON THE NIGERIAN CONFLICT IS REFLECTION OF PRESIDENT TUBMAN'S POLICY AND VIEWS. TUBMAN HAS CONSISTENTLY CRITICIZED BIAFRA FOR HAVING BROKEN WITH NIGERIA AND STARTED THE CONFLICT. TUBMAN FEELS THAT FRAGMENTATION AFRICAN STATES MUST BE OPPOSED. LIBERIAN MEDIA AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS REFLECT TUBMAN LINE ON NIGERIA.

2. HE HAS INDICATED PRIVATELY THAT THOUGH IBOS, AS EDUCATED, CHRISTIAN PEOPLE, ARE CLOSER TO LIBERIANS THAN OTHER NIGERIANS, HE IS NOT SYMPATHETIC TO OJUKWU'S CLAIMS. HE FEELS PARTICULARLY THAT OJUKWU'S CRIES FOR HELP FOR STARVING BIAFRANS ARE CYNICALLY USED PROPAGANDA. TUBMAN FEELS THAT OJUKWU'S PEOPLE CAN BE FED BY STOPPING THE WAR. TUBMAN ALSO FEELS THAT THE NIGERIAN BLOCKADE OF BIAFRA IS A LEGITIMATE ACT OF WAR.

3. TUBMAN HAS MADE \$25,000 CONTRIBUTION TO RED CROSS FOR NIGERIAN RELIEF AND HAS PERMITTED A RELIEF COLLECTION THROUGH LIBERIAN SCHOOLS, BUT HIS MAIN INTEREST IS IN TRYING TO END THE WAR. HE HAS WELCOMED BOTH NIGERIAN AND BIAFRAN DELEGATIONS AND HAS MADE EVERY EFFORT TO DO HIS PART IN TRYING TO REACH A SOLUTION.

4. AT SAME TIME, THERE IS VOCAL COMMUNITY OF BIAFRANS IN LIBERIA WHO HAVE ATTEMPTED TO PLACE BIAFRAN VIEW BEFORE PUBLIC WITH SOME SUCCESS. GOLI HAS NOT VISIBLELY INTERFERED WITH RELIEF COLLECTIONS.

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PAGE 02 MONROV 03572 081402Z

IN BIAFRAN COMMUNITY. GOL HAS INTRODUCED STRICTER RESIDENCE CONTROL MEASURES, OBVIOUSLY IN ATTEMPT KEEP CLOSER EYE ON THE COMMUNITY, PARTLY BECAUSE OF SUSPICION THAT BIAFRANS RESPONSIBLE FOR ANTI-TUBMAN LETTERS AND SIGNS LAST YEAR.

5. SOME YOUNG LIBERIANS IN UNIVERSITY HAVE VOICED SYMPATHY BIAFRAN CAUSE BUT THESE COMMENTS ARE NECESSARILY MUTED. IN GENERAL, GIVEN GEOGRAPHICAL PROXIMITY, PUBLIC INTEREST NIGERIAN CONFLICT SURPRISINGLY LOW. HIGH POINT WAS DAU APRIL MEETING MONROVIA.

HOWISON

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## L I M D I S

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Other

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Other

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
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OOL 27 Biafra-Nigeria  
XR OOL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria  
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 PARIS 12018 081606Z

43  
ACTION SS: 70

INFO OCT 01, CIAE 00, SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, DODEI 00, CCO 00, 1071 W  
046804

PI 081600Z AUG 69  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6116  
AMEMBASSY LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL 12018

LIMDIS

LONDON FOR AMBASSADOR FERGUSON

SUBJ: NIGERIA: FRENCH CABINET STATEMENT

REF: STATE 131758 AND PREVIOUS

② 1. IN LIGHT REFTEL FOLLOWING REPORTED FOR DEPARTMENT'S INFORMATION:

2. EMBASSY AND QUAI MAINTAINING STRICT SILENCE ON ANY DEVELOPMENTS NIGERIA/BIAFRA QUESTION AT GENEVA AND RESPECTIVE PRESS SPOKESMEN WILL ANSWER ANY PRESS QUIRIES BY SAYING THEY ARE UNAWARE OF ANY SCHUMANN-FERGUSON MEETING.

3. THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPORTS IN FRENCH PRESS SINCE AMBASSADOR FERGUSON'S CONSULTATIONS HERE ON EITHER POSSIBLE NEW INITIATIVES RE: NIGERIA/BIAFRA OR POSSIBLE SCHUMANN-FERGUSON MEETING.

4. WE AGREE WITH DEPT CONCLUSION REFTEL ON PROBABLE SOURCE OF WASHINGTON POST AUG 7 STORY. GP-3  
SHRIVER

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By MMAR Date 05/03

## L I M D I S

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## Geographic

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USIA 4 P —  
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## Other

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Authority VND 950503  
By MN NARA Date 10/5/05

46

August 8, 1969

Honorable J. W. Fulbright  
United States Senate  
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Fulbright:

In the absence of the Secretary, I am replying to your letter of July 10 about the Nigerian civil war.

*POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA*  
The enclosures to your letter have been read with interest. Almost as many views on the Nigerian conflict can be found as there are commentators. Many use exaggeration and half-truth to support pre-conceived positions. Regardless of the observer, however, there are certain details which are difficult to refute. This is a real war being fought by both sides for political objectives both believe worth fighting and dying for. A great many innocent victims on both sides, but particularly in Biafra, are suffering. And neither side is willing to subordinate military and political considerations to the provision of food and medicine to those in need.

We, as do you, earnestly hope for an end to the fighting. We have up to now followed a policy of deep involvement in the international Nigerian relief effort while remaining militarily and politically non-involved in the conflict. Much as we desire a negotiated peace, there are no concrete indications at this time that either side is prepared to compromise their apparently irreconcilable objectives - territorial integrity for the Nigerians, independence for the Biafrans. Numerous attempts have been made and several initiatives are now under way to bring the disputants to the negotiating table. We have closely followed them all and encouraged those having any chance of success. We shall continue to do so. But the influence of the United States on both sides is limited, and it is highly questionable whether intervention by us or any other extra-African power would contribute to a meaningful and lasting peace in the area.

In the meantime, our efforts are being concentrated upon obtaining a resumption of the relief effort in Biafra. We have strongly urged both sides to reach agreement on means for relief deliveries. If

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AF/W: RW FAVILLE, BA STOKES: m/s  
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By NARA Date 01/05/05

accord can be reached on this subject, perhaps an atmosphere will be created in which a formula for peace negotiations can be found. However, obtaining the agreement of both sides has always been a major obstacle to ensuring a sustained flow of relief supplies to those in need.

I am enclosing a copy of the Under Secretary's July 15 statement before the Subcommittee on Refugees of the Senate Judiciary Committee, which contains a fuller narrative of our actions to bring about a resumption of relief deliveries to the Biafran enclave. I am also enclosing a copy of the statement made by Ambassador C. Clyde Ferguson before the same subcommittee and a paper on the relief situation. I hope this material will be useful to you in writing to your correspondents.

Please continue to call on me whenever you believe the Department can be of assistance.

Sincerely yours,

WB M

William B. Macomber, Jr.  
Assistant Secretary for  
Congressional Relations

Enclosures:

1. Under Secretary's statement
2. Ambassador Ferguson's statement
3. Paper on Nigerian relief

AF/W:RWFaville, BASTokes:nb 8/5/69  
Copies to:

H - Mr. Grant (w/att)  
S - Mr. Okun (w/att)  
AF - Mr. Alexander (w/att)  
P - Mr. Chishes (w/att)

Clearances: AF/W -Mr. Melbourne by *10/10*  
AF - Amb. Moore *Ch*

H - Mr. Leahy  
U/CF - Mr. Schott *SCS*

*21-JUL-69 - retype first page*

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By *MN* NARA Date *10/5/05*

FORM DS-1563  
12-63

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

CONTROL NO.

AFW  
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146  
TO AF - Mr. Alexander *(To Remain With Correspondence)*

DATE

July 14, 1969

U/CF - Mr. Thomas

SUBJECT

Ltr to S fm J.W. Fulbright dtd 7/10/69

ACTION

\*Prompt handling is essential. Return basic correspondence with reply. If delayed call telephone extension below.

For appropriate action.

For direct reply. Comeback copy required

XXXXXXXXXXXX A response for signature by Mr. H - Amb. Macomber  
Prepare reply

Clear with AF, H

XXXXXXXXXXXX

Prepare o \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_

Refer to White House request of \_\_\_\_\_

Due in XXXXX H by 7/17/69  
XXXXXXXXXXXX

For your information.

REMARKS

We suggest that P's form letter responding to inquiries on Biafra be included with the reply

COPIES TO

H - Mr. Grant (w/att)  
S - Mr. Okun (w/att)  
AF - Mr. Alexander (w/att)  
P - Mr. Chishes (w/att)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
1969 JUL 17 PM 12 36

*Wingate Lloyd*  
Wingate Lloyd  
SECRETARIAT STAFF  
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By MNARA Date 05/05

J. W. FULBRIGHT  
ARKANSAS  
COMMITTEES:  
FOREIGN RELATIONS (CHAIRMAN)  
FINANCE  
JOINT ECONOMIC


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LEE WILLIAMS  
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

United States Senate  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

JAMES B. CASH, JR.  
LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT

July 10, 1969

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ACTION  
is assigned to



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The Honorable  
William P. Rogers  
Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have a number of most urgent letters, requesting that I do something to bring about a settlement of the war in Nigeria and to prevent the annihilation of the Biafrans. I honestly do not know what to recommend to you other than to suggest that we renew our appeals to both sides to seek a negotiated peace. I enclose some material submitted to me which I hope either you or Assistant Secretary Palmer might consider, and if you have any views or suggestions that could give some satisfaction to my correspondents, I would appreciate it.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

  
J. W. Fulbright

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7/11/69

JWF:at  
Enclosure

attached

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By MNARA Date 10/5/05

# THE SUNDAY TIMES

JUNE 1, 1968

## THE ACCUSING FACE OF YOUNG BIAFRA

Richard West was in Biafra at the end of March. Here he reports on conditions there at the time, and argues that the extinction of Biafra would be a disaster for the whole of Black Africa

**B**iafra, two years after its violent creation, has nine High Courts where the judges wear powdered wigs; four football pools and a brewery; 250 doctors and 500 lawyers; an oil refinery and a busy chain of banks; a railway whose train runs on time; and a civil service devoted to duty in triplicate.

Anyone with a television set knows the Biafra of bombed markets and starving children. But Biafra exists as something more than a battlefield and a hospital. It is a proud, hard-working, efficient and exuberant state.

Biafra, starving Biafra, is the only country in Africa where I have spent a week and not been approached by a beggar. The Chief Justice, Sir Louis Mbanefo, says that they no longer get cases of housebreaking and highway robbery. "People would get so angry," he explained, "that criminals would not dare to commit such crimes." When I mentioned to a Biafran that a thief had pinched two packets of cigarettes from Donald McCullin and me, the response was draconic fury: "If they had found the man, he would have been stoned to death." (They did find the man: his punishment was not revealed to us but one packet of cigarettes was returned.) Stern popular vigilance helps to explain why, in Sir Louis' words,

"In two years of war, starvation and shortage, there has never been any breakdown in law and order." All

criminal cases are heard within six months and bail is readily given

because there is no place to go to skip bail.

The telephone works in Umuahia

— most of the time. Garbage collection,

sewage and electricity are far better

run than in Lagos. The tap water is

safe to drink and certain offices still

have air-conditioning. The feeding

centres and refugee camps are clean,

well-ordered and discipline; the starv-

ing wait their turn to be fed and often

smile and sing as they wait. The

refugees living in camps have built

good huts; they conduct schools, till

the land and earn extra money by

weaving and basketry. The Queen

Elizabeth Hospital at Umuahia is clean

and efficient compared to any hos-

pital in the world. The ward sisters

wear tunics of stiffest, starchiest white

and their reprimands strike dread

into the student nurses.

The Ibos, who make up most of

Biafra's population, are expert busi-

nessmen, and their war effort is based

on private enterprise. This is one of

the things that has helped us in the war," said T. Eneli, the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Finance, "— the people's will to help themselves and to make good." Many Biafrans

still walk two days to a market to get the best possible price for their goods.

Thousands cross the firing lines to trade their palm oil for food in territory held by the Nigerians. Biafran

capitalists with business connections

abroad have bought goods on extended

credit and hired planes to airmail

the goods into Biafra. Much of the

food brought in by the charity organiza-

tions is bought and sold several

times in Biafra. This free market pre-

vents a black market and staves off the

danger of inflation. Although prices

are high, there is no loss of confidence

in the Biafran pound.

Office workers as well as peasants

give many hours each week to "digging

for victory" in the Land Army. This

must be the first place in Black Africa

where graduates and professional men

have joined with peasants at manual

work in the bush. "I still have some

difficulty with my arms after the first

day's spade work," said an elegant

ex-diplomat at the Foreign Office,

"but the experience is well worth it,

It's especially good for some of the

girl secretaries who used to worry too

much about their fashions."

Few Biafran girls worry much

about fashion. The wigs, so popular in

the rest of the West Coast, are unob-

tainable now; most girls do their hair

in short catkin plaits. Dancing is

rare, but the Women's Voluntary

Services has opened 60 branches since

independence.

Life is austere but seldom gloom.

Wit and laughter abound in Umu-

ahia's numerous palm-wine bars

like the "War-Time" Hotel, the

"Survival" Hotel and the

"Tanzania," "Gabon" and the

"Ivory Coast" hotels, named after three

of the countries that have recognised

Biafra. Pub conversation always re-

turns to the shortages.

"You know, I can't remember what

beer tastes like."

"I can — unfortunately. But" not

rice. They say the only man who

remembers the taste of rice is a uni-

versity historian."

"I often wonder what the new pop-

groups are like. We're terribly behind

the times here in Biafra. When peace

comes and we meet the rest of the

world again, people will stare at our

old-fashioned clothes and roar with

laughter."

Giving up smoking becomes an

obsession when cigarettes cost five

shillings a piece. One addict confided to me: "When the price of a stick went up to 9d, I said that I'd never smoke again. But when I started to earn good money again I went to a man who was selling cigarettes and I said: 'Don't bother me with the price — just give me a stick.' It was a shilling then. Now it's five shillings — the price of two bottles of palm wine."

Even the bombing produces a few grim jokes. Since the Vandals — as Biafrans call the Nigerians — do most of the raids around mid-day, the hours between ten and three are always referred to as "Vandal Time." The shops, banks, markets and feeding centres open before six in the morning and close as soon as possible after eight, when people go to the hush.

The children act as air raid warning," an Irish nun assured me, "they hear the jet planes long before we do and shout an alarm." Some school classes are held under the shade and camouflage of a Frangipani tree, with a hunker in readiness next to the benches. But when the class is held indoors, the children do not run out for cover as this might attract the bombers. "If a plane comes over," a teacher told me near Ezinshi, "we tell the children to keep still, because if the pilot sees children running away he has a target." One mile away there is a wrecked school and the graves, surrounded by orange lilies, of children who died in the raid.

Crossroads, too, are dangerous during Vandal Time. One morning we stopped at a Y-crossroads where hitch-hikers and saleswomen were standing beside the road. Two hours later, the bombers came over, wheeled once over the crossroads, then strafed it a couple of times with cannon. Four of the women I'd seen were dead and the grass and palm leaves were drenched in blood. It is never safe to stay in a group during Vandal Time.

The Biafrans react to air raids with wonderful courage and calm, always standing aside (God bless them!) to let a foreigner enter the hunker first. They have lost the fear of death and the fear of the dead. "You've been in Africa," said an elderly man, "and therefore you know the meaning of a debt of personal relationship. You know how much we spend on a funeral. Well, we doo'n know. We're no longer frightened of death."

A young man I knew showed me the photograph of his sister, who had been killed that month by a bomb. "R.I.P." he had written beneath the face of a serious, pretty girl with the

usual catkin plaits. "When my sister died," he went on, "I took her body back to my village. This was Monday. On Tuesday, my mother said to me: 'You must get back to your job for the war effort!'"

The same young man, on his last day in Biafra, was called to the bedside of his brother who had lost both eyes and one arm. Although his brother was likely to die, the young man continued quietly with his work.

The medicine men in most countries in Africa do good business in war-time by selling protective charms to the troops. The Biafrans, too, used to get lucky scars cut on their cheeks; but now they have learned that hulls and shells are stronger than any ju-ju, that the scars are simply not worth the five shillings paid for them to the witch doctor. The Biafrans have learned that bunkers are better than sorcery as a safeguard against the bombs. The idol set up in Umuahia marketplace did not save it from bombing and 200 deaths. At Eziuma the marketwomen gave rum and cartridges to the medicine man but, after the jets had strafed them, rightly demanded the gifts back.

Superstition and cannibalism are giving way to a new idea of nationhood. Biafra, in this respect, is growing less African and more European. Yet, paradoxically, it is the one country in Africa that exists almost without the help of whites. Foreign businessmen and advisors have now been replaced by Biafrans. The Peace Corps and the Voluntary Services Overseas, who provide most of the teachers in Nigeria, withdrew from Biafra two years ago. In Biafra, college graduates now teach school in the hush. This fact alone, to anyone knowing West Africa, ranks as one of the country's rarest achievements.

The few score whites now left in Biafra include half a dozen mercenaries (one of them in a military prison), one or two journalists, Red Cross workers and missionaries. "Early oo in the war," said Father Kevin Doherty, "white men were suspect because of the role of Shell. I once got stopped at roadblock 25 times in 22 miles. Now, they lift the barrier almost before you reach it. Recently, I was going to the airport, and the military insisted I had an escort with me. When I got there the guard said, 'What are you doing here?' — to the escort. I had to tell him, 'It's all right, sergeant, he's with me.' That shows the trust they have in us."

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The Biafrans retain a touching affection for English people. "The British are a people we hear when they speak," said a refugee from one of the minority tribes, "we used to like them very good. Now we are very disappoint. But we know that we still have many English friends - friends even among our enemies."

A Chief, more sophisticated, brought out the last of his whisky to toast me. "I like to talk to British people," he said. "I'm tired of talking to continentals who come here. We believe that the British should understand us. These Scandinavians and these Germans, they're very nice people I'm sure, but what have they got to do with us?"

Many Biafrans talked of Britain as "father" to Nigeria. "Why," they asked, "when the two sons quarrel, does the father listen only to one side?" A studious girl, who had lost most of her relatives in the massacres and the war, told me: "I hope you understand that the Nigerians will only unite us over our corpses. Some British M.P.s have said that they want a 'quick kill' against Biafra. How can they say things like that in the Mother of Parliaments? Why do they talk of killing us? Can you explain that to me?"

I said I could not. And I still can't.

**A**ffection for Britain does not extend to the man they call "Little Harold", "John Harold Wilson", the "English Hitler" and the "Crime Minister". Since thousands of Biafrans have worked or studied in Britain, where many, too, were members of the Labour Party, they appreciate the refinements of our policies. "Does Wilson want to force Eire back into a British federation?" asked one - "that wouldn't please the Catholics."

A dozen people gave versions of this argument: "When Rhodesia seceded from Britain, Harold did not use force. He said he wanted to avoid bloodshed. But when we seceded from Nigeria, he gave them arms and told them to kill us. What is the difference except that the Rhodesians are white and we are black?"

Mrs Ezi Ahi, a nursing sister at Queen Elizabeth's Hospital, said, showing me round the children's ward: "Here is a child who was hit during the raid on Umuahia market-place. And here is the piece of metal they took out of her eye. It weighs six ounces. And here is a child with what used to be called Kwashiorkor, the protein deficiency disease that you've seen in all the pictures about Biafra. In this hospital, the disease has been officially renamed 'The Harold Wilson

Syndrome'." This name is used on the patients' records and also on death certificates.

**S**ome of the worst cases of Kwashiorkor were flown for treatment last year to São Tomé, a Portuguese island in the Atlantic. It is typical of Biafra's optimism that all these children, once cured, were flown back to their shrinking and perilous homeland. Their recovery is outstanding. These children, six months ago, had been as bad as those in Donald McCullin's photographs. Today they are not just healthy but even a little plump. The Biafran doctors told me that Kwashiorkor, if checked in time, leaves no mental or physical after-effects.

The São Tomé children played, fought and sprinted about - whereas most Biafran children have too little energy for these things. The Biafran children are solemn and quiet - the São Tomé children are noisy and naughty. One orphan, called "Sergeant Major" after the soldier who had rescued him, gave a howl of rage when some visitors started to leave. "They get used to a lot of petting in São Tomé," said one of the nuns who help look after the school. "They're the centre of the universe down there, and they can't get used to it here. The Portuguese are very fond of children and they carry them around with them all day."

Nothing impressed me so much in Biafra as leaving it. We drove at night to Uli airstrip which is near Federal lines on the west side of Biafra. The strip is merely a widened road; it is harassed most nights by Federal planes; it is blacked out except for thirty seconds before landing and take-off. We had to douse the lights of our car ten miles before coming to Uli and we all leaned out of the windows to guide our driver along the road.

When we got to Uli we learned that the Federal planes had strafed the runway that evening and dropped three bombs that, luckily, did little damage. Somebody in the darkness said that their planes were still about and would shortly be making another attack. A nervous air traveller at the best of times, I felt very impatient to get on a plane and away. What followed sounds like comedy now but certainly was not humorous then.

A man with a torch conducted me into a blacked-out shed where several people sat at desks lit by candle and oil-lamps. I was taken to Health where a dim figure asked me to take a seat. He slowly leafed through my vaccination certificates for smallpox, yellow fever, etc.

cholera ("this will expire in two months, Sir"), typhoid, typhus and the plague. When he had read through every page he started again just in case he had missed something the first time. At last he invited me to his desk, he stood up, smiled, wished me safe journey and gave me my health certificate back with all the dignity of a Vice-Chancellor presenting an honorary degree to a cabinet minister. The Immigration desk was in almost complete darkness; the official inspected my documents with a torch. After a couple of minutes he called a subordinate clerk who asked me to follow him out of the building. We walked in total darkness for 20 to 30 yards (during which time I tripped and fell into a ditch) to another, more brightly lit hut, where the chief immigration officer sat. He shook hands, asked me to sit down, and took a look at my passport.

"British, eh?" he exclaimed with a frown. "Well perhaps you wouldn't mind explaining to me about Harold Wilson?" It was now ten at night. I knew that I might just have time to catch the first Red Cross plane to Dahomey. If I missed that plane I had resuced him, gave a howl of rage when some visitors started to leave. "They get used to a lot of petting in São Tomé," said one of the nuns who help look after the school. "They're the centre of the universe down there, and they can't get used to it here. The Portuguese are very fond of children and they carry them around with them all day."

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Biafra, at the time I left, was faced with the danger of final annihilation. A people that I respect and like were threatened with persecution and death. I cannot therefore pretend to

be impartial. But Biafra is more than a human tragedy. Its defeat, I believe, would mark the end of African independence. Biafra was the first place I had been to in Africa where the Africans themselves were truly in charge of government. It was the first place I had been with a sense of nationhood rather than mere statehood. It was the first place that had started to free itself from the African vices of graft, superstition and ignorance. It was the first African country free of neo-colonialism. Other countries are taking the same course. Both Tanzania and Zambia, of the English-speaking states, are striving for real independence and this is why both have given support to Biafra. But most black African states now exist only as satellites of the Europeans, the Americans and the South Africans.

**N**igeria, which I went to after Biafra, has all the defects of these fake independent states. Although now immensely rich from the revenue of its oil wells, it is depressing and squalid. Lagos stinks of its open drains. The filthy, broken-down shanty-towns contrast with a few acres of luxury suburb that house the privileged and corrupt. Blackout is used as an excuse for the fitful electricity and for the closure of Lagos airport at night. At numerous checkpoints, surly police and soldiers extract their toll of graft from the motorist. One checkpoint outside Ibadan is said to clear £100 a week. In Lagos, 300 miles from the war, there is spy mania and secret police surveillance. People lower their voices to talk of the war and scarcely dare whisper the name "Biafra". In Biafra I did not hear one disloyal word. The first two Yorubas whom I met were secretly favourable to Biafra and talked of the widespread hostility to the war. I do not suggest that these views are typical; but they show the weakness of morale when compared to Biafra, the losing side.

Few African states offer such wealth and luxury as Nigeria does to the white man. The annual income of £70 million a year that will come in soon from the oil fields has made Nigeria glamorous to the foreign investor. The twelve thousand British businessmen, advisors, technicians, teachers and other professional people enjoy high salaries, housing and living allowances, servants and ample leisure. Although some, who had Ibo friends, are sceptical of the war, the majority are even more Nigerian than the Nigerians.

The Ikoyi Club, on the grandest island of Lagos, is open in theory to Africans; in fact it is almost

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totally English. Here the new white masters clout the heads of the ball-boys at tennis, and grous about Africans over drinks in the bar. These white people at Lagos, and all along the West Coast, regard independent Africans with a mixture of patronage and contempt. They are outwardly matey towards their black business associates; they know how to bribe them without giving offence; but in the privacy of their homes and their white clubs they are just as Negrophobe as Rhodesians or South Africans. An Englishman who has lived for years in the country and whose sympathies are for Biafra, said to me: "The English here have a kind of patronising affection for Yorubas and Hausas. They know how to deal with them. But most of them hate the Ibos and hated working in Iboland. The reason is simple. The Ibos were too well educated and they wanted to do the job that the Europeans did. Often they did the job very much better. They didn't complain. They didn't make excuses."

The recent Russian initiative in Nigeria has much alarmed the British and much enriched thousands of local grafters. Russian officials have given enormous bribes to the so-called Nigerian labour leaders. They finance a Communist newspaper that stopped publication for a time when the workers had complained that they had not received their wages. The laughing Yorubas regard their new Russian friends as some of the dastardly white suckers that ever came to the Coast.

In his excellent and propitious book, *The African Predicament*, Stanislaw Andreski wrote that "the Russian conveyors of diplomatic pressure seem to have found that 'buying' African politicians is very tiresome because (in contrast to similar people in Europe) they cannot be bought but only temporarily hired. Whereas a Dutchman or a Norwegian who has accepted money from a foreign diplomat or secret agent is very much concerned about concealing the fact, and therefore can be compelled to render further services by blackmail and without much further payment, an African politician (provided he shares the money with his kinsmen and friends) will be acclaimed by them as a hero, and may even boast about his cleverness in getting it out of the mean foreigners. Consequently, he cannot be blackmailed, will constantly ask for more, and may even repeatedly and almost openly hold a kind of auction." In the last two years Russia and Britain have hid against one another to purchase the dubious loyalty of the Nigerians.

The British civil servants, judges and district officers who administered Nigeria until 1960 at least managed to keep in check the graft of the locals. The present businessmen, owing no allegiance either to Britain or to Nigeria, are quite as open to graft as the Nigerians.

The Lagos Government and its friends in the British High Commission have well-polished arguments to support their war on Biafra. Most of these depend on certain analogies with historical events. The favourite of these analogies is the danger of 'Balkanisation'. Two British diplomats said to me within a week that they "often think" of a *Punch* cartoon showing three maps of Africa: one as it is now, then further divided, and at last as a pile of multi-tudinous fragments. Yet who has worked out what 'Balkanisation' really means - by taking a look at the Balkans?

The Balkans, like Africa, were ruled once by foreign empires. Austria ruled Hungary, Croatia and Slovenia. The Ottoman Empire or Turkey ruled Greece, Albania, Serbia, Bulgaria and Rumania. During the 19th century, independence movements sprang up within these countries. By 1912, the countries once ruled by Turkey had gained their freedom and started to quarrel among themselves over the distribution of territory. The 'Balkanisation' process grew faster after the First World War and the fall of the Austrian Empire. Slovenia and Croatia joined with Serbia in the new state of Yugoslavia. The splintering process in Eastern Europe was not confined to the Balkans proper. Czechoslovakia was formed out of Austrian territory. Poland was reborn from Austria, Russia and Germany. The small nations of Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania broke away from former Russian rule.

'Balkanisation' could be defined as the splitting of supra-national states into small nation states with their own language and culture. Many British writers and politicians, 50 years ago, regretted the overthrow of the empires in Europe and thought that the new nations were too small and incompetent to be workable. Nowadays, most of us favour 'Balkanisation' for Europe. We believe in the sovereign rights of Greece, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania and Rumania. Only Russia, among the European powers, still clings to the old belief in a supra-national state, with control over the Balkans and Eastern Europe. She has extinguished the small nations of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, incorporating them with several other minority nations, into the Soviet Union. She has reversed the ➤

'Balkanisation' of Eastern Europe by setting up a 'Socialist Commonwealth' whose members, in Russia's own phrase, enjoy only "limited sovereignty". The Russians sent tanks into Prague to prevent the Czechoslovaks leaving the 'Socialist Commonwealth'. They have sent jet bombers over Umuahia to prevent the Biafrans from leaving Nigeria.

If 'Balkanisation' has not been bad for the Balkans, why then should it be bad for Africa? Surely it is reasonable that the states of Africa should correspond, as far as is reasonably possible, to the boundaries of their nations. I use the word nation, rather than tribe, to describe such a people as the Ibos because 'tribe' smacks of disengagement. The present boundaries of most African states are simply the old boundaries of the colonies, and were frequently drawn on the map by statesmen who knew nothing of Africa. The State of Nigeria, for example, comprised three major nations with totally different languages, customs, and religious beliefs.

The 'Balkanisation' of Africa would not necessarily mean that all of the states become smaller. The Bakongo, for instance, who were joined in a flourishing kingdom 500 years ago, are now divided between the three separate states of Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa) and Portugal's colony Angola. It would be sensible, though difficult, to incorporate all the Bakongo nation into one state.

The former colonial powers, like Britain, who now complain so poignantly of the 'Balkanisation' of Africa, gave independence to states that were not really nations. Only in Togoland and the Cameroons, two former German colonies under the trusteeship of the United Nations, were the inhabitants able to vote about which state they should join.

This British Government has given freedom and sovereignty to the following four African states: Lesotho (population 800,000), Botswana (population 350,000), Swaziland (population 270,000) and Gambia (population 350,000). The first three of these states are former British trusteeships and are economically dependent on South Africa. The British Government argued, in my view quite correctly, that if the peoples of these territories were brought under South African rule they could not be protected from racial prejudice. Precisely the same argument is applicable to Biafra. The people of Northern Nigeria fear and detest the Ibos. Tens of thousands of Ibos were massacred there in 1966. Iophobia, which is widespread too in Western Nigeria, is comparable to the Nazi

bated of Jews. Biafra was created out of fear of racial prejudice and it is fear of persecution and death that keeps the Biafrans fighting.

This argument cannot apply to the Gambia, a tiny enclave of Senegal on the western edge of West Africa. Wolofs and Mandingoes live in the Gambia; Mandingoes and Wolofs live in Senegal. The two states are tied by race, language, customs, geography and religion. Nothing divides them except the fact that Senegal was once ruled by the French and the Gambia by the English. The British Government, so one might have thought, would have tried to make the Gambians join in a federation with Senegal. On the contrary; it encouraged them to set up their own state. The British motive, in the Gambia as in Nigeria, was to preserve British influence and commercial privilege.

Of course, big states are not necessarily more successful than small states. The only two solvent states in West Africa (and the only two to recognise Biafra) are the Ivory Coast (pop. 4 million) and Gabon (pop. 600,000). The former Belgian Congo (pop. 14 million) has not been an African success story. And in the Sudan (pop. 12 million) a British imposed federation of Arabs and Negroes has caused a civil war almost as dreadful as that in Nigeria. The empire of Ethiopia (pop. 20 million) is ready to erupt at any moment into civil war. Of course bigness does not mean goodness in more developed parts of the world. It would be difficult to argue that Russia and the United States were better, more pleasant or more successful than Denmark, Holland or Czechoslovakia. Size is an economic advantage in an advanced industrial country where it allows for bigger markets, investment and research. But even these economic considerations do not count much in Africa where most economies are based on peasant agriculture. The small advantages of size are offset by problems of transport, administration and regional jealousies. A Biafra of perhaps 12 million people would be on the large side for an African state.

Britain, in the last 15 years, has several times tried to create federations out of her former colonies. The Caribbean Federation folded almost at once. Malaysia and Singapore soon broke apart with great advantage to both sides. The Central African Federation failed because it gave too much power to Rhodesia. When these federations dissolved the British Government shrugged, so to speak, and merely said "what a pity". When Nigeria, the largest, least ➤

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homogenous the most calamitous federation failed, the British government paid for a war to restore it.

**A**nother analogy used by Nigerians and its friends compares the breakaway of Biafra to the breakaway of Katanga from the Congo. The analogy runs thus: Katanga was the richest part of the Congo; Biafra was the richest part of Nigeria; Tshombe, the leader of the Katangan breakaway, was very rich and in the pay of foreign capitalists; Ojukwu is very rich; therefore, Ojukwu is in the pay of foreign capitalists.

This argument is crammed with flaws. In the first place, the eastern region was rich largely because of the industry of its people. There are oil wells in the area claimed by Biafra, but just as rich deposits in the Midwest and West, including one smack under my Legos hotel. If the Ibos had remained in the Federation they would certainly, because of their skill and education, have got a major share of the revenue from the oil throughout Nigeria. The Union Miniere copper company in Katanga was patently in support of the secession. The foreign oil companies in Nigeria are just as blatantly on the Federal side. While Tshombe grew rich during the exercise of office, Ojukwu began as the son of a millionaire and has lost a fortune in fighting for Biafra. The politicians in Lagos do not publish accounts but many of them are grafters in the Tshombe class.

Many British M.P.s who dislike Colonel Ojukwu and smear him by the comparison with Tshombe, are, strangely enough, the people who once supported Tshombe. The City had big investments in Katanga just as it now has in Nigeria. The Irish diplomat, Conor Cruise O'Brien, who led the U.N. forces against Katanga and afterwards wrote a book attacking Tshombe, is now one of the trust friends of Biafra.

Two British diplomats have repeated to me an analogy dear to Nigeria: "People complain about the Nigerian blockade. But how would the British have felt if people had flown food and arms into Nazi Germany?" One can only reply that Biafrans are not Nazis: that during the Second World War, the Germans blockaded Britain more than we blockaded them: that nobody in Britain complained of the food and arms shipped by America through the Nazi blockade.

There is an analogy between the Nigerian treatment of the Biafrans and the German treatment of the Jews. The Ibos have always been nicknamed the 'Jews of Africa'. "There are British and American

Ibophobes as well as Nigerian ones," wrote Conor Cruise O'Brien in *The Listener* (30 January 1969), "who will tell you tales of Ibo arrogance and bad manners: their parvenu display of superior education; their sly and aggressive commercial practices; their channiness, nepotism and jobbery; their callous contempt for the manners and customs of other Nigerians; their aim to dominate all Nigeria . . . There are times when, listening to such catalogues, I half expect to hear of Ibo men smoking in non-smoking carriages (and paying the fine from a hulking wallet, with a sneer) or of Ibo women flaunting their jewellery in the foyer of the Adlon Hotel."

**T**he Jews in Eastern Europe before the war did not believe that the Nazis were planning genocide; and therefore they did not fight back. After the war, the remaining Jews knew better and sought a permanent home in Israel. But here the analogy does not apply. The Jews sought a home in Palestine which had not been Jewish for two thousand years and was now largely occupied by Arabs. The Ibos, in their diaspora, could retire to their own Iboland. There are minority tribes in the territory claimed by Biafra; there used to be millions of Ibos in the land they do not claim, west of the Niger.

The last and strangest analogy links the war in Nigeria with the civil war in America, with General Gowon cast as a black Abraham Lincoln. I suspect that Harold Wilson is much impressed by this analogy. He has been fascinated since his youth by the history of the Civil War and his favourite novel, *King Cotton*, tells of the sufferings of the Lancashire working class who refused to weave cotton brought from the South. Like his hero, Churchill, Wilson regards himself as an expert on the military history of the Civil War. Even in anxious times like the last days of an election campaign, he relaxes with Civil War books such as Bruce Catton's *Stillness at Appomattox*.

This is the weakest of all analogies. The United States, in 1861, had existed for more than 80 years and were tied by a common language, culture, religion and theory of politics. Nigeria, at the start of its war had existed for only six years and had no common language, culture, religion or theory of politics. The Northern side in the United States fought, at least partly, to end the practice of slavery. Even the Foreign Office has not yet tried to suggest that slaveholding is practised in Biafra.

*This is the first in a series of three articles about black Africa by Richard West. He will be writing in subsequent issues about Ethiopia and Liberia*

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Hotel Hudson - 1234 Broadway  
New York, N.Y. 10001  
Tel. No. (212) 736-2040

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Rypon Forum  
Feb. 1969

## Biafra and the Bureaucrats

### I. The Sad Diplomatic History

Last September, hard-nosed American policy-makers had plausible political reasons for not rushing food to the starving population of Biafra. The men who counted in the American foreign policy establishment—from the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs to his cousin who writes the editorials on Africa for *The New York Times*—believed that mass starvation, however tragic for those 6,000 souls affected daily, ought at least to hasten the collapse of Ojukwu's secessionist government. Since a "quick kill" of Biafra would allow the victorious Nigerian armies to bring relief into the liberated areas, the "most humane solution" was to let the Biafrans starve until they abandoned their intransigent claims to self-determination and military security.

**ONE-SIDED NEUTRALITY** While awaiting Ojukwu's capitulation, the State Department gave wide publicity to the fact that it was supplying two-thirds of the food stockpiled by the Federal Military Government (FMG) of Nigeria. It did not mention that its contribution of aid to Biafran-held areas, where the starvation problem was most acute, was negligible. Such small countries as Norway, Sweden, Holland and Ireland bore the brunt of the relief burden in the places where the need was greatest.

But all that was last year. During the campaign, Mr. Nixon made a strong statement in favor of sending massive relief into Biafra, and in the weeks following his election the State Department has made gestures in the direction of a more effective and even-handed relief policy. It approved the release of a few cargo planes for use by voluntary agencies airlifting food into Biafra. It supplied 2,000 tons of surplus U. S. food—a 30-hour supply—to a mercy ship for use in Biafra. It has also at least stopped its talk about Biafran intransigence, and it has drafted plans for stockpiling in Nigeria and off-shore islands the 45,000 tons of food needed monthly to meet the carbohydrate shortage that may cost the lives of from 20,000 to 100,000 Biafrans a day beginning in March.

**DEFUNCT THEORY** There have also been some changes of perception of the political situation. As the new administration enters office, there are no state department briefing officers to give voice to the now discredited theory of the quick kill. On the contrary, those who have supported the

old Nigeria policy are now willing to admit that even with monumental daily starvation rates Biafran resistance to Nigerian forces will continue, by guerrilla warfare if necessary. They are willing to concede that Yakubu Gowon, the Nigerian head of state, has very little control over his hawkish military commanders, who recruit their own soldiers, often deal directly with foreign armament suppliers, and determine their own maneuvers; thus, even if the war did end, Gowon's pledges of fair treatment for Biafrans are in doubt.

Indeed, most State Department officials now see Gowon's personal leadership as much nearer to collapse than Ojukwu's. Ojukwu's people are loyal, though starving, while many of Gowon's well fed citizens have begun to riot against the war and revive old tribal antagonisms against each other.

**SOVIET FOOTHOLD** The perception of these facts has been made easier because the British, our mentors in Nigeria, have also begun to perceive them. Instability in Nigeria has given the Soviets a chance to make rapid gains at the expense of the British among Nigerian military and political leaders.

A Soviet air base in Northern Nigeria to supplement facilities in Southern Algeria and the use of the Lagos port would give them considerable leverage over all of West Africa. Any major Soviet influence over the disposition of Nigerian oil, indispensable source of supply for Britain, would fit nicely with Soviet activity in Arab countries that control Western Europe's oil supply and further dispose Western European countries to treat Russia with respect.

The British, having competed for a year and a half to give the Federal Government more devastating offensive weapons than the Soviets can offer, are now beginning to perceive the fruitlessness of this course. Britain now wants peace. This means that the U. S. Ambassador in Lagos, whose views have coincided with those of his British counterpart, is now sending more realistic and disturbing reports to Washington.

**BACK TO THE 1870's** All of these facts would seem to argue at the very least for a more vigorous American humanitarian role and perhaps for a political role as well. They spell, after all, the utter collapse of American policy on three fronts. In general African policy, the American goal of keep-

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ing 'black Africa' free from great power rivalry is being destroyed as the Russians and British compete to arm the Federal Government, while the French give small arms to the Biafrans and the Communist Chinese and South Africans stand by waiting to help. The throwback to 19th Century imperialism that was avoided in the Congo is fast becoming a reality in Nigeria.

Second, in relief policy the pious American hope that food will flow into Biafra on the heels of a Federal victory has been disappointed by a stalemated war in which Biafra has been landlocked and put under a state of siege. Only a Biafran corridor to the sea, a ceasefire, or a massive airlift will avert mass starvation.

Third, the American hope for a stable unified Nigeria as an example of thriving regional development and as a guard against the balkanization of Africa now seems a very distant dream. The United States made the early mistake of confusing "balkanization" with readjustment of boundaries and jurisdictions that will be necessary if black Africa is to move peacefully from colonial borders to those based on the reality of African power. It made the error of assuming that vigorous regional economic development was impossible without strong central government. In Nigeria this is not the case—a regional development board can distribute the gains of Nigeria's oil, while a dispersal of power away from Lagos is essential to the political stability which will permit economic progress.

Yet at important junctures in recent Nigerian history the United States exerted the decisive influence for over-centralization.

**NEW POLICY: WRING HANDS** The collapse of past policies has not, however, resulted in the definition of a new approach. Though the United States was in the forefront of nations when it came to taking credit for the success of the Nigerian "showcase" it has seized on the present turmoil as an occasion to withdraw to a pious wringing of the hands. The new American posture was struck in an eloquent address by Under Secretary of State Katzenbach in December 1968. Katzenbach enumerated the reasons for America's helplessness in remediying the situation: its wisdom in not supplying arms to either side; its determination to pursue a humanitarian course; its firm belief that it could not be the policeman of the world; its reluctance to intervene in a situation that was essentially African. All of these self-imposed restraints made the United States powerless to act, though it would continue to provide relief, monies and to use routine diplomatic channels to hasten a settlement.

To give Katzenbach his due, the speech did mark an important reversal of American dedication to the quick-kill theory, but the sense of agonized helplessness which it conveyed was due as much to bureaucratic inertia and end-of-administration lassitude as to inherent difficulties in the Nigerian war. State Depart-

ment officials had, with all good intentions, been pursuing inflexibly a Nigeria policy based on misinformation and miscalculation, and one does not turn weary and defensive civil servants overnight into advocates of imaginative new proposals.

Moreover, the Nigerian situation seemed superficially to resemble the early stages of Vietnam. Its resolution might require a more forceful American role, and this could be interpreted as "intervention," the first step on the road to a new quagmire. The lesson of Vietnam was to let the Biafrans starve. The U. S. was willing to deal with the situation through intermediaries but not to take a visible role on its own.

Unfortunately, the available intermediaries are simply not equipped to exert any decisive pressure to stop the starvation. The favored intermediaries of Mr. Katzenbach were the Organization of African Unity (OAU) for political aspects of negotiation and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for relief efforts. Both of these agencies have had severe difficulties in meeting the urgent demands of the situation.

**UNSTEMMED ARMS FLOW** Katzenbach liked the OAU, as represented by Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, because he believed the Nigerian problem to be an essentially African one that could be settled only by African means. But this is palpably not the case. The Nigerian war has become a Great Power question, thanks to the efforts of Russian, British and French armaments suppliers and military personnel. African nations, most of which are dependent in some major way on at least one of these great powers, are incapable without active U. S. support of acting in concert to pressure all of them to clamp down the war by an arms embargo. And so long as arms continue to flow in, the doves in Biafra and Nigeria will find it difficult to resist the pressures of hawkish military commanders to continue and to escalate the war.

Of course, even if for a fleeting moment both sides were ripe for an agreement, there would be no representative from the OAU to hear about it. In all of its suggestions to Haile Selassie the United States had never recommended that he travel back and forth between the two sides, or that he designate representatives from other African countries as go-betweens. Without such face-to-face diplomacy, it is hard to see how both sides can agree to end the war. State Department officials have been diverting themselves with the appearance of diplomatic activity, such as the U. S.-approved cease-fire proposal which emanated from the Emperor last Christmas, when the elementary diplomatic machinery to make such activity meaningful has been lacking from the start.

The ICRC, for its part, has sent Dr. August Lindt,

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a Swiss diplomat, as a go-between to negotiate for increased relief. But since any given relief proposal has military implications that seem to favor one side or the other, Lindt's experience has not been happy. Lacking the power base that would enable him to threaten or cajole the two sides to accept his proposals, his diplomatic credit has become quickly exhausted in the recriminations on relief that are part of the propaganda war between Nigeria and Biafra.

As of this writing, the Biafrans are unwilling to trust the Red Cross, while the Nigerians have pressured the Government of Equatorial Guinea to close down the Fernando Po airstrip from which Red Cross planes fly into Biafra.

**'PALMERIZED' AIR STRIP** The Red Cross effort in Biafra has, in any case, been severely limited by the small capacity of the Fernando Po airfield, which can take only six to ten flights a night. The Class A airfield of the Cameroons, the country neighboring Biafran-held territory, would be the logical place from which to launch relief flights; but this airfield has, as some relief agency people put it, been "Palmerized." That is to say, U. S. Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Palmer, while he was still in his "quick kill" phase, visited the Cameroons to urge that it not permit the use of its territory for any activities connected with the war. Though the State Department has since gone through routine channels to de-Palmerize the country, it has not taken the obvious and most convincing step: it has not sent Palmer himself back to tell the Cameroons that the United States would favor their hospitality to relief as strongly as it opposed this involvement eight months ago.

## II. Towards a New Policy

Perhaps it is too much to ask officials who have invested all their emotional energy in slogans like "One Nigeria" and the "quick kill" and who have devised a way to pass the buck to impotent intermediaries to become suddenly realistic and effective. But it is not unfair to demand a sharp reappraisal of policy from the new Republican administration. Mr. Nixon himself pledged such a change in a campaign statement on September 10. "The time has long passed for the wringing of hands about what is going on. While America is not the world's policeman, let us at least act as the world's conscience in this matter of life and death for millions."

Though the first focus of policy-makers must be on the urgent need to provide food, they cannot ignore the political dimensions of the relief issue. For the starvation in Biafra is not like some earthquake that provides an unambiguous cause for humanitarian action. Starvation is being used as a weapon of war;


any attempt to alleviate it will open the United States to charges of political favoritism. On the Nigerian side, the military policy of the division commanders is one of seige. Allowing food into the beleaguered Biafran enclave while the war continues is bound to be interpreted by the Nigerians as a strengthening of the secessionists. For the Biafrans, the starvation issue has been an important diplomatic lever. Were it not for the drama of starvation, the American public would almost certainly allow the Nigerians with their superior armaments to decimate the population of Biafra over a prolonged period, much as it has stayed quiet while the Muslims of the northern Sudan carry out a similar program against the Christian and animist population of the south. It should not, then, be assumed that the Biafran leaders want to see the starvation problem solved if the price is likely to be the acceptance of Nigerian sovereignty and consequent occupation by Nigerian forces over whom there is no effective civilian control. Nor should it be assumed that either the Nigerians or the Biafrans can agree to stop the war without Great Power pressure on them to do so. On both sides the support of powerful domestic factions for the head of state depends on a continuation of the fighting. Were either Ojukwu or Gowon to agree to a truce that lacked the stamp of Great Power connivance their leadership and their lives might very well be in danger.

**COMPLEXITIES OF RELIEF** If Mr. Nixon wants to get massive relief into Biafra he must recognize that this means anticipating political trouble with the Nigerians, possible objections from the Biafrans, and complications for Great Power diplomacy. It is the stubbornness of these political forces that makes the present policy of dealing through conventional channels and intermediary agencies ineffective. A coherent new policy must be predicated on the new political perceptions that have thus far only immobilized State Department planners. It must be recognized that: a) the Nigerian war has become a Great Power and not solely an African question; b) that the United States is the only Great Power that has preserved any flexibility in this matter; and c) the longer the United States delays in using its leverage the greater will be the cost in innocent lives and the greater the likelihood that the post-colonial age in Africa will not be one of orderly nation-building but of Cold War adventurism, economic stagnation and bloody civil war.

Three general lines of attack are open to the new administration, and as they are mutually reinforcing they should all be pursued concurrently.

1. *Support for intermediate agencies*—the present American policy of acting through the OAU, the ICRC and other groups already dealing with concilia-

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sion and relief should certainly not be abandoned. Though not sufficient in itself, it does serve to increase the flow of food supplies, to improve the climate for negotiation, and to guard against excessive U. S. involvement. But support for these groups must be given a far broader interpretation than hitherto.

a) To make the OAU's role effective, the United States will have to do something bolder than the drafting of ceasefire proposals for Haile Selassie's signature. Such proxy diplomacy may meet the formal criteria of "non-intervention," but it brings the United States all the blame for meddling without yielding any tangible benefits. The State Department should deal more straightforwardly. It should instruct American ambassadors to inform African heads of state that the United States is deeply concerned lest the Nigerian situation turn black Africa into the new frontier for Great Power rivalry. African foreign ministers can remedy this situation by setting up a committee of heads of state to engage in regular face-to-face contact with Gowon and Ojukwu, by forming a consortium of African Red Cross Societies to deliver relief on both sides of the fighting lines and by visiting Paris, London and Moscow to lobby for an arms embargo. Press reports on the attitudes of a number of African leaders indicate that there is already considerable support for a new OAU initiative.

b) To make the voluntary agencies more effective, the U.S. should act to open the Cameroons to the Red Cross for food storage and air facilities. It should make its own assessment of the needs of the Red Cross and other voluntary agencies and offer to fill these needs in personnel as well as material from its own standby resources. The voluntary agencies, though working valiantly, are simply not equipped administratively or logically for a problem like the starvation of several million people. If the United States waits for them to draw up the plans and hire the needed personnel, it will wait for a very long time indeed.

c) The Commonwealth Secretariat and other third parties may be working on viable peace proposals. Should such efforts come close to success the United States should stand ready to take unconventional action to back them: e.g. sending its Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs to visit both Ojukwu and Gowon to encourage their agreement.

2. *Ad hoc Multilateral Approaches* — There is no need for the United States to take unilateral responsibility for relief. It can join countries like Sweden, Canada, West Germany, Norway, Ireland and Holland in a consortium of concerned Western nations to assure

that adequate personnel, supplies and financing reach all voluntary agencies operating in Nigeria and Biafra. These same countries can, when necessary, also provide neutral forces to police land relief routes, to open sea routes and to assure that air shipments of food are free of arms for Biafra and immune from harassment by Nigeria. Public and parliamentary opinion in all the above-named countries is well prepared for such action. Our own Congress, though slower to react, has recently approved significant American involvement (in a GOP resolution first introduced by Republican Senators Edward M. Brooke and James Pearson and Massachusetts Congressman F. Bradford Morse — the initiating draft was prepared in the Ripon Society offices and circulated to members of the Ripon Campaign Research Consortium in October.)

3. *Great Power Diplomacy* — American diplomacy has been preoccupied with getting France to halt arms shipments to Biafra, on the theory that this would lead Ojukwu to surrender. But De Gaulle is unlikely to stop sending small arms to the Biafrans so long as Russia supplies MIGs and Britain supplies armored cars to the Nigerians. Indeed, De Gaulle's New Year's message to the French people singled out self-determination for Biafra as one of four specific goals of his foreign policy, along with self-determination for Quebec, a revision of the international monetary structure and a Mideast settlement. The chances of a three-power agreement to embargo arms to Nigeria-Biafra and withdraw certain kinds of foreign military personnel are slight without an American initiative.

With such initiative, however, the chances are surprisingly good. Nigeria does not represent a vital national interest for any of the Great Powers, though Britain's balance of payments does require that it continue to tap a major share of Nigerian oil. The ease with which the three powers have become embroiled in Nigeria can be matched by the ease of their disengagement, and the occasion of Four Power discussions on the Mideast provides the United States with a good opportunity to propose such an agreement.

**PRELUDE TO OTHER DEALS** It may be objected that a time when the United States is engaged in delicate negotiations on Vietnam, is worried about the Middle East and must make major decisions about the possibility of an arms limitation agreement with Russia is not the moment for talking about West Africa. But the existence of weightier matters, far from arguing against an embargo on Nigerian arms shipments, argues for it. Vietnam, the Mideast and the ABM will require a long and arduous period of international negotiation, during which time the future of NATO may also be decided. A quick and relatively painless agreement on Nigeria would not exhaust the possibilities for Great Power diplomacy but enhance

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them. During the period of negotiation that lies ahead, it will be useful to have had a small success in great power relations to set a climate for relaxation of tensions. An embargo on arms to Nigeria and the drafting of general guidelines for the disposition of oil rights among the four powers would provide a propitious omen for other efforts.

It would also provide an easy means of testing Soviet sincerity about reducing world tension in areas where it has only recent interests. It is argued by many that the Soviet Union would like to preserve instability in the Middle East and Vietnam, by others that such instability is worrying the Soviets at a time when they would prefer to concentrate their attention on East Europe and China. A high level approach to them about a four power arms embargo on Nigeria would be a good way to determine their real negotiating mood in the Middle East, where their interests are roughly parallel but certainly more serious.

### III. Winning the Hearts and Minds of the Bureaucrats

Now it is only proper to note that the above suggestions require a number of changes in present U.S. policy mechanisms. First, the formulation and execution of any coherent policy requires an accurate and continuous flow of information from the field. The State Department does not have such information from the Biafran enclave. It has no official or unofficial representatives there; it is not in regular contact with Colonel Ojukwu; it has had only one official meeting with Ojukwu's American representatives and did not take the trouble to make such meetings regular occurrences. The spotty intelligence reports on Biafra come not from American but British sources, which cannot claim to be disinterested. In such an atmosphere of non-communication there can be no effective diplomacy, only a few notes passed over a void and misunderstood.

State Department officials have incorrectly assumed that to remedy this situation would imply recognition of Biafra. Yet it would be easy to send private American citizens to Biafra to report on the military, health and political situations. One such person might even take up residence in the Biafran capital of Umuahia to permit regular reports to State. Republican Congressman Donald E. Lukens, the first American official to visit Umuahia, reported that the U. S. Ambassador in Lagos was ignorant of the most basic facts about conditions in the secessionist enclave. The dispatch of informal observers with the blessing of the State Department would go far to correct this situation without implying premature recognition of Biafra.

**LOWER HURDLES** Second, the political grid through which State Department officials screen any new initiatives will have to be changed to meet new specifications. To date, any proposal which has seemed unduly to offend the Nigerian government or to imply even obliquely that the United States had any doubts about the desirability of a total Federal victory has been discarded out of hand. Any proposal whose success depended on back-and-forth talk with Ojukwu has died at the first stages. Any proposal implying an upgrading of the international status of the Biafrans has been ruled out as moving toward "recognition", and "the use of any techniques which hint of recognition," a State Department official told this writer, "would require authorization of the President and Congress." Finally, any measure which might require a visible American presence has been scotched as "interventionist".

All these specifications make it impossible for any meaningful relief proposal to filter up, however many plans may be submitted to U. S. officials. Massive relief will of necessity offend the Nigerian government because it violates their military policy of seige; it will of necessity require many prior face-to-face dealings with the Biafrans that will be interpreted by paranoic Nigerians as political steps toward recognition rather than humanitarian steps toward contact. A visible and vigorous American backing for relief, an arms embargo, and for multilateral initiatives is not "intervention"; it is a responsible course consistent with our past involvement in Nigerian affairs and our present desire for relaxation of world tensions.

**PREVIOUS INTERVENTION** The United States *did* intervene to persuade Major General Gowon to hold the Federation together against his own wishes at the time of his accession to power; it intervened again to assure him of unconditional support when he abrogated signed agreements with Ojukwu that granted the former Eastern Region a measure of autonomy. Subsequent U.S. pressures contributed to the dissolution of the Federation by preventing it from relaxing its over-centralized constitution. We are in large measure responsible for the current state of affairs. Past involvement does create moral responsibilities, and though the United States has no vital national interest to protect in West Africa, it does have a duty to protect against starvation millions of innocent victims of its own contributory negligence.

Thus, though it may be argued by self-justifying civil servants that "every feasible relief proposal has already been tried," it must be argued by the new administration that every proposal must be tried again under a set of political constraints that hold greater promise of success. The U. S. must enter into contact with the Ojukwu regime while making it clear to the Nigerians that such contact will not result in recogni-

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tion except insofar as the Nigerian government makes such recognition a necessary diplomatic lever.

In the extreme, this would mean that if the Nigerians shoot down relief planes the U. S. and other countries supporting these planes will recognize Biafra, not as a sovereign state, but as an entity entitled for humanitarian purposes to the use of international waterways (the Niger River, internationalized in 1898, runs into the Biafran enclave) and to overflight rights with armed, multi-nation escorts. This extreme is unlikely to be reached, however, since the Nigerian government, like the Biafran one, cannot afford an open clash with uncommitted Western countries.

**NEW BLOOD BEHIND DESKS** Third, the Nixon administration must provide within the bureaucracy a protagonist for Biafran relief. For the past few months, U.S. officials have been working ceaselessly on the relief problem. They have tried their best and at every turn they have met obstacles, often obstacles of their own creation. One cannot speak to them for long without being impressed with their dedication, their competence and the enormous difficulty they now have in conceiving new policies.

A symptom of their exhaustion is an inability to weigh fresh proposals without conjuring up their logical extremes and recoiling in horror. For instance, a massive relief policy carried out over the strenuous objections of the Nigerian government is immediately supposed to threaten the safety of the 5000 Americans working in Nigeria. Now it is true that if an unpopular relief policy were handled incompetently and the United States made every effort to emphasize that it alone was responsible, there might be reprisals against American citizens that would necessitate military evacuation from some areas of Nigeria.

But American diplomacy need not be so clumsy. All of the proposals suggested in this paper involve multilateral action. Moreover, the 5,000 Americans in Nigeria represent an important assurance for the Nigerians about post-war reconstruction of their country. The war has already cost them \$900 million. Nigeria is counting on American aid; harassment of U. S. nationals would not be prudent.

And, suppose we did have to evacuate all the Americans in Nigeria? Would this not be better than to use their presence as an excuse for permitting the starvation of several million innocent people? Certainly, any program for massive relief should include contingency plans for the evacuation of Americans from those areas where the Nigerian government is unable to police its citizenry. But American civilians are not supposed to be sent to such areas in any case. Scratch the worries about the 5000 American civilians and you'll find a baser concern that Gulf and Mobil may lose their lucrative concessions.

**EXCULPATORY VISIONS** Another fear is that aggressive relief efforts might precipitate the downfall of the Gowon government. The hawks in Nigeria would then take over and the war would rage on. But this should not be our greatest worry. The urgent problem in Nigeria has less to do with military hawks than with starvation. If the starvation problem were met and an arms embargo on major weaponry were in effect, it would be a long time before the Nigerian and Biafran armies could inflict great suffering on each other. The personality of Gowon is not in any case a major influence on the Lagos war coalition, and American policy should not be based on the desire to preserve him if the price is the immobilization of relief efforts. It is actually a good bet that decisive American action for relief would strengthen the doves in both Lagos and Umuahia by convincing opportunist leaders that American desires for peace will have to be reckoned with.

Another vision current in the State Department sees a unanimous outcry of African states against any new "imperialist" initiative. Though this may have been the case several months ago, the London *Economist* reports that many black African leaders are now increasingly worried about the Great Power arms race in Nigeria and would welcome outside leadership to end the war.

The career officers who conjure up these exculpatory visions are, for their part, also in need of fresh leadership. Mr. Nixon can provide this by designating a man in his administration to act as a protagonist for Biafran relief. Mr. Katzenbach assumed this role in the waning months of the Johnson administration and his efforts brought the United States much closer to a realistic understanding of events. To achieve results, Mr. Nixon should charge one of his appointees with acting as the conscience of the new administration in Biafra. A specific charge is necessary lest other pre-occupations delay action on the starvation problem, which is urgent, and on the problem of Great Power entanglement, which, unlike Vietnam and the Middle East, can be quickly resolved.

**REMOVING ROSY LENSES** The final area for change is purely intellectual, for Nigeria, like Vietnam, represents a dramatic failure for American nation-building theories. In Nigeria, as in Vietnam, American policy with its emphasis on centralized "national" government has been ill-equipped to deal with the forces of ethnic and communal nationalism. American policy makers, after all, share a statist liberal ethos that represses references to race and religion. It is not that statists are unaware of ethnic and religious rivalries but they think it wrong to treat them as autonomous social forces. They feel most comfortable dealing with technocrats in the capital city. Such an attitude, well suited to life in American

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bureaucracy, is a handicap to understanding the politics of many if not most underdeveloped countries. Certainly in Nigeria each major political organization has had a tribal base. The three largest tribes — Ibos, Yorubas and Hausa-Fulani — have thus been able to exert demands for autonomy that they can defend by force and that cannot be crushed without mass civilian dislocation.

At the moment it is the talented, entrepreneurial Ibos whose political organization must be broken in the interests of a strong central government. But the sophisticated Yorubas, who are now rioting against the war, will probably be the next to suffer. The logic of Nigerian politics is inexorable: so long as the administration of the country's economy and armed forces is centralized in Lagos any major tribe with the cadres capable of dominating the central bureaucracy and army is a threat to the others. The Ibos and Yorubas pose such a threat and must accordingly be crushed. Already the centralists have plans to gerrymander Yorubaland into two regions once the Ibos are decimated and confined to their densely populated Biafran enclave.

Yet, though with foreign armaments, smaller warlike tribes may be able to subdue the more sophisticated Ibos and Yorubas, there is no evidence that their wartime coalition will be able to turn into a peacetime one. On the contrary, Ibos and Yorubas cannot be governed except by their own administrators, and under self-rule they will quickly be able to move back into a position of dominance, which will be felt to necessitate more military action against them.

The dilemma's solution is simple: loosen Lagos' control over the economy and army. Looser confederation of tribes in their home areas — a dominance they

can exercise without resort to foreign arms shipments — while using various regional agreements to redistribute oil revenues, guarantee limitations on arms and provide for free trade. This is not ideal for the smaller minority tribes, which would be denied their own states, but it is ideal for the economic development and political stability of West Africa. And though the United States would be amiss to try to impose such a plan on Nigeria, any encouragement it gives to such an outcome will limit suffering instead of exacerbating it.

Thus, the ideal of One Nigeria, though it looks good on paper, in practice means continuing communal warfare, whereas an ideal of an open-ended Confederation of West Africa, bodes a lesser degree of such warfare and accordingly provides a better basis for economic development. The United States, in its early experimentation with constitutional forms, went from loose confederation to strong union; Nigeria simply will have to go the other way.

But let us not paint too rosy a picture. As black Africa moves from colonial jurisdictions to a post-colonial age, there will be ample opportunity for economic stagnation, Great Power imbroglios, and genocidal wars. But there will also be room for devising peaceful and plebiscitary means for making the transition.

The outcome in Nigeria may well set the pattern for the rest of Africa.

(Mr. Auspitz was a newspaper editor in Nigeria and Junior Research Fellow at the Nigerian Institute for Social and Economic Research. For some months he has been conferring with officials and interested groups on Biafra relief. All the proposals in this article have been submitted to the State Department prior to publication.)

### Reality Principle —from page 24

ly. But neither achieving a redistribution of income nor making it feasible for threatened governments to call in American soldiers like a householder turning on a tap will eliminate the conflicts about poverty or national security.

Moderate Republicans will find conflicts particularly hard to talk about persuasively. The Ripon Society's positions seem to me to contain a substantial criticism of our priorities and values. But we do not speak from interest in the sense that poor people or black people or old people do except perhaps on the draft issue. We do not represent a materially aggrieved minority. We dissent from the country's purpose and direction on grounds of morality or style. The policies are not offensive to our persons or bank accounts but to our spirits. Still in rhetoric at least we cling to the problem terminology. On occasion someone tries to rationalize this by arguing that the nation "can't survive" unless it undertakes some reform or other. I am

afraid that this kind of talk is only a case of reluctance to think about the unthinkable. People want to believe that the country has to do what they think is the right thing to do, but that is no argument at all.

What is behind "radicalization" and the "New Politics" is the awareness of the shift from problems to conflicts as the center of political concern. We have a lot of thinking to do about this shift and the stands we take. Is it a permanent shift or a delusion of the Vietnam War? If it is permanent, what forum and what style are appropriate to the rather ambiguous position of moderates who represent no interest but only an ideal? Can we move from our technical proposals and our corresponding dry precision of language to the eloquence necessary for persuasion? Let us at least begin by arguing out whether the country has gone wrong or not. I think it has, through raising greed and security above liberty and compassion.

--DUNCAN J. FOLEY

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By MNARA Date 10/5/05

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is not yet determinable with any certainty, his resignation casts a shadow from the Court. That shadow is not yet lifted from Justice Portas himself, and whether it will be, and to what extent, is something we cannot judge. There are so many contradictions, so many economic and political factors, so many legal facts. Ultimately, the contradictions will have to be resolved—in the Justice Department making public what it has been privately whispering around town, by Congress if Justice is not forthcoming, perhaps by Mr. Justice himself. For today, it is enough to say that the uncharitable term "lame duck" is a dramatic sense of the term for it entails the depreciation of a man of great stature and great promise. What we see now is the Abe Fortas of the Wolfson affair, but the political situation will have to take note of another Abe Fortas. The public interest requires that man's past worth remembering and weighing in the balance against the disgrace of his downfall, if empathy and imprudence led him to take some clients and cases he should not have taken, it is nevertheless true that this man's conduct was magnanimously led him to take some cases which self-interest might have led him to reject.

Mr. President, the public interest requires disclosures such as I have mentioned.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I commend the distinguished senior Senator from Tennessee for having raised a most important question.

A question involving the Supreme Court Judge is not one which under the Constitution is one for the Justice Department alone to settle.

One of the most important and special constitutional responsibilities of the Senate, in addition to that of foreign policy, is to pass on men who are appointed to the U.S. courts, and most importantly on appointments to the Supreme Court itself.

I agree with the Senator from Tennessee when he states that it is not enough simply to say that the resignation takes care of the current case. The Senate must be concerned about the operations of the Court itself. It must be concerned about the operation of the Department of Justice in its relation to the Court.

About 8 months ago the Senate was asked to approve the appointment of Mr. Portas as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The information now public was not given to us then. We must be concerned about the process by which nominees for the Court are presented to us.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I listened

to the remarks of the Senator from Tennessee concerning the case of former Justice Portas with interest.

While I do not associate myself with all the remarks and conclusions which the Senator from Tennessee makes, or the emphasis he places in certain parts of his speech, I do agree with the main thrust of his speech, and that is that in order to do justice to the people of the United States and not to former Justice Portas himself, all the facts should be made public.

## BIAFRA

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, during the past year, the horrors of the Nigerian-Biafran war have become clearer. With great starvation has resulted from the displacement of millions

of refugees into an area one-quarter of the original homeland, from disrupted ports, and from the cutting off of trade routes by the belligerent forces. It is reported that over a million Biafran civilians have perished from starvation and a million more deaths may occur within the next few months. Not since World War II has a civilian population been so affected by war.

The American people have responded compassionately by contributing to relief efforts, which operate under the most difficult conditions, to aiffit food and medicine to Biafra. The U.S. Government also has donated food and equipment to relief organizations on both sides of the fighting line.

Unfortunately, this relief effort can alleviate only a fraction of the suffering, for as long as the fighting continues only a small part of the desperately needed supplies can be brought in. As long as official U.S. policy awaits a "military solution," present relief efforts will remain superficial and inadequate, if not contradictory to official policy.

It is time to reexamine our policy of "one Nigeria," which has resulted in our accepting the deaths of a million people as the price for preserving a nation that never existed.

The pattern of American diplomacy in this area is a familiar one, not very different from that in Vietnam. It began with misconception, was followed by self-justification, and is ending in tragedy. Polite preconceptions have kept us from recognizing that the boundaries of Nigeria imposed artificially by a colonial power are not so sacred as to justify the deaths of several million people. The price of unity is too high.

When independence was attained in 1960 Nigeria was a colonial amalgamation of several hundred relatively autonomous peoples, who had by no means developed a national consciousness. It was the Easterners who were the best educated and who had left their crowded homeland in large numbers to occupy middle-level skilled jobs throughout the country, who most looked forward to "one Nigeria." It was the people of the northern regions where indirect rule had strengthened the conservative and authoritarian structure of the society, who were most resolutely oriented and who threatened frequently to secede from the Federation of Nigeria unless they dominated it.

The first 6 years of the Nigerian Republic were characterized by shifting political coalitions, ethnic conflict, regional jealousies, and governmental corruption. A coup by nationalist officers, mostly easterners, in January 1966 was welcomed throughout Nigeria as the beginning of a new order. Although the new national leader, General Irobi, was an Ibo, his policy was more nationalistic and military in outlook than that of his predecessor, and his largely inherited public were characterized by shifting political coalitions, ethnic conflict, regional jealousies, and governmental corruption. A coup by nationalist officers, mostly easterners, in January 1966 was welcomed throughout Nigeria as the beginning of a new order. Although the new national leader, General Irobi, was an Ibo, his policy was more nationalistic and military in outlook than that of his predecessor, and his largely inherited

other easterners residing in the north were killed. The easterners living outside their homeland lost trust in the federal government and 2 million of them returned to the east, suffering loss of jobs and property and in many cases physical injury. They understandably moved away from the commitment to the federal government which had not restored mutual trust among the regions and tribes.

At a conference at Abuja, Ghana, in January 1967, a confederated union with equality among the regions was agreed upon. However, the Abuja agreement was soon abrogated unilaterally by the government in Lagos with the promulgation, without consultation with the east, of a 12-state system particularly designed to confine the Ibos to a small area and to break their influence. The easterners felt excluded from the government and seceded in May, 1967, declaring the independent Republic of Biafra. Spokesmen for the Government of Tanzania stated when that country gave diplomatic recognition to Biafra, that "When the state ceases to stand for the honor, protection, and the well-being of all its citizens, then it is no longer the instrument of those it has rejected. In such a case the people have the right to create another instrument for their protection—in other words, to create another state."

Secession was followed quickly by war in July 1967. The "quiet, surgical police operation" of ending secession, expected to take several weeks, has been followed by five "final offensives" and a war which is now almost 2 years old. Armed with British tanks and bullets and with Russian MiGs piloted by Egyptians, the Nigerians have surrounded the Biafrans and cut them off from traditional sources of food and outlets to the sea. A strategy of siege, designed to produce military victory, has produced massive starvation unparalleled in modern warfare. Refugees make up more than 50 percent of the population of Biafra, yet the Biafrans continue to struggle for their right to exist. Though the Nigerians occupy many deserted towns, the Biafrans control the countryside and the villages. Their will and determination have discredited the advocates of "quick kill" and the prophets of imminent collapse. Biafra continues to maintain a stable administrative structure. The Biafran army remains intact and effective.

The Nigerians claimed originally that the Biafran leaders represented a small, child-like, who acted in their own self-interest, without popular support, and this claim was accepted by the British and American Governments. It was thought that the secession would end soon. Now, although their capital has been moved three times, although they are surrounded and completely cut off from normal sources of food and trade, although they are bombed daily by jet fighters, although their young and old have died of starvation, the Biafrans have survived. They make their own oil, they transport and ship own crude weapons to the enemy rather than collaborate.

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Authority NND 959503  
By MNARA Date 10/5/05

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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They fight on despite the human misery. This is not an offish struggle.

From the beginning of the civil war, the British have supported the federal military government of Nigeria, partly for economic reasons and partly because of an emotional or intellectual stake in a unified Nigeria, which is represented as a triumph of the British colonial technique of indirect rule and of the successful transition from colonial rule to independence. The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Joseph Palmer, who was our first Ambassador to Nigeria, personally shared this commitment to "one Nigeria." He accepted the analogy of the secession of Biafra to the secession of the American Confederacy, entirely overlooking the fact that Nigeria, unlike the United States, was not unified by common language, culture, and historical tradition, and had no background of stable, capable government.

Furthermore, 30,000 South Carolinians had not been massacred in 1861, and the inhabitants of the Southern States were neither pushed out of the Union nor were they living in fear for their physical security as is the case with the Biafrans in Nigeria. The U.S. State Department accepted a historical analogy without looking into the account the complicated background to the secession. By putting its diplomatic and political weight behind the Nigerian position, the United States has committed itself to a purely military solution. In the summer of 1967, the Economic Council put out that the time for mediation was before war and destruction ratified the positions of Nigeria and Biafra. But the United States recognized this, perhaps we could have persuaded our British ally to put pressure on both sides for re-negotiation of an Aburi-type agreement. However, we embarked in the hard line of Lagos, which inevitably resulted in complete rigidity and hostility.

We were and are, in fact, not neutral. The United States has been neutral only in refraining from shipping arms. Whereas Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. continue to send in arms, we have officially accepted the Nigerian explanation of the situation and have used our influence to gain acceptance for this viewpoint among other African nations.

Any review of past events clearly demonstrates the bankruptcy of American policy of "one Nigeria—at any cost." The "one Nigeria," which upon the most optimistic projections might survive from the war would have little resemblance to the carefully balanced federation of regions which many people had envisioned as essential to independence. The "one Nigeria" of the future would have to be postulated upon the inequality of different tribes. The Ibos and other eastern tribes who cooperated in forming Biafra would be stigmatized and penalized in many ways. The Ibos, and according to the new proposed division of the country into states, confined to a crowded, infertile region smaller than their ancestral homelands, with no access to the sea. They would be deprived of all but token participation in the reconstituted military state.

At a recent planning conference in Nigeria, it was declared that it will be 28 years before there can be given positions in Nigeria. Whereas the Nigeria of 1960 was ruled by civilians, it is anticipated that the Nigeria of the future will be ruled primarily by a military clique which has been greatly strengthened during the war by the increase in imports and by enhanced military discipline. The "one" Nigeria" which exists today, if the wishes of the present Federal Government of Nigeria are fulfilled, is undesirable even if it could be brought about at no cost whatever. And to accept it at the cost of millions of casualties, in my judgment, is indefensible, and time has run out.

The United States should immediately call for an arms embargo. We should actively seek a truce. We should use our good offices to promote negotiations for resolving the differences. We should press for a desecration of great power involvement. We should seek to form a multinational effort to provide the logistic support required for an adequate relief effort. We should accept Biafra's right to a separate national existence and look to the possible early recognition of Biafra by the United States and other nations.

The reaction to these proposals by those who have shaped American policy in West Africa heretofore can be anticipated.

They will say that Biafran independence will be a first step toward the Balkanization of Africa.

They will say that the Rivers tribes and other minority tribes of the east will suffer if Biafra gains its independence.

They will say that these proposals will undermine the position of our British ally in Africa.

They will claim that U.S. diplomatic recognition of Biafra will constitute intervention into a purely African problem.

Let us look at each of these objections.

The prediction that Biafran independence would lead to the Balkanization of Africa is obviously the discredited domino theory transferred to a new locale.

There is no more reason to think that it is correct or that it is an adequate basis for present policy in West Africa any more than it is in Asia. Local grievances, local animosities, and local injustices are more important than outside influences in accounting for revolutionary developments within a country. It is significant that four African countries—Tanzania, Zambia, Ivory Coast, and Gabon—have recognized Biafra. Each of them has large minority groups, but none of them seem to fear that its recognition of a secessionist regime elsewhere would encourage secession within its own boundaries.

As regards the question of economic stagnation and retrogression, it should be recognized that eliminating the hostility generated by an artificial political union will release energy for economic development. Certainly the technical community of the Easterners will be stimulated by the independence of Biafra. Furthermore, independence does not preclude economic negotiation. The Biafrans have already indicated their willingness

to cooperate with Nigeria on vital problems of transportation and communication, particularly the use of the Niger River. Almost the advantage that can accrue from "one Nigeria" can also be achieved by regional economic arrangements such as a common market and a regional development board for redistributing revenues. Even without such arrangements it is clear that Nigeria is viable without the eastern region, since it has great resources, including vast amounts of oil in the midwestern region. It has been able to forego eastern oil revenues for 2 years while fighting a costly war, and it would evidently be in far better economic condition without the expense of the war.

It is hard to credit the claims of the Federal Government of Nigeria that Biafra is governed solely by and for Ibos, who subjugate the minority tribes. In any case, the national preference of the minority tribes is a question which can be settled through plebiscites supervised by the United Nations or the Organization of African Unity. Even within some minority tribes, Biafra would be a populous country by African standards, larger than 19 of some 40 African countries. Only 10 of some 40 African countries would be larger.

The argument that American recognition of Biafra would undermine the position of our British ally depends upon two premises, both doubtful. The first is that essential British oil interests would be threatened by Biafran independence. However, as pointed out before, much of the oil is in the Midwest, nor have the Biafrans expressed any intention of expropriating British oil. In any case, this should hardly be a major consideration of American foreign policy in this case.

The second premise is that the British support the Federal Government of Nigeria has diminished Soviet influence upon that government. However, all that can be said with assurance is that the Federal Government of Nigeria has shrewdly played off the Soviet Union against Great Britain in order to receive as many arms as possible from both. Who will come out ahead in this game of influence is uncertain.

In my opinion the interests of the United States and of Great Britain may best be served by discontinuing the Nigerian-Biafran war from the cold war by reducing great power intervention in the area. It would be better to use this as a testing ground for reducing tensions among the great powers—since their interests are less serious here than elsewhere—than to perpetuate cold war maneuvers out of habit. In addition, many African countries are already resentful of the involvements of the great powers in their lands and might welcome a reduction of great power competition in the Nigerian conflict.

To argue that diplomatic recognition of Biafra would constitute intervention into purely African affairs is irrelevant; nonrecognition is also intervention. There are faults of omission as well as of commission. The United States has already intervened repeatedly in the area: first by propping up General Gowon

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when he assumed power; later by backing him when Nigeria boycotted the Abuja agreements; and also by exerting pressure on a number of African nations not to recognize Biafra.

The steps I propose are diplomatic, not military. Our goal should be the recognition of Biafra which has demonstrated that it represents the interest of its people. We should begin by seeking an arms embargo. Our goal should be a truce with a view to reasonable negotiation. We should seek to deescalate great power involvement. We should provide massive relief. The alternative—to continue to give passive military support and active diplomatic support in the name of unity—is no longer defensible.

PRESIDENT NIXON'S TELEVISION ADDRESS TO THE NATION

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, Wednesday night President Nixon spoke wisely as he discussed the status of the Vietnamese and made proposals to end that war. His remarks were honest. They were constructive. They indicated a flexibility of approach which gives promise of breaking the impasse at Paris.

Speaking to one who has been critical of the handling of the Vietnam war over a period of 3 years, I can now say that I have confidence that President Nixon is doing his utmost to bring the war to an end and to do it responsibly.

I was especially pleased to hear the President say that "the time is approaching when South Vietnamese forces will be able to take over some of the fighting fronts now being manned by Americans." And I was pleased to hear the President say that he has ruled out attempting to impose a purely military solution. These are important points with which I agree completely.

The President's report to the Nation was certainly the most comprehensive Presidential statement on the war so far. It was a contribution toward a peaceful solution of the conflict. And it was a contribution toward public understanding of the complex issues involved.

Mr. President, I am very pleased to offer every possible degree of support that I can to the President of the United States.

STATEMENT BY SENATOR PEARSON

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, the senior Senator from Kansas (Mr. Pearson) is in his home State today. He has asked that I have printed in the Record a statement he made on Wednesday evening, May 14, following the President's statement to the Nation.

His statement reads:

The American people tonight heard an honest, forthright, and fair statement by the President which clearly explained the ability of us all to expand our military capability in our support to war and defense in Vietnam. And I think as we heard his message tonight we need to remind ourselves that the options of 1969 are not the options we have available in 1969. It was a policy statement that represents the military capability and the political position that could perhaps, the first was, that we are, no military relationship with South Vietnam in the future, and the second was a reiteration of the concept of self-determination for the

people of South Vietnam. I think we can expect Hanoi, the NLF, and indeed Moscow, itself, to have immediate negative responses. But negative responses in themselves are private, and it seems that what the President needs most tonight is the support of the American people.

WASHINGTON: THE AFFLUENT CITY

Mr. PROXIMIRE. Mr. President, some recently released statistics about this Capital City have just been called to my attention which should help us place the Washington problem in a sharper and clearer perspective.

Washington is viewed by many as a city that has a very serious poverty problem, and of course it does. Many persons have the impression that as the only big city in the Nation with a majority of its population black and many of its people relatively newly arrived from a depressed rural background, the poverty problem must be worse than in the other big cities of the Nation.

Mr. PROXIMIRE, the conclusion is wrong. The fact is that of all the 16 cities in this country with a population between 500,000 and 1 million, Washington is the richest, and by far the richest.

The influence of this city is not a statistical mirage produced by averaging a few very high incomes with many very low ones. The fact is that the average estimated income per household in 1969 in Washington is the highest of all the 10 cities in the half million to 1 million population classification.

It is this year a whopping \$14,222, and that is a big \$1,370—or more than 10 percent—higher than Pittsburgh, which is second. Those figures are for this year, 1969.

For 1967—the latest year for which we have statistics on cash income—Washington ranked first in the number of families with incomes over \$10,000, with 31.3 percent.

One of the remarkable features of this prosperity is that the city of Washington has been moving forward more rapidly than its sister cities in the past 10 years.

Ten years ago, this city, which now ranks first in family income, ranked fifth out of 16 comparable cities in median income and third in the percentage of families with income above \$10,000 per year.

But not only does Washington have more of the affluent than any other city of similar size. What is more impressive in view of the general impression is that Washington has fewer poor persons in proportion to its population than any other comparable city except Milwaukee.

In both Washington and Milwaukee, only 15.2 percent of the families fall into the less than \$3,000 per year category.

This means, Mr. President, that Washington has almost twice as many affluent families—that is, those who earn \$10,000 and above—as poor families which make less than \$3,000.

Furthermore, this city has enjoyed even greater progress in the reduction

of poverty as compared with other cities than it has enjoyed in the increasing proportion of its families having incomes in excess of \$10,000.

In 1959, seven of the 16 comparable cities had a lower proportion of their families with income of less than \$3,000 per year than Washington. By 1967, there were none of the 16 comparable cities with a lower proportion of its families in this poverty classification than Washington.

So not only is Washington better off, it also appears to be improving more rapidly than any comparable city in the Nation.

Again, Mr. President, this does not mean that this city does not have a poverty problem. Of course it does, and it is serious. But it also suggests that Washington is in a financial position to do more about that poverty problem it—*I repeat, itself*—than comparable cities.

The irony is that this city, which has the financial potentiality to do more about solving its poverty problems and its other problems than other cities, has far, far less political power to do this than any other city in the country.

The city does have discretion to raise or lower its property tax. This authority should be used by the city much more aggressively than it has been. But, in all fairness, the property tax is a limited and highly regressive tax. In other revenue areas the District of Columbia has only the humiliating right to come to Congress on bended knee and ask for the right to raise more revenues to meet its problems.

And on that same bended knee it must come before the Appropriations Committees of House and Senate to ask the right to use the congressional trust fund to meet its own problems.

Mr. President, when one considers that even the Washington government that comes before Congress is an appointed agent of the Federal Government—not elected by the people of the District—one can realize how thin the thread of power to act on its own problems is for this, the richest comparable city in America.

It is also interesting, in view of the common association of poverty with the Negro, that Washington has a far, far higher proportion of black citizens than any other city in America. In fact, it is the one major city in America which has a majority of its population black.

So it is not only the blackest city in this sense. It is also the richest comparable city. And this black city has the smallest proportion of its families suffering poverty incomes of any comparable city.

The serious poverty problem of Washington looks good as compared with that of comparable cities. But to those who know how tragic poverty is here in Washington, this simply reinforces the gravity of the nationwide poverty problem.

If Washington is the best this Nation can do in reducing poverty after nearly 10 years of uninterrupted prosperity, what a long way this Nation has to go to meet the tragedy of its poor.

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By MNARA Date 10/5/03

# The Washington Post

## EDITORIAL

### *Genocide*

One word now describes the policy of the Nigerian military government toward secessionist Biafra: genocide. It is ugly and extreme but it is the only word which fits Nigeria's decision to stop the International Committee of the Red Cross, and other foreign relief agencies, from flying in food to Biafra. Nigeria says it intends to take the control of all relief measures into its own hands. But lest there be any doubt of what that means, let it be noted that a few days ago Chief Awolowo, the highest civilian in the Lagos government, was quoted as saying that starvation "was a legitimate means of war. Upward of a million people in Biafra have already died of starvation and its attendant ravages, and it is now likely—according to the President's consultant on nutrition, Professor Jean Mayer—that *two million* more may die within a matter of a few weeks.

For the Nixon Administration there should be no confusion or delay in deciding how to respond. The United States must immediately and unequivocally join in what we trust will be a worldwide demand that Nigeria not interrupt the flow of food and drugs to the civilian victims of the Nigerian civil war. As the principal relief donor Washington can do no less without becoming an accomplice to official genocide. Quite rightly, Nigeria states that providing relief to rebels is an act of political intervention. Nigeria is right too in claiming that Biafra's leadership has not hesitated to increase its own people's suffering as bait for world sympathy. It may be true that Red Cross flights have been misused as a cover for running arms. But so what? There are no diplomatic or political considerations so overwhelming that the United States must stand quietly by while another government murders a million or more souls.

## DAILY NEWS

### EDITORIAL

#### NO MERCY FOR BIAFRA?

Nigeria's government at Lagos announced Monday that it is taking over all war-relief work both for the territory it controls and for rebellious Biafra.

Last week, Nigeria's finance commissioner, Chief Oba Femi Awolowo, remarked in public:

All is fair in war, and starvation is one of the weapons of war. I don't see why we should feed our enemies fat in order for them to fight us harder.

A lot of those "enemies" are small Biafran children teetering on the edge of death from hunger.

We think the time has come for Washington, London and every other free-world capital that can do so to bring the heaviest feasible pressure to bear on Lagos to step up food shipments into Biafra, not cut them down or out. This, in the name of simple decency and mercy.

WEDNESDAY, JULY 2, 1969

NEW YORK POST

## Death Seen For Biafrans In 3 Weeks

By SPENCER RICH  
WASHINGTON — The President's special consultant on hunger says 2 million Biafrans will die of starvation within the next three weeks if international relief for the hungry is cut off.

Dr. Jean Mayer, the Harvard professor and internationally known nutritionist who was chosen by President Nixon to organize the White House Conference on Food, Nutrition and Health, said there were nearly 3 million persons dependent on international food shipments, and most of these "already were hanging on a slender thread." A reduction of food now could send millions to their deaths, Mayer said.

Mayer, who went to Biafra on a study mission last February, made his comments in the wake of Monday's announcement by Nigeria that it was taking over from the International Committee of the Red Cross, the function of coordinating food relief to the hungry in Nigerian-held areas of the civil war-torn country.

Police at Border

At the same time, Nigeria announced that it would require food shipments into land-locked Biafra to be first cleared by Nigerian police or soldiers instead of being flown directly into Biafra from abroad by the ICRC.

Rescue agencies fear that the new regulations will be used to choke off food to Biafra. Chief Awolowo of Nigeria, highest civilian in the federal administration, said recently that starvation was a legitimate means of making war.

In Washington, State Dept. spokesman said the U.S. was worried that relief operations might be hampered by the new Nigerian policy.

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Authority: *ND 959503*  
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## Ends and Means in Foreign Policy

By ANTHONY LEWIS

LONDON — On Monday the war between Nigeria and the breakaway state of Biafra will be two years old. In that time more than one million Biafrans, many of them children, have died of starvation.

For this brutal fact the British Government bears a major responsibility. Britain has given essential political and moral support to the Nigerian Government, and along with the Soviet Union has been its major supplier of arms.

In the Foreign Office, no hint of doubt about the correctness of this policy is visible. The Government has even found it impossible this week to say that Britain "deplores" Nigeria's ending of the famine relief role played by the International Committee of the Red Cross, as Secretary of State Rogers said for the United States.

### Policy Rationale

Those who ask questions about British policy are told in the Foreign Office that starvation in Biafra is actually not that serious; that if it is, the blame is on Biafra's leader, Colonel Ojukwu, who if he were reasonable would have given up long ago; that in any case blockade has always been a weapon of war and that Nigeria has been exceptionally kind to let any relief supplies through.

The Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, has said that Britain is trying to work out new food relief routes. But any such effort is necessarily inhibited by Mr. Stewart's bland refusal to recognize Nigeria's responsibility for the present crisis.

Mr. Stewart says, correctly enough, that Colonel Ojukwu has been difficult about various relief proposals. But the unavoidable truth is that there was an effective relief system operating until last month. Nigeria ended it by deliberately shooting down an unarmed Red Cross plane and then expelling Red Cross officials.

That the Nigerian Government should make starvation a weapon of war, as some of its leading figures have quite openly admitted it is doing, is not surprising. People fighting for what they regard as their national existence have often, and understandably, accepted no limits on their ferocity except those imposed by fear of reciprocal action.

But why should Great Britain go along with such a policy? No one can pretend that Britain's national life is at stake in the Nigerian-Biafran war.

British leaders, from Prime Minister Wilson down, argue that it would be tragic to allow the breakup of Nigeria, Africa's most populous state. To do so, they say, would invite the balkanization of the Continent.

The territorial integrity of Nigeria may be a worthy end, but does it justify Britain's acquiescence in the means used? If at the beginning of the war, two years ago, it had been known that the cost of that objective would be one million lives, or more probably two million, would Mr. Wilson or Mr. Stewart have said that was a price worth paying?

Nor is the price complete. Unless shipments of protein food get through in quantity soon again, Red Cross officials say children will die by the "hundreds of thousands."

It may be a new kind of colonialism, after the fact, that is operating. Britain has given up responsibility in Africa and admitted she has no power to intervene, for example against the tiny white minority in Rhodesia. But she still obviously feels she has some special commitment to a former colony that overrides decency and even prudence. This is more important than the economic motive supplied by Nigeria's oil.

The problem is not so different from the one the United States faces in Vietnam: At what point does the cost of maintaining a commitment become so dear in lives that it is better to change the policy? The Nigerian situation is in a sense even worse, because Britain there is risking others' lives, not her own.

### 'A Hideous Situation'

There has been little formal political debate on the issue because Conservative leaders, with the same colonial inheritance, have gone along with the Labor Government's policy. But the independent voices of back-benchers and journals, notably The Weekly Spectator, have begun to have an effect on the public conscience. The Prime Minister's personal lawyer, Lord Goodman, has now taken a public stand for Biafran relief, saying that "present British Government policy is the cause of a tragic and hideous situation."

Over the postwar years British foreign policy has had many inglorious failures: Palestine, Suez, the spurning of Europe, latterly the fiasco in Rhodesia and the bullying of Anguilla. But for sheer moral obtuseness none of these episodes approaches the record of Britain in two years of war in Nigeria.

### JUDAS-TREE

*John, he respected as the fox the snare;  
Judas, he loved as the moist mouth loves the bait;  
Casting lots in his mind for the betrayer,  
He chose, not the voice which drowns him like  
a fly,  
But the tactful man who casually ate;  
Who knew, when the cup had failed to pass  
him by,*

*That only one whose love was strong as hate  
Would have the will to see the purpose through  
The dead tree and the living tree, and lie  
On eternity's midden, flyblown carrion meat.  
He trembled, and the blood broke forth as sweat;  
But raised his eyes, and met the burning stare  
Never so naked, so compassionate.  
Do quickly, what you have to do.*

D. M. THOMAS

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C. Raymond Hulsart, Secretary.  
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Classified Advertising and Microfilm Reference, 207 West 43d St., N.Y., 10036.

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London Times 6/25/69

## A POLICY OF FAMINE

It is the principle of dissociation of sensibility—out of sight out of mind—which permits the most evil things to be done by quite ordinary men. In the last eighteen months well over a million people have died in Biafra of starvation and the diseases associated with starvation. During the whole of that period the British Government, with the connivance of the Opposition, has supported the besieging forces with very substantial sales of arms. The Government's intermittent attempts to secure a cease-fire have been unsuccessful and the arms supply has continued.

Since June 5, when a Red Cross relief aircraft was shot down by a Federal Nigerian MiG, the food situation in Biafra has become even worse. The relief air lift has been virtually suspended since June 11 and the present flow of relief is reported to amount to little more than a tenth of that of May. Joint Church Aid is still running a skeleton service for hospitals and clinics but outside aid is no longer available for the refugee camps or feeding centres of Biafra.

The facts of the situation are not in dispute. They were reported in The Times on Thursday and there is an equally comprehensive and accurate report in yesterday's Financial Times. Because of the recent harvest the supply of carbohydrates is probably not at present disastrously bad. The reduction in relief has however created an acute shortage of protein, which results in deficiency diseases of starvation, and in any case the relief effort was keeping about three million people fed.

### A deliberate weapon

Because the famine has already been so prolonged the food stocks are long since exhausted, and so is the stamina of most of the people. It is a people half-starved already who face starvation now. The effect of the cessation of the air lift is likely therefore to be almost immediate. The death rate was already high enough but it is likely to mount rapidly. Many of the aged have already died and the casualties among mothers and children may be particularly severe.

The difficulty is to bring this home to people. Perhaps one can start by think-

words and the big abstract concepts. Which one of us could actually bear to see a single child die of starvation? Which member of the Cabinet, who must take this responsibility in a personal sense, could bear this weekend to have a child starving on a blanket between the deck chairs on the lawn and continue to join calmly in the process of tormenting it? Only the capacity of the human mind to steel itself against large figures and abstract terms makes it possible for this policy to be pursued. Men of personal sensitivity and personal kindness, who would not willingly harm a single infant, find it tolerable to support a policy of starvation by the million partly because it is millions that are involved.

Yet if one is to look at the millions, one can perhaps usefully break the prospect of death into a time scale. If the relief flights are not resumed then the rate of death will continue to rise. Perhaps it will run only at the level of 50,000 a month, though that on what is generally reported would seem to be an underestimate; 50,000 a month is rather more than 1,500 a day or, say, some 60 an hour. Not all of these 60 would be children, but perhaps a third of them will be.

Perhaps the Test match could provide as good a way of keeping track of the urgency of this matter as any other. If the batsmen of either side could manage at last to dominate the bowling then they should be scoring at the rate of a run a minute. If they did, the runs going up on the board would be keeping pace with the death rate that may soon be expected in Biafra, as the result of the admitted policy of a government which has the full moral and material support of our own Government.

From the beginning the British Government has argued that British influence should be used in order to moderate and mitigate the evils of this war and that we should not cut off the arms supply because that might destroy our influence. There have also been arguments about the desirability of maintaining one Nigeria, of keeping out Russian influence—though that purpose has surely failed—and about the importance of our oil interests. It is the argument that we should retain our influence on events which seems now the most discredited of all. The other arguments are just not permissible. Mass starvation unites a nation only in death. It is quite simply morally wrong to be the accessory to the slaughter of a million people in order to protect oil supplies and anyone who does not see that it is wrong is a moral imbecile.

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By MNARA Date: 01/05/03

ing not about the mass who are in danger, a population comparable in size to the European Jewish population in 1940, but about the individual responsibility for individual lives. British policy is still to give full support to a government which by a process which has involved much confusion is now using starvation as a conscious and deliberate weapon against very large numbers of what it claims to be its own people. As individuals, acting on individuals, we share the responsibility of our Government.

All the evidence now shows that starvation as an act of war is the effective policy of the Nigerian Government. In the past British Government spokesmen have argued, not very plausibly, that the Nigerian Government was only too keen to feed the people of Biafra, but that it was the fault of the Biafran Government who chose to starve their own people. General Ojukwu must share a part of the blame, but this was never a very convincing view of the situation and now we have from spokesmen of the Federal Government itself an open admission that starvation is not an accident but is regarded as a necessary and legitimate means of waging war.

In Lagos on Thursday, after a tour of the war sectors, Brigadier Hassan Katsina, the Chief of Staff of the Federal Army, said: "Personally I would not feed somebody I am fighting"; that of course includes women and children. The powerful political figure, Chief Awolowo, who is a leading member of the Nigerian Federal Executive Council, had argued the day before that starvation was legitimate and said that he was opposed to the shipment of relief supplies to the secessionists. General Gowon has not yet repudiated these statements. We have therefore clear statements of intention. We have the fact that a million to a million and a half are already dead. We have the shooting down of the relief aircraft. We have the earlier indiscriminate bombing of civilians and hospitals in Biafra reported again and again, and we have the successful campaign, backed by Russian military skill to cut off night flights to the air strip.

## Starvation rather than secession

When one puts together these pieces of evidence one can be left in no doubt that the Government of Nigeria, whatever intentions it may have had at the beginning of the war, is now prepared to use blockade and starvation, even at the cost of a further million deaths, rather than agree to secession. Leaving aside the massacres of the Ibos, this has the effect of a policy of genocide.

Yet one should get away from the big

## The burden of responsibility

The pretence is however that we have preserved our influence, but an influence for what end? If now, or if at an earlier time, we had been able to secure a cease-fire, or to secure adequate provision for relief, then one might say that the British Government in return for accepting a terrible burden of responsibility had managed to achieve a real countervailing effect. But the most that can be made of the countervailing effect is that the stationing of observers may have reduced the risk of massacre outside Biafran territory. British policy has not been able or designed to prevent the death of a nation and of the individuals that comprise that nation inside the territory that Biafra holds.

There is still an opportunity to help. If one could only see this matter for what it is, the greatest tragedy or crime for which Britain has shared responsibility in this century, the worst since the Irish famine, we should now devote all our diplomatic power, all the influence that remains, all the efforts of the Government, to securing effective relief in terms of food for Biafra, at all costs and at once.

This policy is still open. It may meet with the resistance of the Federal Government. It may meet with suspicion from Biafra, and the Biafrans have no reason to regard the conduct or policies of the British Government with anything but the most complete suspicion and distrust. But there is the possibility of opening up a relief corridor by the Cross river and this corridor could, even at this moment, save lives by the tens of thousands.

Faced with the choice between a complete break with Britain and the opening of that corridor, the Federal Government, which seemed earlier to be willing to consent, very possibly would agree. If the resources of the British Government were also put behind the actual provision of relief so that the right foods in sufficient quantities were brought in as rapidly as possible, a further great catastrophe might be avoided. Nothing less than an act involving all the emergency power and capacity of government, and immediately, will begin to relieve the terrible responsibility which we all share. This is also the opportunity for the Nigerian Government to disown the ruthless policy of starvation and join in a work of famine relief which would greatly affect the judgment of the world.

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## Biafra Millions Seen Dying in Food Cutoff

By Spencer Rich  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The President's Special Consultant on Hunger said yesterday that 2 million Biafrans will die of starvation within the next three weeks if international relief for the hungry is cut off.

Dr. Jean Mayer, the Harvard professor and internationally known nutritionist who was chosen by President Nixon to organize the White House Conference on Food Nutrition and Health, said there were nearly 3 million persons dependent on international food shipments, and

most of these "already were hanging on a slender thread." A reduction of food now could send millions to their deaths, Mayer said.

Mayer, who went to Biafra on a study mission last February, made his comments in the wake of Monday's announcement by Nigeria that it was taking over from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) the function of coordinating food relief to the hungry in Nigerian-held areas of the civil war-torn country.

See BIAFRA, A7, Col. 6

Washington Post  
July 2, 1969

## 2 Million Biafrans Face Death In Cutoff of Relief, Mayor Warns

BIAFRA, From A1

At the same time, Nigeria announced that it would allow food shipments into land-locked Biafra only if first cleared by Nigerian police or soldiers, and not when flown directly into Biafra from abroad.

Rescue agencies fear that the new regulations will be used to choke off food to Biafra. Chief Awolowo of Nigeria, highest civilian in the federal administration, said recently that starvation was a legitimate means of making war.

Mayer's sentiments were echoed yesterday by Marcel Naville, the new president of the ICRC, who predicted in Geneva, Switzerland, according to press reports, that

"hundred of thousands of children" will starve in the next few days alone unless international food relief to Biafra was allowed to continue.

Naville, like Mayer, said millions of persons could die of starvation.

In Washington, State Department spokesman said the U.S. was worried that relief operations might be hampered by the new Nigerian policy.

Dr. Mayer, referring to the Biafra situation, said: "We're really seeing the death of a nation right now." He said his study mission had concluded that 1.5 million persons had already died as a result of food shortages and "within the next three weeks, 2 million more people will die of starvation" unless international relief can be continued.

"There are three million people in refugee camps completely dependent on outside food supplies," he said. "So unless they get the food, they'll die."

A Nigerian spokesman said here yesterday that pending the takeover of relief coordination functions by a Nigerian government commission—which would be very soon and was already beginning—the ICRC would continue in that role.

He said direct night flights of food into Biafra from abroad would continue to be banned, and day flights allowed only if they first stopped at Lagos or other Nigerian areas to be sure cargoes did not include war materials.

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JAMES DOYLE

## May Biafra Spoil Many Barbecues

WASHINGTON — The backyard barbecues are working overtime in Washington this July 4th week-end.

This is the time of year when the government winds down to a pace that matches the disposition of a southern bayou. The President is puttering about in Key Biscayne; Congress has fled so its members can address the local clam-bakes and the Summer meetings of the Chambers of Commerce; and the department heads, many of them appalled by their first taste of a Washington Summer, have sneaked away to the cooler embraces of the seashore or the mountains.

For those trapped in the torrid shadow of the Washington monument, it is time to throw another hamburger on the coals and replenish the gin-and-tonic. Surtaxes and guidelines will wait for a while.

It is impolite to mention it, but there is an embarrassing problem that will not. Over there on the dark continent, the President's special consultant on hunger has told us, two million Biafrans will starve to death in the next three weeks if the Nigerian government has its way.

It is really tiresome and annoying to keep bringing it up. Nobody can really imagine what genocide is anyway. And as they say on the newscasts, there were no Americans among the dead.

But the problem of Biafra deserves to spoil a few barbecue parties this week-end. Can the most powerful and rich nation in history allow two million of the earth's human inhabitants to die for lack of food?

Yes it can, and it might. It has happened before. It is happening now. No nuclear weapons explode. No aerosol clouds of germs waft from aircraft. It is just a case of the weakest — the kids and the old people — lying down, closing their eyes and dying because there is no food to eat in the place where they live.

Biafra is a foreign policy problem. Joseph Palmer, the outgoing assistant secretary of state for African Affairs, is emotionally committed to the idea of federal Nigeria, and he long ago committed the United States, tacitly, to

being "neutral" against secessionist Biafra.

Two years ago when the civil war started, the political disintegration of the Nigerian state was less obvious and the Biafran will to resist was unmeasured. So, under Palmer, the State Department and some eminent members of Congress as well, endorsed the "quick kill" theory. Stay out of it, they said, and the Nigerians will win quickly and far fewer persons will die than if we get involved.

That was two years and hundreds of thousands of deaths ago. The perceptions and some of the people have changed.

Maj. Gen. Yakubu Gowon, the leader of the Nigerian junta, finds himself presiding over a disintegrating federation, his control over field commanders slipping away. The Biafran leader, Gen. Odumegwu Ojukwu, leads a nation united by the war and fully in support of him, even though the people are being starved to death.

In the end, the Biafran people may cease to exist or Nigeria may fragment into meaningless and powerless pieces, or both. The State Department has stopped hinting that the war is almost over, and even Joseph Palmer, as he heads back to Africa, is not very optimistic.

All this time there have been token efforts at relief flights to bring food to the people on both sides of the battle lines. (Nigerian tribesmen are starving because of the war too, although there is no genocide involved.) Now the Nigerian government has announced that it intends to stop the International Red Cross and the church groups from continuing food flights. The Nigerians give two reasons. First, they believe guns are getting into Biafra on the relief flights, or at least because of those flights. Secondly, they believe starvation is a legitimate weapon of war.

Because of the weapons merchants in the United States government and elsewhere, it often has been easier for people in underdeveloped countries to get guns than it has been to get food. This has been the case in Biafra.

Now the United States government

is being asked to take a bigger role in getting food to Biafra. If the government decides to make the resources — money and planes — available, the Nigerians will not be able to stop the food from getting to Biafra any more than they have been able to stop the weapons from getting in once there was a profit motive. In fact, despite the ultimatums last month against relief flights, church groups that fly missions out of Sao Tome have landed planes in Biafra every night without any attacks from Nigerian Migs.

The problem is that this kind of political intervention comes hard for the government that has spent so much blood and treasure in Vietnam. It is still easier to fight Communism than hunger in the 20th Century, and Formosa has a better chance of getting American military intervention than Biafra does at getting American food.


In recent days there have been some slight signs of change. The Nixon administration committed itself to Biafran relief during the presidential campaign. Secretary of State William P. Rogers has stepped away from the Nigerians slightly because of their public admission that starvation is a weapon.

Joseph Palmer no longer sits at the African desk and his replacement, David Newsom, has put out the word that he recognizes the danger of past inflexibilities and plans to bury some dogmas when he takes over.

Several of Nixon's appointees in the State Department and in the White House have recognized the moral implications of Biafra's starvation in private statements before taking their present jobs. Not the least of these is Jean Mayer, the Harvard nutritionist who came here to help out on problems of hunger in the United States. Dr. Mayer risked his future by speaking out on the potential death of millions in a statement earlier this week, a foreign policy statement that was clearly not considered part of his responsibility.

These are small but important and encouraging signs. But the overpowering inclination of the government is already underway.

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CONFIDENTIAL 189

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SUBJECT: PUBLIC OPINION ON NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

REFERENCE: STATE 123842

FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT OF KENYAN PUBLIC OPINION  
ON NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR SUBMITTED IN RESPONSE REFTEL:

1. AS WITH MOST ISSUES OUTSIDE NATIONAL BORDERS,  
GOK AND KENYAN PUBLIC IN GENERAL TAKE A RELATIVELY  
ALOOF ATTITUDE TOWARD NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR. IN TERMS  
OF INTEREST TO GOVERNMENT, PUBLIC AND MEDIA,  
CONFLICT RANKS FAR BEHIND DOMESTIC POLITICAL AND  
SOCIAL CONCERN AND RELATIONS WITH IMMEDIATE  
NEIGHBORS - I.E. EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY AND SOMALIA.  
PRESS TREATMENT IS ESSENTIALLY BALANCED, ALTHOUGH  
PRIOR TO REMOVAL PRO-BIAFRAN EDITOR DAILY NATION  
ABOUT ONE YEAR AGO, THAT PAPER HAD STRONGLY  
BIASED PRESENTATION, REFLECTING POTENTIAL TRIBAL  
AND RACIAL CLEAVAGES WITHIN KENYA PARTICULARLY  
THAT POSED BY CONTINUING THREAT OF SOMALI  
SECESSION, GOK OFFICIAL POLICY HOLDS FIRMLY  
THAT NIGERIA MUST REMAIN UNITED.

2. MAJOR PUBLIC EXPRESSIONS OF GOK POLICY, HOWEVER,  
ARE INFREQUENT. PERHAPS MOST VIGOROUS  
STATEMENT CAME FROM VP MOI ON HIS RETURN  
LAST SEPTEMBER FROM FIFTH SUMMIT CONFERENCE  
OF HEADS OF OAU STATES WHEN HE TOLD AIRPORT  
PRESS CONFERENCE QUOTE NIGERIA MUST CRUSH

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BIAFRA. UNQUOTE. GOK DELI WAS DETERMINED THAT ALGIERS CONFERENCE WOULD NOT FORMALLY CONSIDER CIVIL WAR AND WAS ELATED AT OUTCOME. WE UNDERSTAND THAT GOK WAS ALSO INSTRUMENTAL IN INSURING BIAFRA NOT INCLUDED ON AGENDAS OF MEETINGS OF EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICAN STATES.

3. PROBABLY STUNG BY FUTILITY OF EARLY EAST AFRICAN HEADS OF STATE PEACE OVERTURE INVOLVING KENYATTA'S PRESTIGE AND UNDOUBTEDLY FULLY AWARE OF INTRACTABLE NATURE OF CONFLICT, GOK HAS MADE NO RECENT PROPOSALS OR OFFERED QUOTE GOOD SERVICES UNQUOTE TO BRING SIDES TOGETHER. FORMER FONMIN ARGWINGS-KODHEK DID SUGGEST AT 1968 UNGA THAT QUOTE A CONSISTORY OF FOREIGN MINISTERS SHOULD CONFER ON THIS ISSUE AND FIX AN IMMEDIATE END TO DEATH UNQUOTE BUT THIS IDEA, WHICH APPEARED TO BE CONCOCTED ON SPUR OF THE MOMENT, WAS NEVER PUSHED BY GOK. WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED NO SERIOUS SUGGESTIONS BY GOK, MEDIA OR INDIVIDUALS AS TO FORM ULTIMATE POLITICAL SOLUTION MIGHT TAKE.

4. IT IS THE HUMANITARIAN RATHER THAN POLITICAL ASPECTS OF CONFLICT WHICH APPEAR OF MOST CONCERN TO PUBLIC AND PRESS. GENERAL REACTION IS ONE OF QUOTE PLAGUE ON BOTH YOUR HOUSES UNQUOTE WHICH DESPAIRING HAND-WRINKLING AND ANGUISH ABOUT CIVILIANS CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE. EXCERPT JUNE 30 DAILY NATION EDITORIAL QUOTE THE MAIN CONCERN NOW IS THE FATE OF THOSE HELPLESS CIVILIANS, PARTICULARLY CHILDREN, OLD MEN AND WOMEN, WHO DON'T KNOW WHAT THIS WAR IS ALL ABOUT AND WHO HAVE TO SUFFER MALNUTRITION, STARVATION AND DEATH" IS TYPICAL. THERE HAVE BEEN NO RELIEF FUND CAMPAIGNS IN KENYA.

5. WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED SUBSTANTIAL PRO-BIAFRAN SYMPATHY - LARGELY ON HUMANITARIAN RATHER THAN POLITICAL GROUNDS - AMONG KENYAN INTELLECTUALS PARTICULARLY STAFF MEMBERS OF UNIVERSITY COLLEGE AND AMONG COLLEGE STUDENT BODY AS WELL. THESE INTELLECTUAL ATTITUDES, HOWEVER, ARE UNLIKELY TO HAVE MAJOR EFFECT ON GOK.

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
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CONFIDENTIAL 434

REF: STATE 129676 & 123842

NO EDITORIAL COMMENT PAST YEAR. LESOTHO PRESSURE ON NIGERIA.  
RELATIVELY LITTLE INTEREST SUBJECT HERE. PRINCIPALLY DUE  
PROVINCIAL OUTLOOK PLUS LACK OF TRIBAL PROBLEMS. LESOTHO  
NO NOTICEABLE CHANGES IN ATTITUDES. AIRGRAM BEING POUCHED.  
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INFO: OCT 01, EUR 17, SCS 04, SCA 01, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, HI 02, INR 07  
L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, PI 04, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, UCF 05,  
AID 28, PC 04, IO 13, RSR 01, 156 W

050265

RI 071615Z AUG 69  
FMI AMCONSUL IBADAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 879  
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMCONSUL KADUNA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE IBADANI 237

1. DURING CALL ON PETER ODUMOSU, SECRETARY TO MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA'S WESTERN STATE ACM (HEAD OF SERVICE), TO INTRODUCE BPAO COHAN, ODUMOSU, WHO IS ALSO PROMINENT METHODIST LAYMAN, TOLD US HE WAS ARRIVING LONDON WEEKEND AUG 9-10 FOR TWO WEEK MEETING IN CANTEROORY OF GOVERNING COMMITTEE OF WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES ON WHICH HE REPRESENTS NIGERIAN METHODISTS. HE IS ONLY NIGERIAN ON COMMITTEE, THOUGH SIR FRANCIS IBIAKU OF FORMER EASTERN REGION IS A WCC VICE PRESIDENT AND EITHER HE OR OTHER EASTERNERS MAY BE IN CORRIDORS.

2. ODUMOSU WAS VIGOROUS DEFENDER OF FEDERAL NIGERIAN VIEWPOINT AT WORLD ASSEMBLY OF CHURCHES IN UPPSALA LAST YEAR AND IS VERY CRITICAL OF WCC'S SECRETARY GENERAL EUGENE CARSON BLAKE WHO HE BELIEVES USES HIS POSITION TO HAVE WCC TAKE MORE PRO-BIAFRAN POSITION THAN OFFICIAL WCC LINE. HE ALSO BELIEVES BOTH US AND WEST GERMAN COUNCILS HAVE USED THEIR POSITION AS MAJOR FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTORS TO INFLUENCE WCC IN "BIAFRA'S" FAVOR. HE SAID NIGERIAN DELEGATION AT UPPSALA WAS SUCCESSFUL IN GETTING ASSEMBLY TO HAVE WCC DROP USE OF TERM "BIAFRA". YET BLAKE CONTINUES USE TERM IN OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE. ODUMOSU HAD RECENTLY RECEIVED COPY OF BLAKE'S LETTER WHICH SENT TO NIGERIAN CHRISTIAN COUNCIL AND BIAFRAN CHRISTIAN COUNCIL. WHEN HE WROTE TO BLAKE OBJECTING, BLAKE REPLIED SAYING WHATEVER TERMINOLOGY HE USED, HE BOUND TO OFFEND.

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0370

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By MNARA Date 10/5/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 IBADANI 00237 090048Z

SOMEONE. ODUMOSU CLAIMS THIS IS NOT POINT, WHICH IS THAT BLAKE NOT ABIDING BY ASSEMBLY DECISION AND GETTING AWAY WITH IT BECAUSE HE HAS BACKING OF RICHEST AND MOST POWERFUL MEMBER. HE GAVE OTHER EXAMPLES OF POWER POLITICS, ESPECIALLY BY RICHER CHURCHES WITHIN WCC WHICH HE FOUND MOST DISILLUSIONING BEHAVIOR FOR RELIGIOUS LEADERS. IF THIS KIND OF THING CONTINUES, HE SAID, THIRD WORLD NATIONS MIGHT HAVE TO WITHDRAW, DIVIDING WCC IN WORLD COUNCIL OR RICH CHURCHES AND WORLD COUNCIL OF POOR CHURCHES.

5. COMMENT: WHILE ODUMOSU'S RESENTMENT OF ROLE OF WESTERN CHURCHES IN NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR HAS BEEN EVIDENT FOR SOME TIME AND REPORTED BEFORE, IT DOES NOT MEAN HE IS HARD-LINER EITHER ON ISSUE OF RELIEF OR OF ENDING CIVIL WAR. HE SAID AGAIN TODAY THAT HE NOT ENAMORED OF IDEA OF ALL-OUT MILITARY VICTORY, AS HE DID NOT FEEL THIS WOULD SOLVE UNDERLYING NIGERIAN PROBLEM, BUT HE DID FEEL STRONGLY THAT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE WITHIN FRAMEWORK NIGERIAN UNITY. HIS COMMENTS ON USE OF TERM "BIAFRA" IN WCC OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE HIGHLIGHT SENSITIVITY OF EVEN MODERATE NIGERIANS ON EVEN THIS NOMINAL FORM OF RECOGNITION OF WHAT IS TO THEM REBEL REGIME. WHILE HE DID NOT MENTION VOA OR OTHER USG SPOKESMEN, DO NOT BELIEVE IT WAS ACCIDENTAL HE EMPHASIZED THIS POINT TO BPAO AND ME.

STRONG

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By MN NARA Date 10/5/05

Re: m



POL 27 BIAFRA - Nigeria

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 046

PAGE 01 DAKAR 02344 071317Z

43  
ACTION SS 70

INFO OCT 01 CIAE 00, 071 W

R 071145Z AUG 69  
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4445  
INFO AMEMBASSY BATHURST

037557

POL 27 Biafra - Nigeria

UR POL 27-9 Biafra - Nigeria

CONFIDENTIAL I A LI DAKARI 2344

LIMDIS

SUBJ: PUBLIC OPINION OF NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

REF: STATE 123842

FOLLOWING IS REPLY FROM CHARGE LOUGHRA, BATHURST, REFILE

1. BOTH GOVERNMENT OPINION AND PUBLIC OPINION IN GAMBIA NOT ALIGNED ON NIGERIAN STRUGGLE AND THERE HAS BEEN NO NOTICEABLE EVOLUTION OVER COURSE PAST YEAR.

2. GOVERNMENT HAS NOT TAKEN ANY POSITION ON POLITICAL ISSUES OF WAR EXCEPT TO DEPLORE CONTINUED FRATICIDE.

3. PRESS COVERAGE OF NIGERIA NOT PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT AND LITTLE INTEREST AMONG PUBLIC BROWN

CONFIDENTIAL

30

0372

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By MM NARA Date 10/5/03

L I M D I S

~~TOP SECRET~~

I N C O M I N G.

Screener *MM*

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*2344*

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DISTRIBUTIONMONTHLY COUNT 234Secretariat

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2/10/69

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 Authority *VND 959503*  
 By *MAR* Date *10/5/03*

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AUGUST 7, 1969

5-C-121

Honorable Charles S. Gubser  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C. 20515

This document released to  
public per J. Bushup AF

9/11/75

Dear Congressman Gubser:

The Secretary has asked me to respond to your letter of July 10 concerning Mr. David O'Rourke's suggestion that the Organization of African Unity (OAU) be urged to act as a mediator in the Nigerian conflict. The OAU has in fact been playing a major role in attempting to bring about a settlement. The United States Government believes that insofar as possible the Nigerian war should be settled by the Africans themselves. We have consistently supported the many efforts made by the OAU to end the war or to bring about a cease-fire.

The Organization of African Unity established a Consultative Committee on Nigeria in September, 1967, composed of six African heads of state. The Committee subsequently met in Lagos and generally endorsed the concept of "one Nigeria," but was unsuccessful in its efforts to contact the Biafrans. During the winter and spring of 1968, Commonwealth Secretariat efforts led to preliminary peace talks in London followed by formal negotiations in Kampala, Uganda, which were terminated by a Biafran walkout. During OAU-sponsored negotiations in Niger and Ethiopia in the summer of 1968, President Diori of the Niger Republic and Emperor Haile Selassie made valiant but unsuccessful efforts to obtain agreement to halt the fighting and bring relief to the victims of the war. At its summit meeting on September 15 and 16, 1968, the OAU again called on the Consultative Committee to continue its efforts. The Consultative Committee met with delegations from both sides in Monrovia from April 17 to 19, 1969, but no progress was made in bringing the conflict to an end.

(1) During Emperor Haile Selassie's recent visit to the United States, the Nigerian problem was again discussed, as the Emperor is the Chairman of the Consultative Committee. This Government continues to have close consultations with the Emperor, and through him, with the Organization

AF/W: M Peay

10/11/75  
AUGUST 8, 1969

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By MNARA Date 10/11/75

of African Unity. We will continue to support the OAU in its search for a resolution of the Nigerian conflict.


Please continue to call on us whenever you believe the Department can be of assistance.

Sincerely yours,



William B. Macomber, Jr.  
Assistant Secretary for  
Congressional Relations

AF/W:McPeay, B:Stokes:nb 8/5/69

AF/W - Mr. Spigler  
AF - Amb. Moore  
H - 

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By MN NARA Date 10/5/03

**URGENT**  
**A CONGRESSIONAL - FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION**


A reply or written acknowledgment must be made within Three Working Days (See 5 FAM 1524.3 or H - Guide Lines).

If for any reason, a problem is anticipated, drafting officer should immediately call H - Extensions 4286 or 7579.

M-115  
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GPO 935559

0376



CHARLES S. GUBSER  
10TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

40  
MEMBER:  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

ACTION  
is assigned to

AF

July 10, 1969

Honorable William P. Rogers  
Secretary of State  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Enclosed you will find a copy of a communication I have received from my constituent, Mr. David M. O'Rourke, concerning the Nigeria-Biafra conflict. Also, I am sending you a tear sheet from the publication "America" which suggests that the Organization of African Unity be brought into play in connection with our efforts to resolve this tragic situation.

I shall appreciate your consideration of this suggestion and would like to have your advice regarding it.

Thanking you and looking forward to hearing from you,

Yours sincerely,  
*Charles S. Gubser*  
Charles S. Gubser  
Member of Congress

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
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Authority: NID 950503  
By MNARA Date 01/01/03

1848 Jersey Ave.  
Los Altos, Calif.  
July 5, 1967

Hon. George S. Jackson  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Congressman:

Regarding the tragic situation  
in BIAFFRA, I believe the U.S. has  
a moral obligation to help press  
for a settlement or cease fire.

The enclosed article makes a  
good case for working through the  
OAU. Can you mention this to  
the right individuals in the Dept. of  
State or wherever it might help?  
Thank you.  
Daniel M. Penderle

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NOTE

States. In these and other areas, that policy was highly acceptable to the Kremlin. It can live more comfortably with banker Pompidou.

Anyway, whether the decision to abstain on June 15 was made at home or abroad, French Communists can't expect to deliver a solid, silent protest vote. Unfortunately for Poher, however, enough hardcore party members will toe the abstention line to wreck any fighting chance he might otherwise have had.

**The Expendable Mr. Smith** By way of comment on the political situation in Rhodesia, it has been left to British journalist

Douglas Brown to utter the most startling statement of the month. Writing in the May 25 *Sunday Telegraph*, Mr. Brown ventures the opinion that, as far as the white supremacist Republic of South Africa is concerned, a "black-ruled Rhodesia would have suited Mr. Vorster better"—Mr. Vorster being South Africa's present Prime Minister.

Paradoxical as this view may seem, on analysis it makes a lot of sense. For Rhodesia, once the decision to cut all ties to Britain is ratified in a coming referendum, will become economically and militarily a client state of South Africa. It will have nowhere else to go. South Africa, in short, will have to underwrite white supremacy in Rhodesia, a relationship that will in all likelihood be neither happy nor permanent.

As it is, Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith's successful defiance of Great Britain has evoked little enthusiasm in Pretoria. By increasing racial tensions in southern Africa, it has set back South Africa's effort to seek some sort of *modus vivendi* with its neighbors. It has prevented Pretoria, for example, from bringing Zambia into its diplomatic orbit. It has encouraged terrorism in southern Africa and so compelled South Africa to extend its own police operations. It has inspired political, economic and diplomatic conflict that Pretoria would much rather have postponed, or at least have played down, as long as possible.

Let no one be surprised if in the long run Ian Smith proves expendable.

**Nigeria-Biafra War Escalates** The Nigeria-Biafra conflict clearly entered a new phase with the arrival on the scene of Swedish-built and French-equipped Minicon planes, flown by pilots led by Count Carl Gustaf von Rosen, to beef up the Biafran forces. Despite the setback of the fall of Umuahia, Biafra's provisional capital, the secessionist state

has formidably reasserted itself. Strategic Owerri is once again in Biafran hands, with its large supply of the latest Soviet-made AK 40 automatic rifles. Moreover, Nigerians seem only partly successful in garrisoning the areas they have reclaimed. Biafran guerrilla activity has reportedly penetrated 50 miles into Nigerian-held territory.

Gcn. Odumegwu Ojukwu, Biafra's leader, has personally taken over management of the Biafran Foreign Ministry, and one of his closest advisors is said to be Harvard-trained Dr. Ifelegwu Eke, Commissioner of Information, by reputation a hawk. Observers recently back from Biafra report that the population's will to win is undivided and that, despite widespread suffering, public morale is generally high.

Prospects for a settlement continue to hang chiefly on the Organization of African Unity. What is inhibiting the OAU and other international bodies appears to be Biafra's suspicions of their pro-Federal bias. Biafrans point, for instance, to an OAU resolution issued in the fall of 1967 that seemed to exclude any other than a one-Nigeria solution. Earlier this year, too, U Thant stated: "The United Nations as such cannot endorse or support movements for secession."

Low-pressure persuasion from the United States and other quarters could perhaps bring about an OAU call for an immediate cease-fire. Such a resolution might move the conflict off dead center and give both the UN and foreign governments more scope for maneuvering.

**Foreign-Aid Syndrome** Mr. Nixon seems to have taken seriously some of the recent recommendations of the National Planning Association (see AM. 4/26, p. 392) in the matter of foreign aid. In its study, entitled "A New Conception of Foreign Aid," the NPA suggested, among other innovations, the creation of a "corporation actively managed by U. S. private enterprise," in order to help develop the private sectors of emerging-nation economies.

The President's first foreign-aid bill, sent to Congress on May 28, now proposes the establishment of an Overseas Private Investment Corporation, whose program would be authorized for an initial five years. Six of the corporation's eleven directors would come from the U. S. business community, the remaining five from within the government. Its primary function would be to guarantee U. S. private investment capital against political and normal business risks in the developing countries.

The role that U. S. private enterprise, under any circumstances, can play in developmental assistance abroad

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is, of course, a limited one. While there is no denying room for such aid, it can only be effective in countries that have a fairly sound economic infrastructure, which in turn will depend for its development on government-to-government assistance. In short, private investment can never supplant the need for public funds.

Not a few Congressmen would like nothing better than to see public funds thus supplanted. No sooner had Mr. Nixon's proposals reached Congress than the familiar foreign-aid-syndrome made its appearance in Washington. In the minds of some gentlemen on the Hill, foreign-aid bills are meant to be cut no matter what figure is involved. Even though the Administration's \$2.2-billion request is \$138 million less than Lyndon B. Johnson's last "bare bones" economic-aid budget, it is sure to be viewed by them in this mindless way. And yet Mr. Nixon's is the smallest request ever; it is far less than this country can afford in the interests of peace with justice in the world.

**UAW-Teamsters Launch Alliance** What will future labor historians record about the Alliance for Labor Action, which the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and the United Auto Workers formally initiated May 26-27 in the nation's capital?

Will they write that the alliance challenged the pre-eminence of the AFL-CIO and marked one of the more successful attempts at dual unionism in this country? Will they liken it to the Committee for Industrial Organization, which, under the leadership of John L. Lewis, became a formidable rival of the AFL?

Or will historians decide that the alliance performed the constructive role of gadfly to organized labor, challenging the AFL-CIO to concentrate more of its resources on a crusade to uplift the poor, eliminate race discrimination and save the cities?

The alliance could develop either way, or both ways as far as that goes. As 500 delegates listened, Frank E. Fitzsimmons, acting president of the Teamsters, emphasized that they had not assembled to found a competitive labor group to do battle with the AFL-CIO. Rather, they had come together to wage war on conditions that erode the benefits of affluence and deny to many poor people a fair share in the American way of life.

Walter Reuther, head of UAW, also insisted that the alliance aimed not to weaken labor unity but to make unions more effective instruments of social justice. Referring to its plans for organizing the unorganized, he struck a note, however, that historians may decide was

ominously prophetic. In pursuing its organizing effort, he said, the alliance did not intend to let other unions block its progress. No union, he stressed, "has a divine right to sit upon its paper jurisdictional claims" and keep the benefits of unionism from a million unorganized workers.

Doesn't that kind of language have overtones of union rivalry and war?

**Cigarette Labels and Ads** On June 30 the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 will expire. The legislation provides that cigarette packs carry this warning: "Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health." The act also includes a provision prohibiting any Federal agency from restricting cigarette advertising.

Late last month the House Commerce Committee extended the act for six years and strengthened the language of the admonition so that labels could read: "Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health and May Cause Lung Cancer or Other Diseases." The committee did not, however, change the stipulation that keeps regulatory agencies from applying the warning to advertisements.

If the House passes the bill, it faces aggressive treatment in the Senate. Sen. Frank Moss (D., Utah), a tobacco critic, has promised to stall the measure in his Consumers Subcommittee and to filibuster on the Senate floor if legislation gets that far. The anti-smoking forces in Congress not only want labels to carry a stronger health warning but are calling for either the elimination of tobacco ads, especially broadcast ones (as the FCC has recommended and as is the case in Britain, France, Italy, Norway, Denmark and other countries), or the carrying of the warning in all advertisements as well as on package labels.

The practical effect of having warnings appear in commercials would probably be the disappearance of tobacco ads on television—ads that seem very persuasive with young people. Such an effect appears both justified and desirable.

The \$200 million that the tobacco industry is currently spending annually on network billings alone would be put to much better use in cancer research—to isolate whatever it is in smoking that is causing health damage. But whether the upshot of the current debate is that advertisements be required to carry a warning or not, the present anticigarette commercials now appearing on TV and radio ought to continue.

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By: MN  
NARA Date: 10/5/05

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
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CIRCULAR

ACTION: All African Diplomatic Posts  
Amconsul LUANDA  
" LOURENCO MARQUES  
" SALISBURY  
All NATO Capitals  
Amembassy MADRID  
" STOCKHOLM  
USMission GENEVA  
Amembassy HELSINKI  
" VIENNA  
" DUBLIN  
" BOGOTA XK  
" ASUNCION

Amembassy RAWALPINDI  
" KATHMANDU  
USUN

INFO: Amembassy MOSCOW

8 AUG 69 22 32 Z

XMT-Amembassy ANKARA  
" ATHENS  
" REYKJAVIK  
USMission NATO

INFORM CONSULS

Subj: UN and the Nigerian Problem

1. Periodically question arises in US and abroad why Nigerian problem cannot be submitted to UN and why US should not be one of countries taking such initiative. Since outbreak of civil war, US has periodically examined whether role for UN feasible in interest of peace or in more limited area of improving relief situation.
2. We have discussed problem with UNSYG who himself has exhorted parties to conflict to negotiate their differences but continues to insist that Nigerian civil war is African problem in which he cannot interfere as long as OAU seized with problem. He has recently also emphasized UN, particularly UNICEF, role in relief effort.
3. Although referral problem to UN superficially attractive, very serious problems exist in attempting engage UN. More direct involvement would require

Drafted by: 8/6/69  
AF/W: GBSheriff: IO/UNP: BJ Jones: ba  
Tel. Ext. 23391  
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: AF - David D. Newsom

Clearances:

IO/UNP - Miss Brown  
EUR-Miss Tibbets  
NEA/RA-Mr. Stein  
AF/W-RMMelbourne

IO - Mr. Greene  
U-Mr. Ruser  
ARA - GNMorisma

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Classification

FORM DS-322  
8-65

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By NARA Date 10/5/05

0381

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Info:

Security Council or General Assembly action. As noted by Under Secretary Richardson before Kennedy Sub-Committee on July 15, 1969 QTE United Nations has been unable take up this problem because strong African opposition has precluded introduction Nigerian civil war before Security Council or General Assembly UNQTE.

4. Earlier consultations with small number key UN members convinced us that it would be extremely difficult if not impossible obtain 9 votes necessary to inscribe Nigerian item on SC agenda. Not only does the Federal Military Government (FMG) of Nigeria strongly oppose UN consideration, but so does UK which strongly supports FMG. Most other African countries, both individually and corporately as the OAU, also oppose inscription. Four African countries that recognize Biafra, and possibly Haiti (only other country that does), might like to see UN involved, but of these only Ivory Coast has indicated some interest in pushing for UN consideration. Strong opposition of FMG, UK, and Africans has inhibited most other UN members from urging UN action. Many have felt that Western-inspired UN involvement would be viewed by African countries as neo-colonialism or white paternalism.

5. Notwithstanding difficulties involved, we might be inclined to press for UN consideration if it appeared advantages such action clearly outweighed

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

Clearances:

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By MNMARA Date 05/05/05

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Classification

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Origin

ACTION: CIRCULAR Page 3

Info:

political costs. In our continuing reappraisals we have thus far always concluded, however, that this not case. Even if UN organ were seized with issue, it likely under present circumstances agreement ~~that~~ on no more than very limited action could ~~be obtained~~ probably take form of ~~be obtained~~ ~~This would~~hortatory resolution calling on parties resolve differences peacefully and urging UN members assist to this end and to contribute to efforts to alleviate in such case suffering. Even ~~with~~ public debate would be bitter and divisive. It could aggravate tensions and ~~hinder~~ hinder rather than help progress toward reconciliation. In seeking any more far-reaching action UN would encounter same obstacles that have prevented OAU and other peacemaking efforts from prospering. Further problem would be possible Soviet attempt exploit situation to pose as Nigeria's champion and supporter of preponderant African opinion against QTE neo-colonialists, UNQTE including Portugal and South Africa. In seeking to avoid taking sides on basic political issue, we risk would ~~incur~~ incurring enmity of both FMG and Biafrans and their respective supporters.

6. We have no basis to revise above assessment at this time. Therefore, although we will continue maintain contact with UK, key Africans and others particularly concerned we do not now plan any initiative, alone or jointly

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

Clarendon

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8-65

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By MNARA Date 10/5/05

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Origin

ACTION: CIRCULAR Page 4

Info:

with others, to take Nigerian question to UN. Should others indicate desire to take initiative, we would not interpose any objection, but, depending on circumstances, might wish to indicate to them some of problems that might arise from such initiative.

7. Addressee posts may draw on above in discussions with host country officials in event of inquiries concerning US position on this question.

RICHARDSON

Drafted by: \_\_\_\_\_ Tel. Ext. \_\_\_\_\_ Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: \_\_\_\_\_

Clearances: \_\_\_\_\_

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*Classification*

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Authority WND 959503  
By MN NARA Date 05/05



Pol 27 Biafra - Nigeria  
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED 980

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ACTION AFI 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, UCF 05, UPW 01, IO 13, SR 01, ORM 03, SCSE 00, SCA 01,  
AID 28, ACDA 16, CIAE 00, DODE 00, INRI 07, NSAE 00, PI 04, RSC 01,  
USIA 12, PRS 01 ARSR 01, /130 W

037343

RE 071150Z AUG 69  
FM AMEMBASSY FREETOWN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3600  
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON

UNCLAS FREETOWN 961

SUBJ: NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

REF: FREETOWN 932 ✓

PARLIAMENT YESTERDAY PASSED UNANIMOUSLY PRIVATE MEMBER'S  
MOTION ON NIGERIAN/BIAFRAN CONFLICT CALLING FOR IMMEDIATE  
CEASE FIRE, APPOINTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE FORCE, AND  
RESUMPTION OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. ALTHOUGH SPONSOR OF  
MOTION SAID INTENT OF RESOLUTION WAS NOT ENCOURAGE RECO-  
GNITION BIAFRA BUT TO STOP CARNAGE OF WAR, EIGHT OF THIRTEEN  
MP'S WHO SPOKE ON MOTION CALLED FOR RECOGNITION BIAFRA.  
DEPREE  
BT

NNN

①

UNCLASSIFIED

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0385

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NID 959503  
By NARA Date 10/5/03

30

August 7, 1969

Honorable W. E. Brock  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Congressman Brock:

The Secretary of State has asked me to reply to your letter of July 16, requesting the Department of State's views on the "Recognize Biafra Resolution" you enclosed.

We share your deep concern for the suffering caused by the Nigerian civil war and have played a major role in the international effort to bring relief to civilian victims on both sides of the fighting lines. The United States' contribution of over \$75 million, of which over \$62 million has come from the government itself, represents about 50 percent of global contributions to this effort in which over 40 countries together with a host of voluntary relief agencies and international organizations have been participating.

The announcement by President Nixon on February 22 of the appointment of Ambassador C. Clyde Ferguson as Special Relief Coordinator is a further reflection of this government's concern. Charged with assuring that U.S. contributions are responsive to relief needs to the maximum extent feasible, Ambassador Ferguson has been making all-out efforts to develop new arrangements that will permit an increased flow of relief to those in need.

The international relief effort has been much more successful than generally recognized in mitigating the suffering brought about by the conflict. The incidence of starvation in the Biafran enclave was dramatically reduced during the winter and spring months, partly because of the infusion of relief supplies via the night airlifts and partly as a result of increased food production by the Biafrans themselves. The improvement reached a point that on June 1, General Ojukwu himself stated publicly that starvation was no longer a problem.

For the past few weeks, however, the ICRC airlift has been suspended and the Joint Church Aid airlift is operating on a very reduced scale. The Federal Military Government is insisting that only daily relief

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AF: AF/CW: RW Farville

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By MNARA Date 10/5/05

flights, subject to inspection in Lagos, will henceforth be acceptable. It holds that night airlifts are unauthorized invasions of Nigerian air space and provide cover for clandestine air delivery of arms to Biafra. Negotiations are in process with both sides in the effort to reach agreement on daylight flights as well as on the details of the operation of a river route through Federal territory to the Biafran enclave, a proposal which Ambassador Ferguson has been particularly active in developing. There is some reason to hope that the relief impasse may be broken, and our own efforts to this end are continuing, but each side is keenly sensitive to possible military and political ramifications of any relief proposal. Obtaining the agreement of both has always been a major obstacle to assuring a sustained flow of relief supplies to those in need.

Active U.S. participation in the relief effort does not solve the problem of civil war. The underlying conflict, despite foreign arms and other international ramifications, is deeply rooted in issues internal to Nigeria and more generally to Africa as a whole. We have avoided direct intervention in this complex situation because we believe that U.S. capacity to influence either side toward a settlement is limited and because it seems clear that the day is past when outside powers can settle independent Africa's problems. Nevertheless we have made - and continue to make - every effort to encourage a peaceful settlement of this conflict within an African framework.

Basic to this problem is the way the African nations themselves regard the issues involved. To four of them, the issue is self-determination. To the vast majority, however, the issue is defined as one of secession in a continent inhabited by more than 2,000 different tribes with varying degrees of commitment, at this stage of national development, to the states in whose boundaries they find themselves. Most African leaders are convinced that any application of the principle of self-determination to regions or tribes in such circumstances would lead to chaos and bloodshed throughout the continent. This viewpoint explains the over-riding importance attached to the concept of territorial integrity of African states in meetings of African leaders. Article 3 of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity provides that member states "solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to . . . respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state." The sensitivity of this issue is attested to by the resolution supporting Nigerian territorial integrity passed by the OAU Heads of State in 1967 and 1968 and by the many statements of various African leaders.

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Whatever the merits of such arguments, they are strongly held by Africans about their own continent.

With reference to the proposed resolution which you forwarded me I believe ~~it is only fair to~~ point out that the world press did not fully quote the statement of Nigerian Finance Minister Awolowo. In his speech Chief Awolowo followed the statement quoted in the resolution by saying: "From the beginning the Federal Military Government has resisted the temptation to use starvation and has done everything to insure that food and medical supplies find their way to the sick and hungry, all because Nigerians believe they are not fighting an enemy but rebellious Ibo brothers who must be reintegrated."

Under Secretary Elliot L. Richardson in appearing before the Subcommittee on Refugees of the Senate Judiciary Committee on July 15 made the following comments on the question of recognition of an independent Biafra:

"Recognition of an independent Biafra is not a panacea, either for relief, an end to the war, or for the future stability of West Africa. We understand the concern of the Ibo people. We appreciate their insistence on guarantees for their personal safety, just as we appreciate the desire of the Federal Government to restore the high promise of a unified Nigeria. We have repeatedly urged the Federal Military Government to make a precise and unequivocal declaration of these guarantees.

Furthermore, recognition would have no tangible effect on the hostilities. To the contrary, it would only harden the positions of both sides, at the risk of rising Soviet influence in Federal Nigeria.

Whatever the course of the present fighting, an independent Biafra could be a source of recurring conflict. Within the territory claimed by the Biafrans there are numerous tribes with a history of hostility to the dominant Ibo tribe. It would be ironic indeed if we validated one claim for self-determination only to incite new and equally bitter irredentisms threatening the stability of the area.

This Administration, therefore, does not contemplate either support for or recognition of the secessionist authorities. We regard a peaceful and just reconciliation of Nigeria as in the best interests of Africa and all those, like the United States, who wish her well."

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- 4 -

I hope that the above information will be of help to you. Please let me know if there is any further information we can provide you.

Sincerely yours,

an

William B. Macomber, Jr.  
Assistant Secretary for  
Congressional Relations

Enclosures:

1. Testimony of Under Secretary  
Richardson, July 15, 1969,  
Dept. of State Press Release 199.
2. Testimony of Amb. C. Clyde Ferguson, Jr.  
July 15, 1969, Dept. of State Press  
Release.

Clearances: AF - Amb. C. R. Moore

H - Mr. Leahy

AF:AF/CW:RWFaville:ehd 8/4/69

0389

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority VND959503  
By MMAR Date 05/05/03

FORM DS-1563  
12-63DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

CONTROL NO.

SS

11221

AEW

ACTION SLIP  
(To Remain With Correspondence)

TO

U/CF Mr. Thomas

DATE

July 22, 1969

SUBJECT Ltr to S fm Bill Brock (MC) dtd 7/16 re S's thoughts on enclosed  
"Recognize Biafra" Resolution.

## ACTION

\*Prompt handling is essential. Return basic correspondence with reply. If delayed coll telephone extensian below.

Far appropriate action.
For direct reply. Cameback copy required _____.
XX A response for signature by <u>XX H - Amb. Macomber</u>
XX Prepare reply. Clear with <u>AF</u>
Prepare a _____ to _____.
Refer to White House request of _____.
XX Due in S/S by <u>7/25/69</u>
For your information.

## REMARKS

1969 JUL 23 PM 3 16  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## COPIES TO

S - Mr. Okun (w/att)  
H - Mr. Grant (w/att)  
AF - Mr. Alexander (w/att)

gpf  
Wingate Lloyd  
SECRETARIAT STAFF  
EXT. 4735

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By MNARA Date 10/5/05

**URGENT**  
**A CONGRESSIONAL - FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION**


A reply or written acknowledgment must be made within Three Working Days (See 5 FAM 1524.3 or H-Guide Lines).

If for any reason, a problem is anticipated, drafting officer should immediately call H - Extensions 4286 or 7579.

M-115  
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GPO 935559

0391



BILL BROCK  
3D DISTRICT, TENNESSEE  
1441 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
PHONE: 225-3271

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

3  
COMMITTEE ON  
BANKING AND CURRENCY  
11221  
S1

July 16, 1969

ACTION  
is assigned to

The Honorable William P. Rogers  
Secretary of State  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I would appreciate your thoughts on the enclosed.

Very truly yours,

  
BILL BROCK

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
1969 JUL 18 PM 2 32  
et  
Enclosures  
RS/AN  
ANALYSIS BRANCH

Encl : Resolution on Biafra.

3 7-18-69

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DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND959503  
By MMNARA Date 10/3/03

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA XR POL NIGERIA-US

BILL BROCK  
3rd DISTRICT, TENNESSEE  
1341 Longworth House Office Building  
Phone: 225-3271

COMMITTEE ON  
BANKING AND CURRENCY

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

July 16, 1969

The Honorable William Timmons  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Bill:

Enclosed is a proposed Biafran Resolution. This will probably be circulated among the House Members next week and there are many, including myself, who are prepared to sign it out of frustration with the Biafran situation.

Bill, I'm obviously not aware of the niceties of diplomatic logic which lead us to maintain our current position in this affair, nor are many others up here. That's why I thought you should see this and I would appreciate your advice.

I'm convinced if something is not done in the immediate future, this situation is going to become embarrassing to the President. I don't want to see that happen but, at the same time, don't want to understate my personal, emotional commitment to obtaining the relief of Biafra.

Again, I would appreciate your thoughts on this matter and any advice on how I might proceed.

Very truly yours,

  
BILL BROCK

cc: The Honorable William P. Rogers

Encl.

0393

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NID 950503  
By MN NARA Date 10/5/03

RECOGNIZE BIAFRA RESOLUTION

WHEREAS the Biafran people in their two year isolation from the world due to a blockade, mounted by Nigeria with the military assistance of Russia, Great Britain and Egypt, have demonstrated all the attributes of nationhood;

AND WHEREAS over one and a half million Biafrans, most of them children, have been starved to death as a direct result of this blockade;

AND WHEREAS the intentions of the blockade were clearly revealed by Nigeria's top civilian Minister Chief Awolowo when he said:

"All is fair in war and starvation is one of the weapons of war. I don't see why we should feed our enemies fat in order for them to fight us harder.";  
(Financial Times (London) 6-26-69)

AND WHEREAS the Nigerian position is untenable since she claims these "enemies" as her own people;

AND WHEREAS President Nixon on September 10, 1968, described what was happening to the Biafran people as "genocide";

AND WHEREAS "the time is long past for the wringing of hands about what is going on";

AND WHEREAS "America is not without enormous material wealth and power and ability";


AND WHEREAS "there is no better cause in which we might invest that power than in sparing the lives of innocent men and women and children who otherwise are doomed";

BE IT RESOLVED THAT PRESIDENT NIXON, ACTING ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, MANY OF WHOM ARE THEMSELVES DESCENDENTS OF REFUGEES FROM OPPRESSION AND GENOCIDE, SHOULD ACT AS THE "CONSCIENCE OF THE WORLD" BY RENOUNCING THE DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT AND ANY OTHER SUPPORT WE ARE GIVING TO NIGERIA UNTIL SUCH TIME AS NIGERIA ACCEPTS THE REALITY OF BIAFRA'S SEPARATE EXISTENCE;

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED THAT THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZE BIAFRA DIPLOMATICALLY AND USE ALL THE POWER AT HER DISPOSAL, SHORT OF MILITARY INTERVENTION, TO END THE WAR.

\* \* \* \* \*

0394





Re:   
POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA  
XR POL 27-9 BIAFRA - NIGERIA

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 220

PAGE: 01 GABERO 00322 071516Z

52:  
ACTION: SS: 70

INFO: OCT 01 CIAE 001/071 W

038450

RI: 061540Z AUG 69  
FM: AMEMBASSY GABERONES  
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC 1103

CONFIDENTIAL GABERONES 322

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: PUBLIC OPINION ON NIGERIAN WAR  
POL 27 Biafra - Nigeria  
REF: STATE 123842 XR POL 27-9 Biafra - Nigeria

1. REGRET ANSWER TO REFTEL DELAYED BY OFFICE MOVE TO NEW PRE-  
MISES.

2. OUTSIDE OF GENERAL ILL-DEFINED SYMPATHY WITH SUFFERING OF  
STARVING SURROUNDED BIAFRANS, NO STRONG POPULAR FEELING AMONG  
BATSWANA. OFFICIAL GOB POSITION SUPPORTS NIGERIA, REFUSES RECOG-  
NITION TO BIAFRA, HOPES FOR END OF WAR ASAP WITH REAFFIRMED  
NIGERIAN FEDERATION AND GOVERNMENT BENEVOLENT AND FORGIVING TO-  
WARD BIAFRANS. PUBLIC ACCEPTS THIS, NEITHER UNDERSTANDS NOR IS  
CONCERNED WITH POLITICAL ISSUES.

3. NO CLEAR ATTITUDES ON RELIEF ISSUES EXCEPT THAT RELIEF SHOULD  
BE PERMITTED BY NIGERIA AND ACCEPTED BY BIAFRA.

4. LITTLE OR NO INTEREST NOW SHOWN BY LOCAL MEDIA AND PRINCIPAL  
CONTACTS IN WAR AND RELIEF ACTIVITIES. I RECALL BEING ASKED AT  
ONE PUBLIC DISCUSSION RECENTLY IF U.S. BELIEVES IN SELF-DETERMINA-  
TION, WHY NOT SUPPORT BIAFRA. HOWEVER AUDIENCE IN GENERAL SEEMED  
UNINTERESTED IN QUESTION.

PLETCHER

Gaberes 8-6-69 322

CONFIDENTIAL 23

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Authority NND 959503  
By MNARA Date 10/2/05

L I M D I S

TOP SECRET

I N C O M I N G

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 By MAR Date 10/5/03



POL 27 BIAFRA NIGERIA  
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 885

PAGE 01 MOGADI 02307 060752Z

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ACTION: SS 70

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FMI AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO  
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC 6112

COLONIAL DIPLOMATIC ALL MOGADISCIO 2307

LIMDIS

JOINT STATE/USIS MESSAGE

SUBJ: PUBLIC OPINION ON NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

REFN STATE 123842 - PL 27 Biafra Nigeria

1. AS IS COMMON WITH MANY INTERNATIONAL ISSUES NOT DIRECTLY IN MAIN STREAM OF SOMALI INTEREST THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE PUBLIC REACTION OR ANY GREAT CONCERN SHOWN RE ISSUES OF NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR. SOMALI CONTACTS HAVE RELATIVE LIMITED INTEREST IN SITUATION AND GENERALLY DISCUSS MATTER ONLY IF DRAWN OUT ON ISSUES.

2. MOST INDIVIDUALS CONSIDER THAT CIVIL WAR IS BASICALLY NIGERIAN INTERNAL MATTER AND THEY DO NOT TAKE STANDS ON ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER. SOME SOMALIS EXPRESS REGRET THAT SUCH IMMENSE HUMAN SUFFERING IS INVOLVED. WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN RELIEF FUND CAMPAIGNS.

3. LOCAL MEDIA GIVE RELATIVE EXTENSIVE COVERAGE TO ALL ASPECTS OF NIGERIAN WAR AND RELIEF ACTIVITIES WITHOUT TAKING STAND ON MERITS OF ISSUE INVOLVED. POPE PAUL'S VISIT TO UGANDA GIVEN PROMINENT PRESS COVERAGE, INCLUDING ARTICLES EXPRESSING HOPE THAT THE PONTIFF'S EFFORTS TO BRING NIGERIAN AND BIAFRAN REPRESENTATIVES TOGETHER IN KAMPALA MIGHT LEAD TO A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

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Authority NND 950503  
By MNARA Date 10/5/03

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 By MN NARA Date 10/5/05



POL 27 Biafra-Nigeria  
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 886

PAGE 01 BONN 10360 062107Z

85  
ACTION SS 70

INFO OCT 01, CIAE 002/071 W

032701

R 061930Z AUG 69  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4719  
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS

CONFIDENTIAL BONN 10360

LIMDIS

SUBJ: WEST GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION ON NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

REF: STATE 123842

JOINT STATE/USIS MESSAGE

1. THE FOLLOWING PARAS SUMMARIZE OUR IMPRESSIONS OF WEST GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION OVER THE PAST YEAR ON THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR.
2. POLITICAL ISSUES. FOR THE MOST PART THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE KNOWLEDGE OR UNDERSTANDING OF THE ACTUAL POLITICAL ISSUES IN THE CONFLICT. NEVERTHELESS, THE PUBLIC ATTITUDE HAS BEEN HEAVILY SYMPATHETIC TOWARD THE BIAFRAN CAUSE OVER THAT OF THE FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT (FMG), THOUGH THERE IS NOW A GRADUAL TREND TOWARD A MORE NEUTRAL APPROACH. THE PLIGHT OF THE BIAFRAN POPULATION HAS BEEN DRAMATIZED RATHER STRONGLY OVER THE PAST YEAR, WITH THE FMG OFTEN DEPICTED AS BENT ON BIAFRAN ANNIHILATION. THE HUMANITARIAN APPEALS OF CHURCH AND OTHER WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS HAVE BEEN LINKED BY BIAFRAN PROPONENTS, WITH APPEALS FOR SUPPORT OF BIAFRAN POLITICAL AIMS. FOR EXAMPLE, STUDENTS HAVE USED THE PATHETIC POSTERS OF STARVING NIGERIAN CHILDREN IN CAMPAIGNS URGING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR BIAFRAN INDEPENDENCE AND GERMAN RECOGNITION FOR THE "BIAFRAN GOVERNMENT". TO A DEGREE, THESE APPEALS HAVE FOUND SOME POPULAR RESPONSE. AND BY CONTRAST WE HAVE SEEN NO POPULAR SENTIMENT FOR A SPEEDY VICTORY BY FMG FORCES OVER THE REBELS. BUT FOR THE MOST PART, THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE CONCEPT OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION OR OF THE ROLE GERMANY SHOULD ADOPT IN ORDER TO HASTEN A SOLUTION.

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By MNARA Date 01/5/03



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 BONN 10360 062107Z

3. RELIEF ISSUES. GERMAN FEELING HAS BEEN BASED OVERWHELMINGLY ON HUMANITARIAN NOT POLITICAL ISSUES. RELIEF FOR THE STARVING NIGERIAN PEOPLE IS A CAUSE THAT ALL GERMANS SUPPORTED, WHATEVER THEIR VIEWS OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION. THEIR RESPONSE AND THAT OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN VERY GENEROUS. WITH A TOTAL CONTRIBUTION OF MORE THAN DM 100 MILLION (\$25 MILLION), GERMANY RANKS FIRST AMONG ALL DONOR NATIONS IN HUMANITARIAN AID FOR THE NIGERIAN POPULACE. TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT THE POPULAR INTEREST VARIED INVERSELY WITH THE FORTUNES OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELIEF EFFORT. WHEN BIAFRANS SEEMED FACED WITH MASS-STARVATION, PUBLIC INDIGNATION WAS AT ITS HEIGHT. AS THE RELIEF EFFORT GOT INTO FULL SWING, POPULAR FEELING DROPPED OFF. IT SURGED FORTH ONCE AGAIN IN EARLY JULY AT THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE FMGI WAS TAKING OVER THE INTERNATIONAL RELIEF ACTIVITY AND NEWSPAPER STORIES SUCH AS THE FOLLOWING APPEARED: "NO HUMANITY - THE MASS DYING IN BIAFRA MUST COME TO AN END", AND "WITHOUT MERCY INTO THE THIRD YEAR - NO END IN SIGHT". POPULAR FEELING WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO VARY WITH THE EXTENT OF HUNGER AND MISERY IN NIGERIA.

4. IN KEEPING WITH THE HUMANITARIAN CHARACTER OF PUBLIC CONCERN, THERE HAS BEEN FAIRLY UNIVERSAL CRITICISM OF COUNTRIES SUPPORTING THE WAR BY SUPPLYING RMS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO THE COMBATANTS. IN PARTICULAR, THE SOVIET UNION, THE U.K. AND FRANCE HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED TO EXTENSIVE PUBLIC AND MEDIA CRITICISM. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ISOLATED BUT VOCAL ELEMENTS FAVORING ALL-OUT SUPPORT FOR BIAFRA, POPULAR FEELING HAS SUPPORTED THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT POLICY OF PROHIBITING AND DEPLORING MILITARY SUPPORT FOR EITHER SIDE.

5. DEGREE OF CURRENT INTEREST. POPULAR SENTIMENT IN FAVOR OF BIAFRA REACHED ITS PEAK AROUND THE END OF 1968. WHILE IT IS STILL STRONG, THE GERMAN PUBLIC HAS GRADUALLY COME AWAY FROM ITS PARTISAN APPROACH AND IS TENDING INCREASINGLY TO VIEW THE CIVIL WAR AS A COMPLEX INTERNAL CONFLICT, WITH FAULT ON BOTH SIDES. A CONFLICT FROM WHICH GERMANY AND INDEED ALL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES SHOULD REMAIN ALOOF. PRO-BIAFRAN FEELING LOST GROUND IN JUNE AFTER THE SEIZURE AND THREATENED EXECUTION OF ITALIAN AND GERMAN OIL WORKERS BY BIAFRAN FORCES. IN GENERAL, HOWEVER, THE GERMAN PUBLIC HAS GROWN TIRED OF THE CONFLICT, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE ISSUES NO LONGER LOOK SO DRAMATICALLY CLEAR AS THEY ONCE HAD. THE SENTIMENT IS THEREFORE TOWARD CONFINING GERMAN EFFORTS TO

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Authority NND959503  
By MN NARA Date 05/05



*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 03. BONN 10360 062107Z

SUPPORT OF THE RELIEF PROGRAM. EVEN IN THE HUMANITARIAN SPHERE THE MALAISE HAS BECOME EVIDENT IN A CLEAR REDUCTION IN PUBLIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO CHURCH AND OTHER WELFARE FUNDS FOR THE SUFFERING IN NIGERIA. AT PRESENT, INTEREST IN THE WAR AND RELIEF ACTIVITIES IS RELATIVELY SUBDUE. ONCE VACATIONS ARE OVER AND STUDENTS RETURN, THERE WILL DOUBTLESS BE AN UPSURGE IN PUBLIC INTEREST, BUT IT WILL PROBABLY NOT APPROACH THE DEGREE IT ATTAINED LAST FALL AND WINTER.

WEISS

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DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND959503  
By MM NARA Date 10/5/05

L I M D I S

TOP SECRET

I N C O M I N G

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POST Born

SERIAL 70360

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DISTRIBUTION

MONTHLY COUNT 65

Secretariat

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Principals and  
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Geographic

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EUR 10 ~~10~~  
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Functional

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Authority VND 950503  
By MNARA Date 10/5/05



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA  
Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 07070 061149Z

53.  
ACTION AFI 18

INFO: OCT 01, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INRI 07, LI 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10,  
P 04, RSC 01, PRS 01, SPI 02, SS 20, USIA 12, UCF 05, UPW 01, AID 28,  
ACDA 16, IO 13, RSR 01, 1/149 W

RI 060950Z AUG 69.  
FM: AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC 8211

029232

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE: LAGOS 7070

SUBJ: ALLEGED ATTACK ON WARRI

FBIS CARRIED TEXT AUGUST 2 OF BIAFRAN RADIO CLAIM THAT  
BIAFRAN AIR FORCE "CARRIED OUT A VERY SUCCESSFUL MISSION TO  
WARRI TOWN AND ENVIRONS IN THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF JULY 29,  
1969, AND COMPLETELY DESTROYED THE EREMU OIL PUMPING CENTRE."  
BIAFRAN CLAIM IS FALSE, POSSIBLY INSPIRED BY SUCCESSFUL ATTACK  
ON KOKORI OIL FLOW STATION (JULY 28) (LAGOS 6801).

OLSON


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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

31

*Pol 27 Biafra - Nigeria*

CONFIDENTIAL 815

PAGE 01 LONDON 06194 061827Z

82-S  
ACTION AFI 18

INFO: OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, SS 20, JPM 04, LI 03, HI 02, NSC 10, CIAE 00

DODEI 00, INR 07, NSAE 00, P 04, RSC 01, USIA 12, PRS 01, UCF 05, UPW 01

E 15, AID 28, RSR 01, /168 W

031869

RI 061728Z AUG 69

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2005

INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY LAGOS

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USMISSION USUN NY

CLONIFFIDENITIA LONDON 6/94

SUBJECT: PUBLIC OPINION IN NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

REF: SECSTATE 123842

1. THERE HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANT COOLING OF PUBLIC PASSIONS AROUSED IN BRITAIN BY NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR DURING PAST YEAR. UK'S CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH NIGERIA, ITS AUTHORITY OF FEDERATION AND ITS CONTINUING SUPPLY OF ARMS TO LAGOS ASSURES THAT PRESS AND PARLIAMENTARY INTEREST IN CONFLICT WILL NOT DWINDLE BEYOND CERTAIN POINT. IT IS EVIDENT HOWEVER THAT AS WAR DRAGS ON AND AS MORE BRITISH JOURNALISTS AND MP'S BECOME FAMILIAR WITH COMPLEXITY OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS INVOLVED, THERE IS LESS TENDENCY TO OVER-SIMPLIFY ISSUES AND TO BELIEVE THAT BRITAIN COULD STOP FIGHTING AND IMPOSE SETTLEMENT SIMPLY BY CHANGING ITS ARMS SUPPLY POLICY. PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING AND INTEREST, NEVER PARTICULARLY HIGH, HAS PROBABLY BECOME MORE SOPHISTICATED AS TONE OF PRESS AND PARLIAMENTARY DISCUSSIONS HAS BECOME MORE REASONABLE.

2. HIGH POINT OF PUBLIC INTEREST IN NIGERIA CAME YEAR AGO WHEN PARLIAMENT WAS CALLED BACK FROM SUMMER RECESS AFTER CZECH CRISIS AND CONDUCTED FULL SCALE DEBATE ON GOVT'S

CONFIDENTIAL

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By MM NARA Date 10/5/03



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 LONDON 06194 061827Z

POLICY OF SUPPLYING ARMS TO FMG. AT THAT TIME BIAFRAN PUBLIC RELATIONS CAMPAIGN WAS GETTING INTO HIGH GEAR, MOST OF PRESS WAS OUTSPKENLY PRO-BIAFRAN AND BACKBENCH CRITICS OF GOVT POLICY, INCLUDING LEFT-WING PACIFISTS LIKE PHILIP NOEL-BAKER AND CONSERVATIVE CATHOLICS LIKE HUGH FRASER, WERE DROWNING OUT SUPPORTERS. SINCE THEN THERE HAVE BEEN THREE FULL DRESS DEBATES IN HOUSE OF COMMONS IN PAST TWELVE MONTHS, EACH ONE LESS SHARPLY POLARIZED AND LESS UNCOMFORTABLE FOR GOVT. HARDCORE SUPPORT FOR BIAFRA IN HOUSE HAS REMAINED AT 50-60 MEMBERS FROM ALL PARTIES, BUT SUPPORTERS OF GOVT'S POLICY HAVE PRESENTED THEIR CASE MORE EFFECTIVELY THAN BEFORE AND SOME FENCE-SITTERS HAVE BEEN SWUNG OVER TO GOVT SIDE. AT SAME TIME PRESS HAS BECOME LESS PARTISAN DUE TO OVERPLAYING OF THEIR HAND BY BIAFRAN SPOKESMEN, BETTER PUBLIC RELATIONS EFFORT BY FEDS AND, MOST IMPORTANT, GROWING NUMBER OF NEWSMEN WHO HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN TO NIGERIA AND STUDIED SITUATION AT FIRST HAND.

3. POLITICAL AND RELIEF ISSUES HAVE BEEN AS HARD FOR BRITISH TO DISENTANGLE AS FOR EVERYONE ELSE. YEAR AGO HEADLINES WERE DOMINATED BY FEARS OF MASS FAMINE IN BIAFRA AND CHARGES OF GENOCIDE AGAINST NIGERIA. TODAY CRITICS OF GOVT POLICY RARELY CONTENT THAT FMG INTENDS TO WIPE OUT IBOS, OR COULD DO SO IF IT WANTED TO. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY OBSERVERS HAVE DONE MORE THAN ANYONE ELSE TO ALLAY PUBLIC ANXIETIES ON THIS POINT, PLUS FACT THAT AS BIAFRAN ENCLAVE HAS BEEN WHITLED DOWN LARGE NUMBER OF IBOS HAVE COME UNDER FEDERAL CONTROL WITHOUT GENOCIDE OCCURRING. THERE HAVE BEEN FEW SERIOUS ATTEMPTS TO ANALYSE FORM ULTIMATE SETTLEMENT SHOULD TAKE AND MOST BRITONS DOUBTLESS COULD LIVE WITH ANY ARRANGEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES. BIAFRAN SUPPORTERS, OF COURSE, ADVOCATE POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE, ALTHOUGH IN RECENT PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES THEY HAVE TENDED TO EMPHASIZE NEED FOR SOME KIND OF SPECIAL ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP. THREAT OF FAMINE IS STILL TAKEN SERIOUSLY BY BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION, BUT PRESS AND MPS FIND IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO BLAME ONE SIDE OR OTHER WHEN IT IS MANIFESTLY CLEAR THAT BOTH ARE OBSTRUCTING RELIEF SHIPMENTS FOR POLITICAL REASONS.

4. NONE OF THIS IS TO SAY THAT BRITISH GOVT'S POLICY ON NIGERIA IS POPULAR -- GALLUP POLL RESULTS OVER PAST YEAR SHOW IT IS NOT -- OR THAT PASSIONATE CRITICISM COULD NOT FLARE

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**TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 LONDON 06194 061827Z

UP AGAIN IF FMG MAKES MOVES IN POLITICAL OR RELIEF FIELD THAT EXCITE PUBLIC INDIGNATION. WITHIN PAST YEAR, HOWEVER, COURSE OF BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION HAS RUN SMOOTHER THAN BEFORE AND PRESS AND PARLIAMENT HAVE ADOPTED MORE MEASURED VIEW BOTH OF POLITICAL AND RELIEF ASPECTS OF CONFLICT.  
ANNENBERG

CONFIDENTIAL

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By MNARA Date 09/5/03

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 873: 860981

PAGE 01 STATE 130098

87

ORIGIN SS 10

INFO OCT 01, 1971 R

66631  
DRAFTED BY AF/CW REED

APPROVED BY AF/CW WILLIAM E. SCHAUFELE, JR.  
S/S MR BROWN

019217

R 050057Z AUG 69  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN 1287

SECRET STATE 130098

EXDIS

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION SECSTATE FROM PARIS JULY 18, QTE:

PARIS 10932

EXDIS

DEPT PASS EMBASSY ROME FOR AMBASSADOR FERGUSON  
FOR UNDER SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

SUBJ: NIGERIA

REF: STATE 119064

1. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE AS YET HEARD NOTHING IN RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT NIXON'S LETTER TO HOUPHOUET, ALL SIGNPOINT TO EXTREMELY SERIOUS CONSIDERATION OF NIGERIA/BIAFRA PROBLEM BY FRENCH AF. HOUPHOUET. WE SHOULD GET RESULTS OF THIS CONSIDERATION DURING COURSE OF AMBASSADOR FERGUSON'S VISIT, IF NOT BEFORE.

2. YOUR JULY 15 SPEECH WAS SUPERB. WE HAVE MADE WIDE USE OF IT IN PREPARING GROUND FOR FERGUSON VISIT AND REINFORCING IN TALKS WITH QUAI (LEBEL) AND FOCCARY'S OFFICE (ROPARTZ). POINTS YOU MADE WITH LUCET THAT TIME HAS COME FOR FRENCH TO MAKE SERIOUS TRY AT FINDING PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND THAT WE ARE PREPARED SUPPORT

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATEI 130098

CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORTS TO THIS END. IN ADDITION TO COPIES GIVEN TO QUAI AND FOCCART'S OFFICE, WE HAVE SENT YOUR SPEECH TO HOUPHOUET AND TO ALL INFORMATION MEDIA. I WILL GIVE COPY PERSONALLY TO PRIME MINISTER WHEN I DISCUSS NIGERIA/BIAFRA WITH HIM THIS EVENING.

3. QUAI AFRICA DIRECTOR LEBEL HAS INFORMED US THAT FONMINI SCHUMANN WILL MEET WITH FERGUSEON AT 1800 JULY 23, AFTER HIS RETURN FROM BRUSSELS (JULY 22) AND COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING (EARLIER ON JULY 23). LEBEL ALSO SAID THAT HOUPHOUET HAD SEVERAL MINUTES ALONE WITH SCHUMANN YESTERDAY EXCLUSIVELY ON NIGERIA/BIAFRA BUT THAT HE DOES NOT YET KNOW WHAT WAS SAID.

4. ROPARTZ SAID HE THOUGHT NIGERIA/BIAFRA PROBLEM ENTERING "VERY INTERESTING PERIOD" SO FAR AS IT CONCERNED RELIEF AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, BUT WOULD NOT GO ANY FURTHER. HE INDICATED THAT POMPIDOU TAKING PERSONAL INTEREST IN MATTER AND FOLLOWING IT CLOSELY. STRIVER UNQUOTE  
RICHARDSON

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Department of State  
TELEGRAM

SECRET 678

PAGE 01 STATE 116456

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ORIGIN SS 10

INFO OCT 01, 011 R

66637  
DRAFTED BY: AF/CW:R REED  
APPROVED BY: AF/CW:WE SCHAUFEL JR  
S/S:MR. BROWN

018553

R 050015Z AUG 69  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN 1284

SECRET STATE 116456

EXDIS

FOLLOWING TEL SENT ACTION GENEVA FROM SECSTATE DATED 17 JULY 69

QUOTE STATE 116456

EXDIS

FOR GUTMAN

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION PARIS, GENEVA, JULY 15 FROM SECSTATE  
REPEATED TO YOU:

QUOTE SECRET STATE 116456

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADORS SHRIVER AND TUBBY FROM UNDER SECRETARY

SUBJ: NIGERIA

REF: ABIDJAN 1948

1- ABIDJAN'S REFTEL INDICATES HOUPHOUET IN PARIS, ALTHOUGH  
WE UNDERSTOOD HE REMAINING GENEVA UNTIL JULY 16.

*Cardeco*

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By MNARA Date 10/5/03

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 STATE 116456

2. EITHER PARIS OR GENEVA, WHICHEVER HAS ACCESS TO HOUPHOUET, SHOULD DELIVER PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO HIM IMMEDIATELY WITH UNDERSTANDING FRENCH TEXT WILL BE SENT SOONEST. TEXT FOLLOWS:

"DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I AM WELL AWARE OF YOUR DEEP HUMANITARIAN CONCERN OVER THE EFFECTS OF THE CIVIL WAR IN NIGERIA. AS A FRIEND OF AFRICA, THE UNITED STATES ALSO DEPLORES THIS TRAGEDY, PARTICULARLY THE SUFFERING OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS.

"THE PRESENT INTERRUPTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELIEF EFFORT, IF IT CONTINUES, COULD BRING ABOUT CATASTROPHE. I AM ADDRESSING URGENT APPEALS TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, JOINT CHURCH AID AND THE FEDERAL MILITARY GOVT TO EXERCISE THE UTMOST FLEXIBILITY AND COOPERATION IN AGREEING TO A PROMPT RESUMPTION OF THE RELIEF AIRLIFT INTO BIAFRA AND THE REALIZATION OF THE CROSS RIVER CORRIDOR. THE UNITED STATES IS ALSO TAKING OTHER STEPS TO ENCOURAGE THE IMMEDIATE ACTIVATION OF THESE RELIEF ROUTES WITH REASONABLE SAFEGUARDS TO MEET THE SECURITY CONCERN EXPRESSED BY BOTH FEDERAL NIGERIA AND BIAFRA.

"I APPEAL TO YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, TO USE YOUR GREAT STATURE AND SPECIAL POSITION TO ENCOURAGE THE BIAFRAN AUTHORITIES TO SHOW THE SAME STATESMANSHIP WE HAVE URGED SO STRONGLY UPON FEDERAL NIGERIA.

"MY LETTER TO GENERAL GOWON OBSERVED THAT HISTORY WOULD JUDGE HARSHLY ANY GOVT'S HEEDLESS ACCEPTANCE OF SUFFERING IN THIS CONFLICT. THAT VERDICT WOULD FALL MOST HEAVILY, HOWEVER, ON THE BIAFRAN AUTHORITIES SHOULD THEY SACRIFICE, FOR MILITARY OR POLITICAL ADVANTAGE, THE VERY PEOPLE WHOSE SURVIVAL THEY CLAIM TO BE THEIR GOAL.

"IN A SPIRIT OF MUTUAL HUMANITARIAN CONCERN, I HOPE YOU WILL CONVEY THIS APPEAL TO GENERAL OJUKWU ALONG WITH YOUR OWN STRONG SUPPORT FOR AN EQUITABLE AND IMMEDIATE ELIMINATION OF THE OBSTACLES TO AN EFFECTIVE RELIEF PROGRAM.

SINCERELY, RICHARD NIXON" ROGERS UNQUOTE ROGERS UNQUOTE RICHARDSON

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Authority VND950903  
By MNARA Date 10/5/03

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 STATE 126726

ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF USG'S INSENSITIVITY WAS REFERENCE IN POINT EIGHT TO UAR'S EXERCISE OF QUOTE JURISDICTION UNQUOTE OVER CANAL. WHY NOT USE TERM QUOTE SOVEREIGNTY UNQUOTE. RIFAI SAID HE UNDERSTOOD OUR RATIONALE FOR THIS, BUT FELT SOME COMPROMISE WOULD SOOTHE UAR SUSPICIONS.

6. RIFAI SAID THAT IT WAS ONLY A MATTER OF TIME BEFORE KING HUSSEIN WOULD HAVE TO MAKE SOME IMPORTANT DECISIONS. HE SUSPECTED THAT HUSSEIN WOULD HAVE TO GO ALONG WITH NASSER TO SOME DEGREE (IN ACKNOWLEDGING THAT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION WAS REMOTE), AND THIS WOULD AFFECT JORDAN IN ITS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS (I.E., WITH THE USG), IN INTER-ARAB RELATIONS, AND IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS. QUOTE WE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO DO ALL THAT WE HAD WANTED TO DO INSIDE JORDAN UNQUOTE. COMMENT: RIFAI OBVIOUSLY WAS REFERRING TO ANTI-FEDAYEEN POLICY. SOME EASING OF PRESSURE ON FEDAYEEN MAY IN FACT HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN LAST FEW DAYS. END COMMENT.

7. RIFAI'S OTHER COMMENTS ON NEAR-INEVITABILITY OF WAR "WITHIN YEAR OR TWO" BEING REPORTED SEPTEL.

8. COMMENT: WE HAD HEARD INDIRECTLY FROM OTHER SOURCES THAT KING HUSSEIN WAS IN DISSPIRITED MOOD. HIS RATHER COOL BEHAVIOR TO OUR MILITARY ATTACHES DURING JULY 27 TEST FLIGHTS OF F-104 SEEMED TO CONFIRM THIS. RIFAI HIMSELF HAS NEVER SOUNDED GLOOMIER. ALTHOUGH HE IS SUBJECT TO UPS AND DOWNS, RIFAI ON THIS OCCASION WAS CLEARLY SURE THAT CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS WERE MORE FOREBODING THAN USUAL. HE SAID HE TOO WAS LOSING HOPE. ODELL QUOTE RICHARDSON

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By	MNARA Date 05/05



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POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA  
XR POL 27-9 BIAFRA - NIGERIA

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 609

PAGE 01 MBABANE 00276 051456Z

48  
ACTION SS: 70

INFO OCT 01, CIAE 00, 1071 W

022757

R 050900Z AUG 69  
FM AMEMBASSY MBABANE  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 682

CONFIDENTIAL MBABANE 276

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: PUBLIC OPINION ON NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

POL 27 Biafra - Nigeria

REF: STATE 123842 XR POL 27-9 Biafra - Nigeria

MBABANE  
8-5-69

67

1. PUBLICLY EXPRESSED OPINIONS IN SWAZILAND ON ISSUES RAISED IN REFTEL ARE PRACTICALLY NIL. SWAZI SYMPATHY TENDS TO BE PRO-BIAFRAN BECAUSE SWAZIS FEEL THAT IBOS HAVE RIGHT TO OWN STATE AS SWAZIS HAVE THEIRS. AT SAME TIME, SWAZI LEADERSHIP IS AWARE OF DANGER OF BALKANIZING AFRICA AND PRIMIN RECENTLY EXPRESSED HOPE IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION THAT SOME FORM OF LOOSE FEDERATION COULD BE AGREED UPON WHICH WOULD SAVE FACE OF FEDERAL NIGERIAN LEADERS WHILE GIVING BIAFRA NEAR AUTONOMY, WITH FULL AUTONOMY ON DOMESTIC AND INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

2. EXPATRIATE SOCIETY HERE, PRIMARILY BRITISH OR SOUTH AFRICAN, TENDS SUPPORT BRITISH STAND ON NIGERIA AND OPPOSE ANY BREAKUP OF STATES AS THEY EMERGED FROM FORMER COLONIAL ADMINISTRATIVE PATTERNS.

3. WE HAVE HEARD NO RPT NO EXPRESSIONS OF ATTITUDES ON RELIEF ISSUES AND TO BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE THERE HAVE BEEN NO RPT NO RELIEF FUND CAMPAIGNS. VERY LIMITED PURELY LOCAL MEDIA HAVE SHOWN NO RPT NO RECENT INTEREST IN WAR OR RELIEF ACTIVITIES, DEVOTING THEIR PAGES OR BROADCASTS TO LOCAL ISSUES. OTHER MEDIA TO WHICH SWAZI PUBLIC EXPOSED AND WHICH DO TOUCH UPON NIGERIAN PROBLEM ORIGINATE IN RSA OR ELSEWHERE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, EUROPE OR AMERICA.

CHASE

CONFIDENTIAL

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Authority NND 959503  
By MNARA Date 01/5/03

L I M D I S

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POST MBABANE  
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DISTRIBUTION

MONTHLY COUNT 181

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Principals and  
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Geographic

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POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA

Department of State

**TELEGRAM**

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484

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PAGE 01 BUJUMB 00484 060605Z

45 S:  
ACTION AFT 07

INFO: OCT 01, SS 10, RSR 01, RSC 01, 020 W

027589

RE 051430Z AUG 69  
FM: AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA  
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC 1310

UNCLAS: BUJUMBURA 484

REFI STATE 129676 *POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA*

SEE: BUJUMBURA 478, OF 1 JULY 31.

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POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 538

PAGE 01 MONROV 03498 051409Z

48  
ACTION SS: 70

INFO OCT 01, 1971 W

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R 050905Z AUG 69  
FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7320

CONFIDENTIAL MONROVIA 3498

LIMDIS

SUBJ: PUBLIC OPINION ON NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

REF: STATE 129676 — POL 27 Biafra - Nigeria

STATE 123842 NOT RPT NOT RECEIVED MONROVIA. PLEASE ADVISE.  
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POL 27 Biafra Nigeria  
XR POL 27-9 Biafra - Nigeria

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L I M D I S

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I N C O M I N G

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Principals and  
"S" Area

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Geographic

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EUR 10 *7* 0  
NEA 8

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
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USIA 4 *—* 4  
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Other

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA  
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

(11) CONFIDENTIAL 608

Kampala 1496  
8-5-69

PAGE 01 KAMPAL 01496 051455Z

52  
ACTION SS: 70

INFO OCT 01 CIAE 00, 1071 W

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RE 051200Z AUG 69  
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4408

CONFIDENTIAL KAMPALA 1496

LIMDIS

JOINT EMBASSY/USIS:

SUBJECT: PUBLIC OPINION ON NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

REF: STATE 123842 - POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

RE POL 27-9 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

1. UGANDA HAVING BEEN LOCALE FOR SO-CALLED KAMPALA TALKS OF LAST YEAR AND HAVING RECENTLY BEEN VISITED BY POPE, IS EXTREMELY CONSCIOUS OF NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR. ADDITIONALLY, PRESENCE SMALL BUT VOCAL GROUP IBOS IN INTELLECTUAL ATMOSPHERE AT MAKERERE HAS FURTHER SERVED KEEP ISSUE IN PUBLIC EYE. FINALLY, UGANDA LIKE ALL AFRICAN NATIONS, ACUTELY AND UNHAPPILY AWARE PROBLEMS TRIBAL.

2. IN SPITE OF THESE FACTORS MOST UGANDANS WITH WHOM WE HAVE TALKED, AND MEDIA, ARE NOT DEEPLY INFORMED ON COMPLEXITIES NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR. THERE ARE, OF COURSE, EXCEPTIONS THIS BLANKET STATEMENT AND THERE ARE ADVOCATES OF BOTH FMG AND BIAFRA.

3. BUGANDA SITUATION, WHICH PERMEATES ALL ASPECTS LIFE IN UGANDA, IS EQUAL SIGNIFICANT AS UGANDANS CONTEMPLATE NIGERIA. PRESIDENT OBOTE, WHO, WE BELIEVE, AND BASED ON NUMEROUS AND RELIABLE SOURCES, PERSONALLY FAVORS BIAFRA, CANNOT APPEAR TO LET THIS BIAS SHOW AS IT WOULD IMMEDIATELY GIVE ENCOURAGEMENT TO BAGANDA SEPARATISTS.

4. INSOFAR ULTIMATE SETTLEMENT IS CONCERNED UGANDANS WOULD PROBABLY BE MOST INTERESTED IN SEEING A LOOSE

(11) CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 KAMPALI 01496 051455Z


FEDERATIVE ARRANGEMENT WITH BIAFRA AND OTHER REGIONS HAVING CONSIDERABLE AUTONOMY. SOME UGANDANS HAVE SUGGESTED THIS TO US AND SUGGESTED THAT SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT BE PUT IN EFFECT FOR A SPECIFIC PERIOD OF YEARS PENDING A FURTHER MORE DEFINATIVE SETTLEMENT.

5. RELIEF MATTERS SEEM TO BE SUMMED UP IN IDEA OBSTINACY BOTH PARTIES IS SICKENING TRAGEDY AND ACCEPTANCE MOST EFFICIENT RELIEF ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE FORCED UPON BOTH FMG AND BIAFRAN REGIMES. IN THIS CONTEXT, SEVERAL UGANDANS HAVE COMMENTED THAT USG SHOULD ENFORCE SETTLEMENT OF WHOLE PROBLEM, WHICH, HOWEVER UNREASONABLE, IS INDICATIVE OF ATTITUDE SOME PEOPLE HERE HAVE AS TO RELATIVE FAULT, THERE APPEARS BE NO CLEAR-CUT ANSWER. THERE HAVE BEEN NO RELIEF CAMPAIGNS HERE IN UGANDA, AND NEITHER GOV NOR MEDIA HAS DWELT ON OTHER RELIEF EFFORTS IN ANY SIGNIFICANT DETAIL.

6. ABOVE AND BEYOND ALL THIS, SINGLE MOST OVERRIDING FEELING OF UGANDANS FROM FONMIN ON DOWN, INCLUDING MEDIA, IS FEELING "BIG POWERS" SHOULD KEEP HANDS OFF. FEELING THAT ARMS SUPPLY TO EITHER SIDE IS FRIGHTFUL MISTAKE AND SHOULD BE STOPPED AT ONCE. IN THIS RESPECT AGAIN MANY UGANDANS HAVE EXPRESSED VIEW USG SHOULD USE ITS POWER TO BRING ABOUT STOPPAGE ALL ARMS DELIVERIES. THERE ALSO MANY WHISPERED ILLUSION TO OIL INTERESTS AND THEIR DESIRE MAINTAIN THEIR IMAGINED POSITION INFLUENCE IN BIAFRA AND LAGOS. GP-3.  
STEBBINS

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## L I M D I S

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## Geographic

AF 5 X 5  
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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

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PAGE 01 KIGALI 00398 061404Z

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ACTION SS: 70

INFO: OCT 01, CIAE: 00, 1071 W

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1200

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CHORRIFIC THEDI C: OMPY (TEXT)

SUBJECT: PUBLIC OPINION ON NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

- POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA  
REF: STATE 123842 AND 129676 XE POL 27-9 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

1. RWANDAN MASSES ARE SO GENERALLY INARTICULATE ON CURRENT EVENTS OUTSIDE RWANDA THAT MEANINGFUL CONSENSUS NON-EXISTENT, EXCEPT THAT SUFFERINGS OF NIGERIAN POPULACE ARE GENERALLY DEPLORED AND POPE'S VISIT HAS RAISED HOPES WAR WILL END.

2(A). THE FEW ARTICULATE RWANDANS OPPOSE FRAGMENTATION OF NIGERIA. THEY WOULD INSIST, HOWEVER, ON ARRANGEMENT WITHIN NIGERIA THAT WOULD GIVE VOICE TO BIAFRAN MINORITY. BIAFRAN INSISTENCE ON INDEPENDENCE DOES NOT ENTER INTO THEIR CALCULATIONS.

2(B). EARLY END TO SUFFERINGS IS PARAMOUNT ISSUE, WITH NO SPECIFIC SOLUTIONS OFFERED.

3. RADIO RWANDA CARRIES ALMOST DAILY NEWS ITEMS ON NIGERIAN WAR, BUT OUR PRINCIPAL CONTACTS IN KIGALI HAVE NEVER MENTIONED SUBJECT.

GP-3  
CYR

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
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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

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CONFIDENTIAL 802

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ACTION SS: 70

INFO OCT 01, CIAE 00, 1071 W

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2510  
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS UNN

CONFIDENTIAL OUAGADOUGOU 817

JOINT STATE/USIA

LIMDIS

SUBJ: VOLTAN PUBLIC OPINION ON NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

REF# STATE 123842 - POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

XR POL 27-9 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

1. DURING PAST YEAR NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR HAS NOT RPT NOT BEEN A BURNING ISSUE IN UPPER VOLTA. WHILE NEWS OF BOTH FIGHTING AND RELIEF ACTIVITIES ARE DULY REPORTED BY RADIO AND TWO LOCAL NEWSPAPERS, THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE EDITORIAL COMMENT. OUR PRINCIPAL CONTACTS SHOW SOMEWHAT MORE INTEREST THAN THE MEDIA BUT EVEN THIS INTEREST LACKS FOCUS AND IS USUALLY EXPRESSED AS UNHAPPINESS AND FRUSTRATION AT WAR'S CONTINUATION AND PESSIMISM ABOUT EARLY SOLUTION.

2. BELIEVE INFORMED VOLTAN PUBLIC AGREES WITH GOV LEADERSHIP THAT NIGERIA UNITY OVERRIDING ISSUE. INFLUENTIAL SEGMENT OF POPULATION SUPPORTS THE GOV STANCE OF RECOGNIZING ONLY THE FMG AND BELIEVING WAR SHOULD BE PRESSED UNTIL BIAFRA CAPITULATES. GOV ATTITUDE IS THAT SOME FORMULA SHOULD BE FOUND WHEREBY IBOS COULD HAVE PLACE IN EVOLVING FEDERAL STRUCTURE. DURING PAST YEAR, THERE HAS APPARENTLY BEEN AT LEAST SLIGHT EROSION ON THIS. GHANAIAN EMBASSY TELLS US THAT DURING AFRICA'S VISIT HERE LAST WEEK, HE AND LAMIZANA AGREED THAT EVEN IF FMG CONQUERED BIAFRANS MILITARILY, LAGOS WILL PROBABLY BE UNABLE WIN IBOS' LOYALTY. SEVERAL OF OUR CONTACTS, USING THIS REASONING, ARGUE AGAINST CONTINUED EFFORTS TO FORCE BIAFRANS INTO SUBMISSION. MANY VOLTANS ARE SYMPATHETIC TO

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By MM NARA Date 10/5/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 OUAGADO 00817 041245Z

IBO FEARS ABOUT GENOCIDE.

3. THERE IS CONSIDERABLE POPULAR RESENTMENT HERE OVER PROVISION OF ARMS TO EITHER SIDE FROM WHATEVER SOURCE. NIGERIAN WAR IS DESCRIBED AS AFRICAN PROBLEM WHICH NIGERIANS AND OTHER AFRICANS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO SOLVE WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE THAT RISKS BRINGING EAST-WEST CONFLICT INTO AFRICA. THERE IS AMBIGUITY HERE SINCE SOME OF OUR CONTACTS TELL US BIG POWERS, AND ESPECIALLY U.S. SHOULD BE ABLE TO HELP FIND WORKABLE SOLUTION TO WAR. U.S. NON-INVOLVEMENT IN MILITARY SUPPLY PICTURE HAS MET WITH TACIT BUT GENERAL APPROVAL HERE. AT SAME TIME, THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC CRITICISM OF THOSE COUNTRIES SUPPLYING ARMS. PROBABLY WITH BOTH FMG AND FRENCH SENSITIVITIES (AS WELL AS THOSE OF IVORY COAST AND GABON) IN MIND, GOUV OFFICIALS AND PRESS USUALLY AVOID THE SUBJECT.

4. IMPORTANCE OF RELIEF EFFORTS AND U.S. ROLE IN IT IS WIDELY ACCEPTED BUT NOT EMPHASIZED HERE. TO OUR KNOWLEDGE THERE HAVE BEEN NO LOCAL RELIEF FUND CAMPAIGNS. AN INFLUENTIAL CATHOLIC-EDUCATED ELEMENT IN THE VOLTAN ELITE MIGHT PROVIDE SOME PREDISPOSITION HERE TO FAVOR BIAFRA ON RELIEF ISSUES, BUT IN PRACTICE FAULT IS ASCRIBED ABOUT EVENLY TO NIGERIA AND BIAFRA. GP-3.  
DAVIS

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LIMDIS

SUBJ: Public Opinion on Nigerian Civil War

REF: State 123842

Department does not appear have received responses to reftel from addressees. In effort complete wrapup on subject, would appreciate replies within next day or so.

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POL 27 BIAFRA-  
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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 YAOUND 01408 041424Z

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ACTION SS 70

INFO OCT 01, CIAE 00, 1071 W

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RI 041315Z AUG 69  
FM: AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE  
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC 3551

CONFIDENTIAL YAOUNDE 1408

LIMDIS

SUBJ: PUBLIC OPINION ON NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

REF: (A) STATE 123842; (B) YAOUNDE 815

1. DURING THE EARLY PHASE OF THE WAR THE GFRG TRIED TO MAINTAIN A POSITION OF MODIFIED NEUTRALITY RECOGNIZING ONLY THE FMG AND SUPPORTING THE INTEGRITY OF ONE NIGERIA. IN RECENT MONTHS THIS POSITION HAS CHANGED TO ONE OF STRONG OUTSPOKEN SUPPORT FOR THE FMG AND UNMISTAKEN DISAPPROVAL OF BIAFRA. REF B REPORTED AHIDJO'S STATEMENT QTE AS LONG AS I AM THE HEAD OF THE CAMEROON GOVERNMENT THERE WILL NEVER BE A QUESTION OF RECOGNIZING THE SECESSIONIST STATE OF NIGERIA WHICH CALLS ITSELF BIAFRA - TODAY OR TOMORROW UNQUOTE. THE PRESIDENT HAS ALSO STRONGLY CRITICIZED THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE RECOGNIZED BIAFRA. SINCE THE OFFICIAL POSITION HAS HARDENED IN FAVOR OF THE FMG THE INFORMATION MEDIA ARE RESTRICTED TO STRAIGHT REPORTING OF WAR NEWS AND RELIEF OPERATIONS GATHERED FROM THE REGULAR NEWS SERVICES. ANY EDITORIALIZING RISKS GOVERNMENT CENSURE OR OTHER ACTION INCLUDING BANNING OF THE OFFENSIVE PUBLICATION. AS A RESULT THE RADIO AND PRESS DO NOT PROVIDE A GAUGE FOR MEASURING PUBLIC OPINION. THE FOREIGN MINISTER IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID PRIVATELY THAT HE DOES NOT ENTIRELY AGREE WITH THE CAMEROON GOVERNMENT'S POSITION BUT HE UNDERSTANDS ITS LOGIC AND FEELS OBLIGED TO SUPPORT IT. THIS VIEW IS PROBABLY SHARED BY MANY OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL CAMEROONIANS. THE RECENT INITIATIVE BY POPE PAUL HAS BEEN GIVEN EXTENSIVE COVERAGE AND HAS CREATED KEEN PUBLIC INTEREST AND A DEGREE OF GUARDED OPTIMISM.

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PAGE 02 YAOUND 01408 041404Z

2. PRIVATELY EXPRESSED PUBLIC OPINION ON THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR CAN BE DIVIDED LARGELY ALONG TRIBAL LINES. NORTHERNERS TEND TO SUPPORT UNRESERVEDLY THE LAGOS GOVERNMENT; SOUTHERNERS AND PARTICULARLY WEST CAMEROONIANS SYMPATHIZE WITH THE BIAFRANS.

3. FEW CAMEROONIANS ADDRESS THEMSELVES TO THE MERITS OF THE POLITICAL ISSUES AND SIMPLY EXPRESS THEIR HOPE THAT THE TWO SIDES WILL FIND A SOLUTION. MANY BELIEVE THAT NOW EVEN A LOOSE FEDERATION WILL NOT WORK AND THE ULTIMATE SOLUTION MAY HAVE TO BE SOME FORM OF INDEPENDENCE FOR THE IBOS.

4. CAMEROONIANS TEND TO CRITICIZE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT NOT ONLY FOR ITS PRESENT POLICY OF SUPPLYING ARMS TO LAGOS BUT ALSO FOR ITS COLONIAL POLICIES WHICH IN VARYING WAYS IS CONSIDERED TO HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE BASIC TRIBAL STRIFE IN NIGERIA. THE RUSSIANS, AND TO A LESSER DEGREE THE FRENCH, ARE ALSO CONDEMNED FOR THEIR ROLES IN THE CONFLICT.

5. THERE HAVE BEEN VIRTUALLY NO PUBLIC FUND COLLECTIONS FOR BIAFRAN RELIEF. AN ORGANIZATION WHICH WAS ESTABLISHED IN WEST CAMEROON TO RECEIVE BIAFRAN REFUGEE CHILDREN WAS QUICKLY DISSOLVED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. ALL RELIEF ASSISTANCE IS SUPPOSED TO BE CHANNELLED THROUGH THE CAMEROONIAN RED CROSS. CONCERN IS FREQUENTLY EXPRESSED FOR THE WELFARE OF THE BIAFRANS BUT THIS IS NOT TRANSLATED INTO ACTION. ALTHOUGH CAMEROON HAS NOT PARTICIPATED IN THE RELIEF EFFORTS, IT HAS ALLOWED ICRC PLANES FROM SANTA ISABEL TO BE SERVICED AT DOUALA AIRPORT AND ICRC PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN GIVEN PERMISSION TO TRANSIT CAMEROON WITHOUT VISAS.

6. AHIDJO AND THE GFRC REMAIN DISPOSED TO ASSIST IN OAU INITIATIVES TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE WAR, BUT THERE IS LITTLE CHANCE THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION WILL CHANGE OR THAT PRIVATE ENDEAVORS ON BEHALF OF EITHER SIDE WILL BE PERMITTED. IT IS TRUE THE CONFLICT IS ON CAMEROON'S DOORSTEP BUT AHIDJO SEEMS DETERMINED TO KEEP IT THERE AND NOT PERMIT IT TO ENTER HIS COUNTRY TO COMPOUND HIS OWN INTERNAL PROBLEMS.

GP-3.  
PARKER

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INFO: OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, UCF 05, UPW 01, SR 01, DORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 01,  
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PI 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, RSR 01, 158 W  
015185

R 041031Z AUG 69  
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4330  
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
US MISSION USUN NEW YORK 138

CONFIDENTIAL ABIDJAN 2163

SUBJ: PUBLIC OPINION ON NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

REF: STATE 123842

1. IVORIAN ATTITUDES NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR REFLECT DICHOTOMY BETWEEN PRESIDENT'S INTENSE PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO BIAFRA AND ENDING OF WAR, AND LACK OF REAL INTEREST AMONG PUBLIC AND MOST OF ELITE. WERE IT NOT FOR HOUPHOUET IVORY COAST WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY FOLLOW PRO-FMG LINE OF MOST OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS. IVORIANS' PRE-WAR IMAGE OF NIGERIANS WAS MOULDED BY PRESENCE NIGERIAN TRADERS WHO OFTEN RESENTED AS EXPLOITIVE, BUT LITTLE DISTINCTION MADE BETWEEN TRIBES. BASIC HOSTILITY OF GENERALLY RATHER XENOPHOBIC IVORIANS WAS REFLECTED IN ANTI-NIGERIAN RIOTING IN SEVERAL IVORIAN TOWNS IN EARLY 1968. GOIC HAS SOUGHT DEVELOP PRO-BIAFRAN SYMPATHIES AMONG PUBLIC, BUT DESPITE HUMAN APPEAL OF BIAFRAN CASE AND INTENSE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGNS IN LOCAL MEDIA (ALL IN WHICH ARE GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED) NOT MUCH MORE THAN PASSIVE ACQUIESCENCE IN HOUPHOUET'S LINE HAS BEEN ACHIEVED AMONG PUBLIC OR ELITE. THE ONE VISIBLE CONCRETE RESULT HOUPHOUET'S POLICY, THREE SHELTERS FOR BIAFRAN CHILDREN, ARE GENERALLY RESENTED BY ORDINARY IVORIANS. NEVERTHELESS, DESPITE OCCASIONAL CRITICISM IN PRIVATE, NO ONE IS LIKELY CHALLENGE HOUPHOUET'S PREROGATIVE TO DETERMINE IVORY COAST POLICY THIS ISSUE.

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2. SPECIFICALLY,

A) OFFICIAL LINE IS THAT BIAFRA HAS EARNED SOVEREIGNTY WITH ITS BLOOD, AND THAT ANY SETTLEMENT UNION WITH NIGERIA MUST BE NEGOTIATED ON BASIS SOVEREIGN EQUALITY, THOUGH PRIVATELY THERE SEEMS GREATER RECOGNITION THAT CONFEDERAL STATUS BEST BIAFRA COULD HOPE FOR. BRITISH AND SOVIETS, AND SOMETIMES GREAT POWERS IN GENERAL ARE REGULARLY LAMBASTED FOR AID TO FMG AND/OR FAILURE "DO SOMETHING". OAU MAJORITY ALSO CRITICIZED FOR PLACING EXPEDIENCY ABOVE HUMANITY. USG HAS COME OFF VERY EASILY, WITH NO SPECIFIC CRITICISM AND GOOD PLAY GIVEN

OUR RELIEF EFFORTS: PROBABLY TRUE, HOWEVER, THAT AS IN OTHER PROBLEM AREAS PEOPLE THINK WE COULD DO MORE IF WE WANTED TO. HOUPHOUET HAS NOT, HOWEVER, SHARED WITH PUBLIC HIS PRIVATE TENDENCY VIEW THE WAR AS PART OF COMMUNIST-MOLEM CONSPIRACY AGAINST AFRICA, PRESUMABLY BECAUSE HE DOES NOT WISH ALIENATE MOLEM AFRICAN COUNTRIES, AND IVORY COAST'S OWN MOLEM POPULATION. POLITICAL ISSUES ARE, HOWEVER, OVERSHADOWED BY HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF WAR. GOIC INVARILY JUSTIFIES ITS STAND ON IMPERATIVE NEED PREVENT EXTERMINATION OF IBOS, AND NEWS IS USUALLY SLANTED TO GIVE CREDENCE TO GENOCIDE CHARGES.

PUBLIC WOULD CERTAINLY ACCEPT ANY NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WITH RELIEF, THOUGH DISAPPEARANCE BIAFRAN ENTITY WOULD BE BIT OF SHOCK AFTER SO MUCH PROPAGANDA.

B) THOUGH MEDIA GIVE FAIRLY FULL COVERAGE RELIEF ACTIVITIES AND PROBLEMS THEY HAVE OFFERED LITTLE GUIDANCE AS TO FAULT FOR RELIEF HITCHES, PERHAPS

BECAUSE BIAFRAN STUBBORNNESS MAKES CLEARLY PRO-BIAFRAN LINE DIFFICULT TO SELL. INTEREST IN DETAILS OF RELIEF SEEMS RELATIVELY SMALL, AND LARGELY CONFINED TO FEELING THAT "SOMEBODY SHOULD DO SOMETHING". IF GOIC HAS DONE ANYTHING SIGNIFICANT OTHER THAN OPENING REFUGEE SHELTERS HERE, IT IS NOT ADVERTISING FACT. NO FUNDRAISING CAMPAIGNS HAVE TAKEN PLACE (RESIDENT IBOS, OF COURSE, COLLECT MONEY AMONG THEMSELVES), AND ONLY LOCAL CONTRIBUTIONS ANNOUNCED AT ALL HAVE BEEN A FEW INSTITUTIONAL GIFTS TO REFUGEE SHELTERS. RELIEF SHELTERS OPENED IN THREE CITIES FOR BIAFRAN CHILDREN HAVE CAUSED CONSIDERABLE RESENT-

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MENT AMONG SURROUNDING POPULATIONS, PARTLY BECAUSE OF BIAFRAN ALOOFNESS, BUT MOSTLY BECAUSE BIAFRAN CHILDREN RECEIVING WHAT LOCALS CONSIDER EXCESSIVELY LAVISH CARE AT EXPENSE IVORIAN CHILDREN. THOUGH IN FACT PERSONNEL AND MUCH OF FINANCING COMES FROM OUTSIDE SOURCES, RESENTMENT AT SHELTERS HAS BEEN SUFFICIENT TO INDUCE GOIC REDUCE PUBLIC MENTION OF THEM TO MINIMUM.

C) INTEREST IN WAR AND RELIEF ACTIVITIES CURRENTLY DISPLAYED BY MEDIA IS RELATIVELY SMALL AS COMPARED WITH EARLIER PERIODS SUCH AS THAT WHEN HOUPHOUET OBTAINED RELEASE ITALIAN TECHNICIANS, AND LARGELY CONFINED WIRE-SERVICES REPORTS BASED BIAFRAN COMMUNIQUES. NIGERIA RARELY COMES UP IN CONVERSATIONS WITH IVORIANS. NOW THAT HOUPHOUET BACK IN COUNTRY, HE MAY INDUCE INCREASED PUBLIC ATTENTION TO BIAFRA (HE RARELY SPEAKS WITHOUT MENTIONING IT), BUT FOR MOMENT PUBLIC ATTENTION IS AT LOW LEVEL.

GP-3  
MORGAN

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POL 27 Biafra-Nigeria  
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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40  
ACTION SS 70

INFO OCT 01, CIAE 00, 1071 W

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R 021010Z AUG 69  
FM AMEMBASSY LISBON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3592

CONFIDENTIAL LISBON 1511

LIMDIS

SUBJ: PUBLIC OPINION ON NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

REF: STATE 123842 / POL 27 Biafra-Nigeria

JOINT EMBASSY/USIS MESSAGE

✓ POL 27-9 Biafra-

1. UNLIKE MOST OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, PUBLIC OPINION AT PRESENT DOES NOT EXIST IN PORTUGAL AS A DIRECT FORCE FOR INFLUENCING COURSE OF GOVERNMENT POLICY. IN TRADITIONAL GOPI PHILOSOPHY TOWARD PUBLIC OPINION, INCORPORATED IN CONSTITUTION, IT IS ASSUMED THAT GOVERNMENT POLICY EXPRESSES WILL OF PEOPLE AND PURSUES NATIONAL OBJECTIVES. NON-GOVERNMENT OPINIONS, ESPECIALLY THOSE EXPRESSED IN MEDIA OR BY PORTUGUESE TO FOREIGN MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES, ARE THEREFORE JUDGED ON WHETHER THEY HELP OR HINDER NATIONAL OBJECTIVES. EVEN THOUGH GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS INTERPRET NATIONAL WILL, JUSTIFICATION FOR CENSORSHIP AND CONTROL OVER FORMATION PUBLIC OPINION CONSENSUSES HAS ITS ROOTS IN THIS PHILOSOPHY. IN RECENT MONTHS THERE HAS BEEN SOME RELAXATION OF APPLICATION OF THIS NORM UNDER CAETANO ADMINISTRATION, BUT ISSUE LIKE GOPI POLICY RE: NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR, WHERE PORTUGUESE ACTIONS ARE SUBJECT INTERNATIONAL SCRUTINY AND GOPI HAS STRONG SYMPATHIES FOR ONE SIDE, I.E. FOR BIAFRA (THOUGH NOT FORMALLY STATED), MAKE CONSIDERATION EVOLUTION PUBLIC OPINION LARGELY CONSIDERATION EVOLUTION GOPI POSITION.

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2. WITH ABOVE CAVEAT IN MIND, ANSWERS TO  
SPECIFIC QUESTIONS KEYED TO REFTEL AS FOLLOWS:

(A) PORTUGUESE FEEL THAT NIGERIAN WAR EXAMPLE OF  
PITFALL OF PREMATURE INDEPENDENCE FOR AFRICAN STATES.  
THAT WAR BROKE OUT IN "SHOWCASE" NATION ONLY SERVES  
TO PROVE CASE MORE STRONGLY FOR LESS PREPARED STATES.  
IN ADDITION PORTUGUESE SYMPATHIES ARE WITH CHRISTIAN  
IBOS. BOTH POINTS SELFSERVING TO PORTUGUESE, HELPING  
TO JUSTIFY THEIR HOLDING ON TO TERRITORIES IN AFRICA  
AND VINDICATING THEIR "CIVILIZING MISSION", WHICH  
INVOLVES CONVERSION TO CHRISTIANITY. PORTUGUESE HAVE  
BACKED UP THEIR BELIEFS WITH ACTIONS, SUCH AS PERMITTING  
ESTABLISHMENT IMPORTANT "BIAFRAN" MISSION IN LISBON  
AND PERMITTING USE OF PORTUGUESE TERRITORY AND FACILITIES  
FOR ARMS AND RELIEF SHIPMENTS. AS FOR ULTIMATE  
OUTCOME OF WAR, PORTUGUESE BELIEVE IBOS HAVE EARNED  
RIGHT TO BE INDEPENDENT - AND ALSO BELIEVE PORTUGAL'S  
LONG RANGE INTERESTS IN AFRICA ARE SERVED BY EXISTENCE  
THERE OF LARGE NUMBER OF SMALL STATES RATHER THAN  
FEW LARGER UNITS.

(B) RELIEF SHIPMENTS FOR BIAFRA HAVE NOT BECOME  
AN ISSUE. THERE IS OVERWHELMING SUPPORT FOR THEM AS  
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT IS CONSISTENTLY  
DEPICTED AS BEING AT FAULT IN OBSTRUCTING  
RELIEF SHIPMENTS. RELIEF CAMPAIGNS HAVE NOT BEEN  
INSTITUTED IN PORTUGAL SINCE PORTUGUESE FEEL THEIR  
ROLE IS IN MAKING TERRITORIES AND FACILITIES AVAILABLE  
FOR ALL. (GOP HAS ANNOUNCED SAME FACILITIES AVAILABLE  
TO NIGERIANS, WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING NIGERIANS NOT USING  
THEM.) PUBLIC OPINION HAS NOT REALLY BEEN ALLOWED TO  
FOCUS ON ISSUES OF RELIEF, HOWEVER, SINCE THIS  
WOULD TOUCH ON ISSUE WHICH BECAME SENSITIVE TO GOP  
OVER PAST YEAR, WHICH IS RELIEF VERSUS ARMS SHIPMENTS.

(C) LOCAL MEDIA AND PRINCIPAL CONTACTS DEMONSTRATE  
HIGHER THAN AVERAGE INTEREST IN NIGERIAN WAR. INTEREST  
IN WAR AND RELIEF ACTIVITIES CONSISTENTLY REFLECTS  
BIAS IN FAVOR BIAFRAN SIDE.

KNIGHT

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## L I M D I S

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I N C O M I N G

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NEA *8*

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H *1*  
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IO *4* *4*  
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OC *1*  
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WLG *1*  
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WHRE *1*  
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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

Department of State

TELEGRAM

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8-2-69

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51  
ACTION SS: 70

INFO OCT 01, CIAE 00, 071 W

008201

R 021222Z AUG 69  
FM AMEMBASSY FORT LAMY  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3151

CONFIDENTIAL FORT LAMY 1387

LIMDIS

JOINT STATE-USIS MESSAGE

SUBJECT: PUBLIC OPINION ON NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

REF: STATZ 123842

1. CHAD MEDIA HAS COVERED CIVIL WAR FULLY BUT BASED ENTIRELY ON WIRE SERVICES. OCCASIONALLY SOME ARTICLES SEEM BEAR SOME SLIGHT PRO-BIAFRA BIAS BUT WE BELIEVE THIS DUE FACT CHAD PRESS AGENCY DEPENDS HEAVILY ON AFP.

2. ALTHOUGH IT DIFFICULT SPEAK OF PUBLIC OPINION HERE, THOSE FEW CHADIANS WHO HAVE SPOKEN ABOUT CIVIL WAR WITH MISSION OFFICERS INEVITABLY SUPPORT GOC POSITION THAT NIGERIA MUST REMAIN UNITED. THERE IS SOME SYMPATHY FOR HUMAN SUFFERING BUT SECESSION ISSUE OVERRIDING. SO FAR RELIEF ISSUE APPARENTLY NOT IMPORTANT HERE.

WALKER

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L I M D I S

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Principals and "S" Area

ES 1  
S 1  
U 1  
J 1  
D 1  
C 1  
USC 1

S/CPR 1  
S/FW 1  
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S/IL 1  
S/P 1  
S/PM 1  
S/R 1  
U/CF 1  
U/PW 1  
J/PM 1  
J/WP 1  
S/PRS 1  
U/UGS 1

Geographic

AF 5 *X 5*  
ARA 9  
EA 11  
EUR 10 *10*  
NEA 8

Functional

CU 1  
E 2  
H 1  
INR 6 *6*  
IO 4 *4*  
L 2  
O 3  
OPR 1  
OC 1  
SY 1  
WLG 1  
P 1  
SCA 1  
VO 1  
SCS 1  
SCI 1

Other

WH 10 *10*  
VP 1  
DOD 1  
CIA 1  
USA 4 *4*  
PG 1

Other

ACDA 5  
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AA/EA 3  
AA/NESA 2

TRSY 6  
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COM 2  
STR 1  
TAR 1  
WHRE 1  
AGR 3  
LAB 1  
HEW 1  
INT 1

TRANS 1  
CAB 1

AEC 3  
NASA 1

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

Department of State

TELEGRAM

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RE 021211Z AUG 69  
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8146  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN  
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM  
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE  
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
USMISSION USUN NY  
AMCONSUL IBADAN UNN  
AMCONSUL KADUNA UNN

CONFIDENTIAL LAGOS 6965

REFS LAGOS 6772 POL 27 Biafra Nigeria

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE DISCUSSION OF NIGERIA AT UPCOMING UN  
GÉNÉRAL ASSEMBLY

IN COURSE DISCUSSION OTHER TOPICS, HEAD OF AFRICAN DIVISION,  
MINEXTAFF, CONFIRMED THAT FMG IS ACTIVELY LOBBYING IN OAU  
CONCOM CAPITALS IN ORDER TO HEAD OFF ANY GA CONSIDERATION OF  
NIGERIA. FMG TAKING SERIOUSLY POSSIBILITY IVORY COAST WILL  
RAISE ISSUE AND IS WORKING TO KEEP ISSUE WITHIN AMBIT OF  
OAU AS REGIONAL UN ORGANIZATION.  
OLSON

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POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

XR POL 27-14 BIAFRA - NIGERIA

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Kaduna  
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ACTION AF 18

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, AID 28, SR 01, ORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 01, IO 13, CIAE 00,  
DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02,  
SS 20, USIA 12, UCF 05, UPW 01, RSR 01, 158 W

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R 020950Z AUG 69  
FM AMCONSUL KADUNA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1244  
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
AMCONSUL IBADAN

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AUGUST 2 NEW NIGERIAN CITING  
RECENT INSTANCES OF "REBEL ATTACKS AND HARRASSMENT"  
AS WELL AS REPORTED ACQUISITION OF FIVE AIRCRAFT "CAPABLE"  
CARRYING OUT ATTACKS AGAINST FEDERAL POSITIONS",  
COUNSELS NEED FOR CONSTANT VIGILANCE WHILE CHARGING  
PEACE NEGOTIATIONS IN KAMPALA ARE "DECAY... TO  
DIVERT ATTENTION FROM WAR." TALK OF TRUCE DURING PAPAL VISIT  
IN AFRICA WAS "DIABOLICAL TRICK". KAMPALA OFFERS NO HOPE FOR PEACE  
AS "REBELS WILL NEVER COME TO SENSES UNTIL LAST TOWN  
AND AIRFIELD HAVE BEEN TAKEN".

COMMENT: PEACE INITIATIVES DURING PAPAL  
VISIT IN KAMPALA HAVE ELICITED STRONG NEGATIVE RESPONSE  
IN NORTHERN STATES WHERE CRITICISM LEVELED AGAINST INJECTION  
RELIGIOUS LEADERS INTO CIVIL WAR CREATING IMPRESSION THAT THIS  
IS RELIGIOUS STRIFE. DURING JULY 31 CONVERSATION WITH KANO  
STATE GOVERNOR AUDU BAKO, HE CRITIZED PAPAL INITIATIVES IN  
INTEMPERATE TERMS WHILE CHARGING THAT POPE PAUL'S ACTION  
MERELY SERVED TO EXACERBATE SITUATION.

HUTCHINSON

(2)

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA  
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UNCLASSIFIED 498

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ACTION AF 18

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NSAE 00, NSCI 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, AID 28, SCSE 00,  
SCA 01, SR 01, ORM 03, UCF 05, UPW 01, RSR 01, /154 W  
000883

R 011500Z AUG 69  
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4323  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

UNCLAS ABIDJAN 2143

SUBJ: COMMENTARY ON NIGERIAN WAR

FOREIGN PAGE SEMI-OFFICIAL FRATERNITE-MATIN AUGUST 1 FEATURES  
ARTICLE ON BIAFRA QUOTING FROM LONDON TIMES APPEAL FOR ANGLO-  
FRENCH NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT PRESSURING BOTH SIDES NIGERIAN  
WAR MAKE PEACE, AND STATEMENT BY SWEDISH RED CROSS OFFICIAL  
GERARD EWALD THAT UNLESS IMMEDIATE ACTION TAKEN REOPEN RELIEF  
CHANNELS PREVIOUS EFFORTS SAVE BIAFRAN CHILDREN WILL HAVE BEEN  
IN VAIN.  
MORGAN

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POL 27 Biafra-Nigeria  
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 HELSIN 00786 011758Z

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ACTION SS 70

INFO OCT 01, CIAE 00, 071 W

001580

RI 011530Z AUG 69  
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1775  
INFO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN  
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AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY OSLO  
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

786  
8-1-69

Helsinki

CONFIDENTIAL HELSINKI 786

LIMDIS

JOINT STATE/USIA MESSAGE

SUBJECT: PUBLIC OPINION ON NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

1. FINNISH PUBLIC OPINION DURING PAST YEAR HAS REMAINED ALOOF FROM POLITICAL ISSUES OF NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR, IN CONSONANCE FINNISH POLICY OF NEUTRALITY. PUBLIC ATTITUDE SUPPORTS PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT THROUGH NEGOTIATION, BUT HAS AVOIDED INVOLVEMENT AND HAS TAKEN COOL ATTITUDE TOWARD NORDIC EXPLORATIONS OF POSSIBLE MEDIATION BY FINLAND OR OTHER NORDIC COUNTRIES. SOME SECTORS BELIEVE GREAT POWERS COULD EFFECT SETTLEMENT BUT HAVE INSTEAD EXACERBATED SITUATION BY CHOOSING SIDES.

2. OFFICIAL AND PUBLIC SUPPORT HAS FOCUSED ON HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS, SPECIFICALLY ON AID TO WAR VICTIMS. MEDIA INTEREST PEAKED LAST FALL WHEN FINNISH BROADCASTING COMPANY AND MAJOR NEWSPAPERS SENT REPRESENTATIVES TO REPORT ON RELIEF ACTIVITIES. BY AUGUST 1968 FINNISH AID IN MONEY, TRANSPORT, GOODS AND MEDICINES HAD REACHED ONE MILLION FINNMARKS (FMK. 4.20 TO US \$1.00, PAR VALUE) WHICH WAS CHANNELLED THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS. (SEE EMBASSY'S A-590 OF AUGUST 17, 1968). AT PRESENT, TOTAL HAS REACHED 1,630,000 FINNMARKS, OF WHICH 450,000 CAME FROM FINNISH GOVERNMENT, 245,000 FROM THE FINNISH LUTHERAN CHURCH, AND 935,000 COLLECTED FROM FINNISH PUBLIC.

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

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TOTALS ON OTHER AID, SUCH AS CHURCH FUNDS NOT DONATED THROUGH RED CROSS, SOME MINOR CONTRIBUTIONS OF STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS, AND PARTS OF FINNISH CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNICEF, ARE NOT AVAILABLE. STUDENT ORGANIZATION TOOK KEEN INTEREST IN RELIEF EFFORTS, AND PARTICIPATION OF FINNISH PILOTS ON RELIEF FLIGHTS, AND THEIR FIRST-HAND ACCOUNTS ON RETURN STIMULATED INTEREST GENERALLY.

3. SOME DISENCHANTMENT SET IN DURING SPRING WHEN FINNISH MEDIA CHARGED INEFFICIENCY AND INEFFECTIVENESS OF RED CROSS IN DISTRIBUTION OF AID, AND WHEN INCIDENT OCCURRED IN BIAFRA INVOLVING 18 FOREIGN OIL WORKERS. DURING LAST SIX MONTHS MEDIA HAVE TREATED SUBJECT SPORADICALLY WHEN NEWSWORTHY DEVELOPMENTS OCCURRED. LAST COVERAGE CONCERNED A BIAFRA RALLY, ORGANIZED BY FINNISH-BIAFRA COMMITTEE (WHICH INCLUDES REPRESENTATIVES OF GOVERNMENT AND RED CROSS AS WELL AS STUDENTS) AT WHICH LOCAL ARTISTS PERFORMED FREE OF CHARGE TO HELP RAISE FUNDS.

GP-3  
PETERSON

CONFIDENTIAL

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## L I M D I S

TOP SECRET

I N C O M I N G

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
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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

Department of State

GRAM

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ACTION SS: 70

INFO OCT 01, CIAE! 00, 1071 W

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R 011045Z AUG 69  
FM AMEMBASSY ACCRA  
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COINFI D E NIT I A L ACCRA 2416

LIMDIS

JOINT EMBASSY/USIS MESSAGE

SUBJECT: PUBLIC OPINION ON NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

REF# STATE 123842 - m

Accra 2416  
8-1-69

1. FOLLOWING ARE OUR COMMENTS KEYED TO PARAS REFTEL:

A. PARA 2A: NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR IS NOT BURNING PUBLIC ISSUE GHANA

OR A DOMINANT THEME IN DISCUSSIONS WITH EMBASSY/USIS CONTACTS. GHANAIANS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT CONFLICT AND THERE IS CONTINUING GENERAL INTEREST IN NIGERIAN DEVELOPMENTS. HOWEVER THERE IS LITTLE EDITORIAL OR PUBLIC DEBATE OVER PARTICULAR ISSUES INVOLVED OR OVER DETAILS OF ULTIMATE SETTLEMENT. GHANAIANS PROFESS UNDERSTANDING FMG POSITION RE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY BUT SEE CIVIL WAR BASICALLY AS TRIBAL CONFLICT WITH IBO FIGHTING LOSING BATTLE FOR THEIR SURVIVAL.

B. GHANAIANS GENERALLY ACCEPT CURRENT GOG PUBLIC POLICY IN FORMAL SUPPORT OF FMG AND DO NOT ENVISION ACTIVE GHANAIAN ROLE BEYOND MEDIATORY EFFORTS (GHANA IS MEMBER CONCOM). SIZEABLE SEGMENT OF GHANAIAN PUBLIC DOES HAVE SUBSTANTIAL SYMPATHY FOR IBO PLIGHT. IN ARMED FORCES, PROFESSIONAL GROUPS, THE UNIVERSITIES, CIVIL SERVICE, PRESS AND CHURCHES, THERE ARE MARKED PRO-BIAFRAN SENTIMENTS BASED ON ACCEPTANCE OF IBO CLAIMS RE GENOCIDE THREAT. IBO'S ALSO GENERALLY BETTER

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By MM NARA Date 10/5/03



# Department of State

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REGARDED BY GHANAIANS WHO TEND TO FOCUS THEIR ANTI-NIGERIAN RESENTMENTS ON LARGE HAUSA AND YORUBA COMMUNITIES IN GHANA WHICH ARE MUCH MORE VISIBLE AND COMPETE ECONOMICALLY IN SMALL-SCALE TRADES (THERE ARE OVER ONE MILLION NIGERIANS ESTIMATED TO BE IN GHANA).

C. HOWEVER PRO-BIAFRA ATTITUDES ARE PASSIVE AND TINGED WITH DEEP PESSIMISM ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR ANY EARLY END TO CIVIL WAR. THERE IS WIDELY HELD VIEW THAT NEITHER SIDE IN CIVIL WAR WILL MAKE SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS AND THAT BIAFRANS WILL FIGHT TO THE END EVEN IN THE FACE OF OVERWHELMING ODDS. HOWEVER IF THERE ANY CHANGE IN ATTITUDE OVER PAST YEAR, SHIFT HAS BEEN AWAY FROM PRO-BIAFRAN TO MORE INDIFFERENT ATTITUDE. THERE ALSO LESS INTEREST NOW THAN WHEN GOG PUBLICLY ACTIVE IN MEDIATION EFFORTS.

D. PARA 2B: RELIEF OPERATIONS AND ATTENDANT ISSUES HAVE GENERATED SURPRISINGLY LITTLE INTEREST HERE. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING IMPORTANCE OF PREVENTING MASS STARVATION, GHANAIANS IN GOVT AND OUTSIDE TEND TO VIEW RELIEF OPERATIONS AS PERIPHERAL EXERCISE WHICH DOES NOT AFFECT UNHAPPY COURSE OF EVENTS IN NIGERIA. THEY VIEW CONTROVERSY OVER MODUS OPERANDI FOR RELIEF OPERATIONS AS MANIFESTATION OF DEPTH OF THE ANTAGONISM AND SUSPICION WHICH SEPARATES FMG AND BIAFRAN LEADERS AND NOT A MATTER ON WHICH TO MAKE JUDGEMENT RE: CORRECTNESS OF POSITION HELD BY EITHER SIDE.

E. THERE HAVE BEEN NO MAJOR PUBLIC RELIEF FUND DRIVES FOR EITHER SIDE (BUT IBOS IN GHANA REGULARLY CONTRIBUTE SUBSTANTIAL SUMS IN SUPPORT BIAFRAN REGIME. SEE ACCRA 5635, NOV 27). THE BIAFRA PEACE ASSOCIATION WAS ESTABLISHED SEVERAL MONTHS AGO BY GHANAIAN LAWYER AND REGIONAL POLITICIAN I.L. OHEN-DJAN. ORGANIZATION HAS APPARENTLY DONE LITTLE OUTSIDE PLACING FEW ADS AND DISTRIBUTING MEMBERSHIP APPLICATIONS.

F. PARA 3: NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR IS PROBABLY MAJOR CONTINUING INTERNATIONAL NEWS STORY IN GHANAIAN PRESS BUT WAR DOES NOT ATTRACT DISPROPORTIONATE COVERAGE. MOST OF DAILY COVERAGE IS FACTUAL REPORTING WITH ONLY OCCASIONAL COMMENTARIES OR EDITORIALS. ONE EXCEPTION IS TAKORADI WEEKLY "THE HERALD" WHICH ON OCCASION CARRIES OBVIOUSLY SLANTED, PRO-BIAFRAN

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Authority NID 959503  
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PAGE 03 ACCRA 02416 011525Z

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
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## L I M D I S

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## DISTRIBUTION

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## Secretariat

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 767

PAGE 01 FREETO 00932 060321Z

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ACTION SS: 70

INFO OCT 01, CIAE 00, 071 W

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FM AMEMBASSY FREETOWN  
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CO R R E C T E D C O P Y

LIMDIS

JOINT EMBASSY/USIS MESSAGE

SUBJ: PUBLIC OPINION ON NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

1. NIGERIAN WAR IS OF CONSIDERABLE INTEREST AMONG EDUCATED SIERRA LEONEANS. WAR AND RELIEF EFFORTS RECEIVE BROAD PRESS AND RADIO COVERAGE. GOVT OWNED DAILY MAULI HAS CARRIED WIRE SERVICE ARTICLES ON WAR AND RELIEF BUT HAS THUS FAR REFRAINED FROM EDITORIAL OPINION RE: POLITICAL ISSUES AND FORM FINAL SETTLEMENT SHOULD TAKE. UNITY, AN INDEPENDENT DAILY, HAS DISPLAYED STRONG PRO-BIAFRAN LEANINGS, REFLECTING SYMPATHIES OF EDITOR SAM METZGER FOR BIAFRAN CAUSE BUT HAS STOPPED SHORT OF SUGGESTING SLI RECOGNIZE BIAFRA. UNITY RECENTLY PUBLISHED ENTIRE SPEECH OF SENATOR EUGENE McCARTHY ON NIGERIAN/BIAFRAN SITUATION.

2. BIAFRANS IN SLI HIGHLY VISIBLE. THERE ARE MANY BIAFRAN STUDENTS AND SOME FACULTY AT FOURAH BAY COLLEGE AND A "BIAFRAN FOR SIAKA" GROUP ALWAYS ON HAND TO GREET PM ON OFFICIAL OCCASIONS. JUST THIS DATE GROUP OF 30-40 WOMEN AND CHILDREN CARRYING "SAVE BIAFRAN CHILDREN" SIGNS PARADED THROUGH FREETOWN PAST SOVIET AND U.S. EMBASSIES SINGING "WE SHALL OVERCOME."

3. THERE IS UNQUESTIONABLY STRONG BIAFRAN SYMPATHY AMONG

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By MM NARA Date 05/05

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

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INFORMED SL PUBLIC. GOVT'S OFFICIAL POSITION HAS BEEN TO SUPPORT OAU RESOLUTIONS AND NIGERIAN UNITY. HOWEVER, MANY PARLIAMENTARIANS AND CABINET MEMBERS KNOWN TO BE HIGHLY SYMPATHETIC TO BIAFRAN PLIGHT. REASONS FOR SUPPORT BIAFRA RUN ENTIRE GAMUT OF RATIONALE FREQUENTLY HEARD IN NIGERIAN/BIAFRAN DEBATE BUT, AND LARGE, ISSUES OF WHO IS AT FAULT AND WHAT SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE ARE SECONDARY TO CONCERN OVER CONTINUED BLOOD SHED. DESPITE SIERRA LEONE'S OWN TRIBAL DIVISIONS, THERE IS NOT A STRONG FEELING IN SL THAT PARTITIONING OF NIGERIA WOULD BE AN UNFORTUNATE PRECEDENT THAT WOULD SET OFF A DOMINO-LIKE EFFECT IN OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES. RELIEF EFFORTS ARE WELCOMED BY VAST MAJORITY.


4. ISSUE OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST THAT PARLIAMENT HAS INCLUDED DISCUSSION NIGERIAN/BIAFRAN SITUATION ON ITS AGENDA. DISCUSSIONS HAS NOT YET TAKEN PLACE.

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
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
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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 LUSAKA 02067 011617Z

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INFO: OCT 01, CIAE: 00, /071 W

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FM AMEMBASSY LUSAKA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4129

CONFIDENTIAL LUSAKA 2067

SUBJ: PUBLIC OPINION ON NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

REF: STATE 123842 - POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

XL POL 27-9 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

LIMDIS

JOINT EMBASSY/USIS MESSAGE

1. PUBLIC OPINION HAS CONTINUED SYMPATHETIC TO BIAFRA OVER LAST YEAR, WITH NO NOTICEABLE CHANGE. FOLLOWING LEAD OF GRZ ON ISSUE, ALL MEDIA TEND TO SELECT PRO-BIAFRAN MATERIALS FROM WIRE SERVICES. OCCASIONAL FEATURES ARE LIKELY TO HIGHLIGHT NIGERIAN BOMBINGS.

2. A. ESSENTIALLY, ZAMBIA'S FAVOR SETTLEMENT ON ANY TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO BIAFRA. MOST ZAMBIA'S WOULD PROBABLY FIND REASONABLE A SOLUTION PROVIDING FOR AUTONOMY WITHIN SOME SORT OF CONFEDERATION.

B. ZAMBIA'S ATTITUDES STRONGLY INFLUENCED BY REPORTS OF IBO MASSACRES IN NORTHERN NIGERIA. THEY GENERALLY ACCEPT BIAFRAN FEAR OF GENOCIDE AS VALID AND THUS ARE SYMPATHETIC TO ARGUMENT THAT BIAFRANS MUST RETAIN CONTROL OF THEIR PHYSICAL SECURITY.

2. ZAMBIA'S ARE DISTURBED BY DISRUPTION OF RELIEF FLIGHTS AND GLOBALLY BLAME NIGERIA. THEY RARELY INFORMED OR VERY INTERESTED IN DETAILS OF RELIEF QUESTION - PASSAGE THROUGH NIGERIAN-HELD TERRITORY, NIGHT AND DAY FLIGHTS, ETC. FEELING SIMPLY ONE OF DISTRESS AT SUFFERING BIAFRANS. LOCAL RELIEF EFFORTS ARE SPORADIC BUT WIDELY SUPPORTED.

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By MN NARA Date 01/20/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 LUSAKA 02067 011617Z

FUNDS RAISED FOR RED CROSS. SERIES OF CHARITY DANCES ON SECOND ANNIVERSARY BIAFRAN INDEPENDENCE WAS WELL ATTENDED. CONSIDERABLE PUBLICITY GIVEN TO PROPOSAL THAT ZAMBIAN FAMILIES ADOPT BIAFRAN WAR ORPHANS. WHILE THIS DROPPED AS IMPRACTICAL, REACTION REFLECTED GENUINE, WIDESPREAD ZAMBIAN SYMPATHY FOR BIAFRAN PEOPLE.

3. INTEREST HAS FALLEN OFF SOMEWHAT AS STORY GROWS OLDER, BUT PRO-BIAFRAN SLANT REMAINS UNMISTAKABLE. NEITHER OFFICIALS OF GRZ NOR REPRESENTATIVES MEDIA HERE INITIATE DISCUSSIONS NIGERIAN WAR VERY OFTEN IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH US, BUT THEY APPARENTLY ARE MORE INCLINED TO DO SO WITH SOVIETS AND BRITISH. IN PUBLIC FORUMS SUBJECT COMES UP FREQUENTLY. IN TV INTERVIEW JULY 23 I WAS ASKED STATE US POSITION ON NIGERIAN WAR. ZAMBIA CONGRESS OF TRADE UNIONS RAISED QUESTION WITH RUSSIAN DELEGATION NOW IN LUSAKA, AND DISAGREEMENT ON ISSUE MADE FRONT PAGE OF TODAY'S TIMES OF ZAMBIA. NATIONAL UNION OF COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL WORKERS CONDEMNED STAND SOVIET UNION AT ANNUAL CONFERENCE NDOLA LAST WEEKEND. REGARDLESS OF HOW SUBJECT COMES UP, ZAMBIANS PROMPTLY AND SOLIDLY TAKE A PRO-BIAFRAN LINE. MOST, WE FEEL, WOULD DENY THAT THERE ANY LESSENING IN THEIR CONCERN WITH PASSAGE OF TIME.

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## L I M D I S

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 By *MWN* NARA Date *05/05*



POL 27 Biafra - Nigeria  
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

XR POL 27-9 Biafra -  
Nigeria

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ACTION SS 70

INFO OCT 01, CIAE 00, 1071 W

R 011225Z AUG 69

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1350

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CONFIDENTIAL DUBLIN 516  
LIMDIS

SUBJECT: IRISH PUBLIC OPINION AND NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

REFERENCE STATE 123842: POL 27 Biafra - Nigeria

on POL 27-9 Biafra -  
Nigeria

1. NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR HAS CAPTURED AND HELD ATTENTION OF IRISH PUBLIC OPINION AS HAS NO OTHER INTERNATIONAL DISTURBANCE IN RECENT YEARS. WAR HAS PROVOKED DEEP EMOTIONAL RESPONSE AMONG IRISH PEOPLE BECAUSE OF LARGE NUMBER OF IRISH ROMAN CATHOLIC PRIESTS AND MISSIONARIES WHO HAVE LONG BEEN ACTIVE IN NIGERIA, ESPECIALLY IN SECESSIONIST AREA. IRISH INTEREST IN NIGERIA REFLECTED BY FACT IRELAND MAINTAINS ITS ONLY AFRICAN EMBASSY IN LAGOS. NIGERIA RECIPROCATES WITH COMPARATIVELY LARGE EMBASSY IN DUBLIN.

2. MAJORITY OF IRISH PEOPLE FAVOR BIAFRA OVER FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, REFLECTING TRADITIONAL IRISH BIAS IN FAVOR OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND DEEP SYMPATHY FOR BIAFRANS. GOI HAS BEEN UNDER HEAVY DOMESTIC PRESSURE TO TAKE STAND FAVORING AT LEAST AUTONOMY FOR BIAFRA. ATTITUDE OF GOI TOWARD CONFLICT IS STRONGLY INFLUENCED, HOWEVER, BY GOI DESIRE TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WHOSE EVENTUAL VICTORY OVER BIAFRA GOI BELIEVES INEVITABLE. AT SAME TIME GOI HAS DESIRED TO DEMONSTRATE ITS SYMPATHY FOR PLIGHT OF BIAFRANS BY DOING ITS UTMOST TO FACILITATE RELIEF SHIPMENTS TO BIAFRA. GOI HAS ADOPTED OFFICIAL POLICY OF STRICT NEUTRALITY AND IMPARTIALITY VIS-A-VIS INTERNAL CIVIL WAR WHILE BEING ACTIVE IN BEHIND-THE-SCENES EFFORTS TO MITIGATE SUFFERING AND END STRUGGLE.

3. CHIEF RELIEF ISSUE IS SUFFERING CAUSED BY WAR TO

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CIVILIAN POPULATION OF NIGERIA, PARTICULARLY IN BIAFRA AND  
ESPECIALLY TO CHILDREN. WAR'S SUFFERING LARGELY BLAMED  
ON RUTHLESS FEDERAL EFFORTS END CONFLICT. IRISH ALSO  
CONCERNED OVER REPORTS OF ATROCITIES ON BOTH SIDES, BUT  
ESPECIALLY AGAINST BIAFRANS. LESSER BUT IMPORTANT ISSUE  
IS SAFETY OF IRISH MISSIONARIES IN AREA

4. TOTAL IRISH PLEDGES FOR RELIEF/ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL  
WAR VICTIMS NOW PROBABLY APPROACHING \$2 MILLION. THIS  
REPRESENTS ONE OF LARGEST PUBLIC APPEALS EVER MADE IN  
IRELAND. NUMBER OF AGENCIES, BOTH LAY AND CLERICAL, HAVE  
PARTICIPATED IN RELIEF CAMPAIGN (DUBLIN 174 OF MARCH 25).  
GREAT MAJORITY OF IRISH RELIEF ASSISTANCE HAS GONE TO  
BIAFRA. RELIEF CAMPAIGNS CONTINUING UNABLDED

5. LOCAL MEDIA AND EMBASSY CONTACTS STILL DEMONSTRATING  
GREAT INTEREST IN WAR AND RELIEF ACTIVITIES, ALTHOUGH  
SOMWHAT LESS THAN A YEAR OR SO AGO.  
MORE

NOTE: HANDLED LIMDIS PER MISS JENKINS, S/S-O.

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L I M D I S

TOP SECRET

I N C O M I N G

Screener *Ken*POST DublinSERIAL 516

(Time Received)

169 AUG 1 PM 1 58

DISTRIBUTIONMONTHLY COUNT 29Secretariat

S/S-S 1  
 S/S-O 1  
 S/S-Screener 3  
 S/S-EX 1  
 S/S-CMS 1  
 S/S-O DIR  
     MilRep 1  
     Digest 1

Task Force 1Principals and  
"S" Area

ES 1  
 S 1  
 U 1  
 J 1  
 D 1  
 C 1  
     USC 1

S/CPR 1  
 S/FW 1  
 S/GOV 1  
 S/IL 1

S/P 1  
 S/PM 1  
 S/R 1

U/CF 1  
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 J/PM 1  
 J/WP 1

S/PRS 1  
 U/UCS 1

Geographic

AF 5 *X 5*  
 ARA 9  
 EA 11  
 EUR 10 10  
 NEA 8

Functional

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P 1  
 SCA 1  
     VO 1  
     SCS 1  
     SCI 1

Other

WH 10 10  
 VP 1  
 DOD 1  
 CIA 1  
 USIA 4 4  
 PC 1

Other

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 AID/EXSEC 3  
     AA/AFR 2  
     AA/VN 2  
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     AA/NESA 2

TRSY 6  
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 EXIM 1  
 BOB 1  
 CEA 1  
 COM 2  
 STR 1  
 TAR 1  
 WHRE 1

AGR 3  
 LAB 1  
 HEW 1  
 INT 1

TRANS 1  
 CAB 1

AEC 3  
 NASA 1

JUS 1  
 FBI 1  
 NIC 1  
 NSA 1  
 File 1

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Pr Pol 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria

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ACTION SS: 70

INFO OCT 01, CIAE 000/071 W

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R 010640Z AUG 69  
FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2660  
INFO USMISSION GENEVA UNN  
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI UNN  
AMEMBASSY LAGOS UNN  
AMEMBASSY OSLO UNN  
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK UNN  
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM UNN  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK UNN

CONFIDENTIAL COPENHAGEN 2927

LIMDIS

JOINT EMBASSY/USIA MSG

SUBJ: PUBLIC OPINION ON NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

REF: STATE 123842

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1. INTEREST IN NIGERIAN SITUATION, WHICH STILL CLEARLY PRO-BIAFRA, WITHOUT REGARD TO POSSIBLE SOLUTION, HAS FADED SOMEWHAT DURING PAST YEAR BUT IS FAR FROM DYING OUT. POLITICAL ISSUES OF WAR ARE NOT WIDELY DISCUSSED. IN GENERAL, BOTH PUBLIC AND MEDIA APPEAR TO SUPPORT DANISH GOVERNMENT POSITION NOT TO INTERVENE POLITICALLY OR MILITARILY IN HOPE THAT MATTER BE SETTLED BY AFRICANS THEMSELVES. BUT NORDIC COUNTRIES, ACCORDING DANISH FONOFF, APPEAR BE UNDER SOME PRESSURE CONSIDER JOINT INITIATIVE. FURTHERMORE, DESPITE PRO-BIAFRA LEANINGS OF PUBLIC WHICH MAY INDICATE VAGUE DESIRE SEE SEPARATE BIAFRA STATE, MOST (INCLUDING VARIOUS NORDIC GOVTs) UNABLE COME UP WITH FEASIBLE SOLUTION.

2. RE RELIEF ASSISTANCE, VIRTUALLY ALL DANISH INTEREST SINCE WAR BEGAN HAS BEEN DIRECTED TOWARD RELIEF AND DANISH PUBLIC CLEARLY SYNPATETIC TO NEED, PRIMARILY IN BIAFRA.

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
FOR ASSISTANCE, BIAFRA WAS CONVENIENT ISSUE FOR CRITICS OF GOVT ONE YEAR AGO BUT, AS FONOFF OFFICIAL TOLD EMBOFF THIS WEEK, CRITICS NO LONGER ASKING WHY GOVT NOT DOING ANYTHING, THEY ASKING WHY GOVT NOT DOING MORE. (ACCORDING FONOFF, GOVT HAS PROVIDED ABOUT TWO MILLION DOLLARS, SPLIT BETWEEN ICRC AND JOINT CHURCH AID; PUBLIC DONATIONS HAVE ALSO AMOUNTED TO ABOUT TWO MILLION DOLLARS, OF WHICH THE FIRST 1.3 MILLION DOLLARS WENT TO JCA AND THE REST AND FUTURE COLLECTION SPLIT BETWEEN ICRC AND JCA.) UNTIL RECENTLY, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN FUND-RAISING HAD BEEN ACTIVE BUT TV COMMENTATOR JUL 30 NOTED CONSIDERABLE DROP IN GENERAL INTEREST AND FUNDS COLLECTED.

3. AS FOR PLACING OF BLAME FOR SITUATION, MOST DANES EITHER DIRECTLY OR BY IMPLICATION CITE NIGERIAN GENOCIDE AGAINST IBOS, ALTHOUGH THERE SOME CURRENT FEELING THAT OJUKWU ATTEMPTING USE WAR FOR OWN AMBITIOUS PURPOSES AND THEREFORE NOT WILLING HELP SEEK REASONABLE SETTLEMENT.

4. MEDIA INTEREST, ALONG WITH THAT OF PUBLIC AS NOTED ABOVE, HAS DROPPED OFF CONSIDERABLY BUT PICKS UP WHEN NEWS ITEMS SUCH AS VON ROSEN'S ESCAPADES OR POPE'S TRIP TO KAMPALA APPEAR. BERLINGSKE TIDENDE EDITORIAL JUL 31 EXPRESSED HOPE THAT POPE MIGHT BE ABLE HELP END WAR WHILE IN AFRICA SINCE HE VIRTUALLY ONLY ONE NOT COMMITTED TO EITHER SIDE. GP-4.  
DUDLEY

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L I M D I S

TOP SECRET

I N C O M I N G

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SERIAL *2927*

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1969 AUG 1 AM 5 30

<u>DISTRIBUTION</u>		<u>MONTHLY COUNT</u> <u>8</u>
<u>Secretariat</u>		
S/S-S	1	AF 5 <i>X</i> 5
S/S-O		ARA 9
S/S-Screener	<i>0</i>	EA 11
S/S-EX		EUR 10
S/S-CMS		NEA 8
S/S-O DIR		
MilRep		
Digest		
Task Force		
<u>Principals and "S" Area</u>		
ES		CU
S		E 2
U		H
J		INR 6 <i>X</i> 6
D		IO 4 <i>X</i> 4
C		L 2
USC		O 3
S/CPR		OPR
S/FW		OC
S/GOV		SY
S/IL		WLG
S/P	<i>1</i>	P
S/PM		SCA
S/R		VO
U/CF	<i>1</i>	SCS
U/PW		SCI
J/PM		
J/WP		
S/PRS		<u>Other</u>
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		VP
		DOD
		CIA
		USIA 4 <i>X</i> 4
		PC
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<u>Functional</u>		
<u>Other</u>		
ACDA	5	TRSY 6
AID/EXSEC	3	FRB
AA/AFR	2	EXIM
AA/VN	2	BOB
AA/EA	3	CEA
AA/NESA	2	COM 2
FRB		STR
EXIM		TAR
BOB		WHRE
CEA		
COM	2	AGR 3
STR		LAB
TAR		HEW
WHRE		INT
		TRANS
		CAB
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NASA		
JUS		
FBI		
NIC		
NSA		
File		
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